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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the therapist's use of professional knowledge in their 
relationship with patients. It addresses a gap between theory and practice 
and the challenges to therapist expertise in a postmodern climate in which 
there are a multiplicity of competing perspectives about psychological 
problems. 
In semi-structured interviews eight NHS Psychodynamic Psychotherapists 
revealed narratives that underpinned their practice about the nature and 
treatment of psychological problems. These were organised as narratives 
about living the `good life' psychologically, and the origins and treatment 
of psychological problems. 
The central finding of this thesis is that, rather than relying on professional 
knowledge conceived as conventional psychodynamic theory, therapists 
engage in a largely intuitive process I have termed `clinical reasoning' 
which is practice-based, `reflection-in-action' that involves tacking 
principally between their professional knowledge base, their experience 
with the patient and their personal beliefs and experience. Such a process, 
I argue, constitutes a `hazardous journey' in a postmodern climate in 
which the value of a psychodynamic perspective cannot be taken for 
granted. 
A key implication is the value of therapists becoming more explicitly 
aware of their own particular narratives and the effect these have on the 
therapeutic encounter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I describe my exploration of the use of professional knowledge by NHS 
psychodynamic psychotherapists in their relationship with patients. I have addressed a 
gap that I perceived between theory and practice in psychotherapy where the 
professional knowledge of the therapist encounters the `reality' of the patient. I had 
not found an adequate conception of the process whereby professional knowledge was 
applied in practice. I found this lack of clarity problematic for my own practice as a 
therapist. 
Therapists practise within a postmodern climate in which a simple correspondence 
between psychological theory and the inner space of the human mind is no longer 
accepted. Fact and value are now seen as inevitably intertwined in keeping with the 
saying in the Talmud that "we see things as we are not as they are" (quoted in 
Phillips, 1999). A therapist faces the hazard of practising in a climate of `truth without 
certainty', taking account of the inevitable element of relativity without losing the 
capacity to have something relevant to say. 
I explored the question of the application of professional knowledge in practice in a 
postmodern climate through qualitative, semi-structured interviews with eight NHS 
Psychodynamic Psychotherapists who worked in the South Trent Health Service 
Region. As I am myself an NHS Psychodynamic Psychotherapist working in the 
South Trent Region I have had the status of an `insider' in this investigation and knew 
my informants previously as colleagues, supervisors and trainers. This `insider' status 
has been a strength of the research but also an aspect to be monitored and taken 
account of. 
I have structured this thesis to reflect as far as possible the way the research unfolded 
for me so that the reader can share the experience of the process. 
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Location in the Literature 
I undertook a preliminary literature search in the areas of professional knowledge, its 
status and the critiques of its use in order to ground my enquiry in contemporary 
debate about psychotherapy. 
I set out to establish the conceptual tools available to the therapist as described in the 
literature which could be said to constitute their professional knowledge. At this stage 
I was working with a rather `flat' conception of professional knowledge as the sort of 
knowledge that could be found in textbooks about therapy. I explored the nature of 
object relations theory as it provided the main theoretical base for the practice of the 
therapists I interviewed. I tracked shifts in this theory towards a more postmodern 
sense of theory as a perspective and towards a greater appreciation of the 
intersubjective nature of therapy. I summarised the perspectives of key theorists. 
I briefly considered the place of narrative in therapy but did not at this stage see its full 
significance. I also explored the literature concerning developmental stages in the use 
of professional knowledge which offered a way of conceptualising a tension between 
creativity/integration and conformity/avoidance in the therapist's use of their 
professional knowledge. 
I explored the debate in the literature about the epistemological status of professional 
knowledge. I focused in on the debate about whether the therapist's professional 
knowledge could be viewed as being informed by a dependable body of knowledge 
and what criteria could be employed in a postmodern climate for judging this 
question. I looked at what empiricism, phenomenology and hermeneutics offered to 
this debate as traditional `ways of knowing'. I found that the absence of a simple 
correspondence between theory and the mind of the patient had not led to an 
epistemological `quagmire' for the therapist. The concept of `pragmatic rationality' 
(Bernstein, 1983) captured the sense that therapist's professional knowledge could be 
located beyond objectivism and subjectivism and could claim a status as `dependable' 
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through an interweaving of epistemological criteria. Theory could thus be viewed as 
offering proven, emotionally powerful ways of organising experience 
I explored in the literature critiques of the use of professional knowledge in practice 
by therapists along with some responses made to these critiques by therapists. Some 
writers saw their critiques as invalidating practice while others saw `flaws' to be 
addressed in practice by therapists. Critiques centred around four areas. Therapist 
thinking was too clinically individualistic and failed to take enough account of the 
intersubjective nature of the therapy encounter. Therapists assigned too much 
objectivity to their thinking and failed to understand the nature of power and 
influence. These critiques provided me with a base against which to compare the 
therapist accounts in the interviews. Craib (1992) offered the metaphor of the dirty 
bathwater of professional practice that need not lead to baby and bathwater being 
thrown out together. 
The Enquiry 
For my enquiry I adopted a qualitative approach, using a semi-structured interview 
format, rooting the therapist's account in their practice by focusing on their work with 
two patients, one judged to be more `disturbed' and one less `disturbed'. I took the 
view that the interviews comprised eight individual case studies that offered 
significant pointers beyond themselves to the practice of NHS psychotherapists. I 
clarified the nature of my involvement as well as addressing the ethical issues 
involved in researching into practice. 
I have described how the categories I employed to organise my analysis evolved and 
settled later (as part of my core findings) on the concept of the therapists' narratives 
of practice which I found to fit and explain well the data. These consisted of a 
narrative of what constitutes `living the good life' psychologically, a narrative of how 
psychological problems develop, and a narrative of how treatment is best conducted. 
My initial use of grounded theory gave way to my sense that I was looking for patterns 
in the narratives and adopting the stance of a `bricoleur'. I have given an account of 
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the `natural history' of my research as well as addressing relevant ethical issues. I 
have discussed the status of my findings and argued they should be judged primarily 
on their plausibility and theoretical cogency. 
Findings 
After conducting five of the interviews I formulated my initial findings. The 
professional knowledge of the therapists that I interviewed I found to be saturated 
with values and morals, expressed in the form of narratives, requiring a facing up to of 
limits, emerging from a combination of personal and the professional experience, and 
employed in an intersubjective context that could be extremely stressful. 
I then completed the remaining interviews and through further analysis came to my 
core findings which better explained my data. I undertook a further literature search at 
this point which I have included within my findings so that the reader can see the 
development of my understanding. 
I revised my initial definition of professional knowledge as being like textbook theory 
similar to flat-packed furniture that is assembled in the therapy room in accordance 
with the instructions. I formulated a concept, `clinical reasoning', that better 
conceptualised the processes I had found in the interview accounts. In the accounts I 
observed the therapists reasoning clinically in a way that was mostly intuitive, that 
involved `reflection-in-action' and `problem setting', and that was more practice- 
based than theory-based. 
I discovered that the clinical reasoning of the therapists was not just expressed in the 
form of narratives but was organised in the form of narratives in the therapists' minds. 
The therapists had constructed, mainly intuitively, narratives of living the good life 
psychologically, of how psychological problems develop, and of how treatment is best 
conducted. These narratives were actively shaping their clinical thinking and practice. 
The therapists' narratives, I further found, had emerged from an amalgam of their 
personal and professional experiences and were fostered and held within a community 
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of therapists. I applied Haraway's (1988) concept of `situated knowledge' as a frame 
for understanding this. Clinical reasoning, I found, involved the therapists in a process 
I have referred to as `dialectical tacking'. Broadly this can be conceived of as 
involving the therapist in tacking between their professional knowledge base, their 
experience of being with the patient, and their personal beliefs and experiences. 
All in all I concluded that the therapists' clinical reasoning constituted a `hazardous 
journey' in a postmodern climate, a journey which reveals the gap between textbook 
theory and practice. The therapists were employing `situated' knowledge, within a 
demanding intersubjective encounter that required the capacity for on-the-spot 
reflection and `dialectical tacking'. I had found in the concept of clinical reasoning a 
much richer way of conceptualising the use of professional knowledge in practice, one 
that was far more helpful in understanding and explaining the data. 
A Note About Terminology 
In this thesis I have used the term `patient' to describe those receiving psychodynamic 
psychotherapy as this is the term used within the NHS and I would find other terms 
such as `service user' out of context. The term `patient' is not meant in any sense to 
imply passivity. 
I have opted for the title `therapist' to describe my informants as it fitted naturally 
within the context. Where it would have created any confusion I have reverted to the 
term `informant'. 
The title analyst, psychoanalyst, therapist and psychotherapist are used 
interchangeably at times within this thesis. The psychodynamic psychotherapy 
literature draws on practice that can be three or more times a week as well as practice 
that is once weekly. I saw no advantage in trying to overstandardise terminology. 
However the therapists who acted as my informants were describing the practice of 
once weekly psychodynamic psychotherapy. 
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THE PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPIST 
At the beginning of this research project I undertook a preliminary survey of the 
literature to look at the conceptual tools that could be said to constitute a 
psychodynamic psychotherapist's professional knowledge. In this chapter I have 
outlined these through a description of object relations theory and its key theorists. I 
have also described shifts in psychodynamic theorising towards postmodern and 
intersubjective perspectives. I have described an initial look at the concept of narrative 
and concluded with a survey of the literature on the relevance of the developmental 
stage and morale of the therapist to their use of professional knowledge. 
At this stage I was conceptualising professional knowledge as formal theories of the 
type that reside in books. So, in the context of psychodynamic psychotherapy, it could 
be thought of as comprising: 
o Theories of psychological functioning i. e. how `the mind' works from a 
psychological point of view. 
o Theories about the process of being therapeutic for people by engaging in a 
talking/listening/relating process. 
o Underlying theories, which I have referred to as meta-psychologies or 
philosophies of life that address the question of how we might envisage what it 
means to live `the good life' (McLeod, 2000). 
Through my experience of the interviews and further literature searching I came to see 
this as too `flat' a definition and I will come on to this later in the thesis. However, at 
the start of my research it was the definition I employed and, with it in mind, I 
surveyed the theoretical and conceptual tools psychodynamic psychotherapists had 
available to them and that constituted their `professional knowledge'. 
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Object Relations Theory 
I saw Object Relations Theory as providing for my informants the main organising 
conceptual tools for practice. I have set out here an understanding of the nature and 
content of that theory as it will inform the reader's understanding of the interviews 
and of my findings and conclusions. As it constitutes such a vast area I have been 
selective and covered those theorists referred to by my informants. In practice this has 
meant I have outlined British Object Relations Theorists. I have included also 
Bowlby's attachment theory as it also came to inform my findings. 
Running through object relations theory is the tension between modem and 
postmodern ways of viewing the individual. I have highlighted these and in time they 
came to form a central thrust of this thesis and they are further discussed in the 
chapter on the status of professional knowledge. 
Object Relations theory has emerged from an awareness of the way in which, as 
people, we carry other people and our experiences with them within us in an internal 
world. It makes the assumption that relationships are central to people's lives and 
focuses on how external relationships with actual others come to be represented in an 
`internal world' within each individual (Fonagy and Target, 2003). It is too diverse a 
theory to be containable within a single definition and Greenberg and Mitchell 
(1983: 14) opted for the widest possible definition of it as comprising theories which 
are "concerned with exploring the relationship between real, external people and the 
internal images and residues of relationships with them and the significance of these 
residues for psychic functioning". 
Greenberg and Mitchell (1983: 2) summarised object relations theory in these terms: 
People react to and interact with not only an actual other but also an 
internal other, a psychic representation of a person which in itself has the 
power to influence both the individual's affective states and his overt 
behaviour..... what is generally agreed upon about these internal images is 
that they constitute a residue within the mind of relationships with 
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important people in the individual's life. In some ways crucial exchanges 
with others leave their mark; they are "internalised" and so they come to 
shape subsequent attitudes, reactions, perceptions, and so on. 
Gomez (1997: 213) wrote of how we "import the other, and otherness metaphorically 
resides within us". 
How we manage the relation between our internal and external worlds, how each 
affects the other, has become the major focus of psychoanalytic theorising. The term 
`object' remains from Freud's original usage in which he was referring to the aim of 
the impersonal drives which he called the `id' and which he saw as the main force of 
motivation for human beings. More relational ideas have been tacked on to this drive 
theory or relational theories have supplanted' drive theories but the term `object' has 
remained partly in recognition that we do not always relate to others as whole people 
(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). 
There has been a proliferation of therapies for the `healing' of the modern self. Karasu 
(1986) counted over four hundred. The more respected forms of therapy can be 
thought of as socially sanctioned treatments for the modern self (McLeod, 1997). Four 
approaches stand out within the field: the psychodynamic, the cognitive-behavioural, 
the humanistic/existential, and the systemic. They may be distinguished by their 
relative emphasis. 
The psychodynamic approach, of which object relations theory is one part, seeks to 
evoke rather than direct, works with feelings as well as cognitions and behaviour and 
emphasises the mystery of life as much as mastery (Bakan, 1966, Frank, 1974). It 
employs more organic, botanical metaphors that emphasise growth and the need for a 
facilitating environment. 
While there has been this proliferation of therapies, the range of therapies may be 
seen as having much in common. Frank (1974) suggested six factors common to the 
range of psychotherapies: 
19 
° An intense, emotionally charged confiding relationship, with a helping person; 
°A rationale which contains an explanation of the patient's distress and of the 
methods for its relief; 
° The provision of new information about the nature of origins of the patient's 
problems and of ways of dealing with them; 
° Hope in the patient that he can expect help from the therapist; 
° An opportunity for experiences of success during the course of therapy and a 
consequent enhancement of the sense of mastery; 
° The facilitation of emotional arousal in the patient. 
Object Relations Theory does not provide the therapist with a clear set of conceptual 
tools. There is a diversity to the theory such that it should not be thought of as 
comprising a unified view. It is best thought of as a gathering of theories that at 
minimum salute the same flag. Fonagy and Target (2003: 289) liken it to a family of 
ideas "with resemblances, relationships and feuds, and with new members expected to 
take their place alongside the rest and respect the authority of the ancestors, especially 
Freud". 
It is difficult to compare key theorists within the theory as they express competing 
visions and assumptions and have each developed their own particular vocabulary or 
shaped existing vocabulary to express their own meanings. Such diversity reflects the 
complexity of the phenomena being explored and the way professional knowledge is 
shaped by and emerges from a theorist's personal and professional experience. 
The Self 
The nature of the `self that object relations investigates is itself hard to define with 
any clarity or agreement. Psychodynamic psychotherapists, employing an object 
relations perspective, operate within culturally shared views of what it means to be a 
`person' or 'self, within the phenomenology of the self. In their clinical reasoning 
therapists employ views of `selfhood' to provide a frame for their thinking. Such 
views have changed considerably over the centuries from religious themes of the 
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soul's relationship to God into modern secular themes about the life and growth of 
the individual self (Kirschner, 1996) 
However, clearer definitions of the `self seem elusive as Khan (1981: 294) expressed: 
No matter how zealously, or critically, one studies the varied and 
perplexing literature on the subject, no clear definition of the self, as a 
concept, crystallises, though each of us feels very sure about what we 
mean when we use the concept of self, it is hard to communicate our 
particular meaning to another. 
So therapists have to struggle with the difficulty that the concepts of the self and of 
the subject are central to the whole psychoanalytic project and yet are among the 
"least well-articulated psychoanalytic concepts" (Ogden 1992: 624). 
McLeod (1997: 4) described a shift over the centuries in the western world away from 
a sense of a person-in-community' to a sense of a person-in-relationship', with the 
self seen as 'autonomous, masterful and bounded'. Object relations theory has 
developed within this individualistic culture and contains the paradox within it that "it 
focuses its attention on individual experience while defining the essence of this 
experience as beyond the individual" (Gomez, 1997: 212). So the `self is frequently 
written about in object relations theory as if it were a relatively fixed identity within 
the individual. Spatial metaphors are often employed to describe it. However, and 
alternatively in the theory, the self may be seen as a more a temporal and multiple 
phenomenon (Mitchell, 2000). The mental health of the modem self may be defined in 
positive or negative terms, as the presence or absence of a quality (Aggleton, 1990). 
The Classical and Romantic views of the self provide a dividing line that runs 
through Object Relations Theory (Strenger, 1989; Fonagy, 2001). 
The Classical view within object relations theory draws on the Kantian philosophical 
tradition and is represented by Freud and Klein among others. They held a more 
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pessimistic perspective on humanity seeing it as flawed and conflicted in its basic 
nature (a kind of `original sin'). They emphasised reason and autonomy and, through 
their application, the darker side of humanity could be held in check and some 
civilised living become possible. Reason provided an objective foothold for the 
experience of living. 
The Romantic view within object relations theory draws on the thinking of Rousseau 
and Goethe and is represented by Winnicott and Fairbairn among others. They held a 
more optimistic perspective on humanity seeing it as basically good and loving but 
falling prey to the effects of the environment in the shape of the unempathic parent. 
Deficit' rather than conflict was emphasised. They valued authenticity, spontaneity and 
imagination over rationality and saw humanity as füll of potential, including the 
potential for healing (Fonagy, 2001). 
Within the literature common ground centres around the notion that we each have 
what can be thought of as a `deep interior self (Taylor, 1989). Within that self we may 
exclude from conscious awareness parts of ourselves and our experiences that we find 
too painful to bear and thus we experience ourselves as divided and in conflict. There 
is value (as a general rule) in exploring our `deep interior self, in evoking feelings 
held in within us, in exploring our, mystery in the service of facilitating our 
psychological growth (Frank, 1974, Sutherland, 1968). 
The close personal relationship that is created in the setting of therapy between 
therapist and patient is seen as a rich form of enquiry into ourselves which can evoke 
a potentially valuable and visible re-enactment of our psychological problems within 
the therapy relationship. What is lived and can be tolerably experienced is then more 
open to development and change (Mitchell, 1988; Fairbairn, 1952). I would argue that 
Frank's common factors are congruent with the aims and practice of object relations- 
based therapy. 
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A Shift of Focus towards Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity 
There have been significant shifts in focus within object relations theory over the last 
half century in response to (and contributing to a shaping of) changing cultural. views 
of what selfhood means. These shifts have involved a greater focus on subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity (Fonagy and Target, 2003). 
The paradox that runs through object relations theory is that we are both individual 
and social creatures (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Object relations theory divides 
into strands that follow and make primary our individuality and strands that follow 
and make primary our relationality. 
For Fonagy (2001) the relational or intersubjective approach has been and is still the 
most rapidly developing orientation in psychoanalysis. It repudiates the idea of an 
isolated individual mind as a "theoretical fiction or myth" (Stolorow 1988) and 
emphasises the co-constructed nature of the encounter in therapy which is seen as 
being between two subjects. At the same time the concept of our individuality retains 
a place as it `fits' in an important way an aspect of our experience as human beings 
(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). 
A growing emphasis on intersubjectivity has created a shift in the temporal focus of 
therapy away from archaeological-type attempts to reconstruct the past towards ä 
deepened awareness of the present (Holmes, 1998). Eliot (1960: 11) wrote how "he is 
not likely to know what is to be done unless he lives in what is not merely the present, 
but the present moment of the past". It is that `present moment of the past' that is seen 
by therapists as being re-enacted in the therapy. 
There has been a shift from a view of the self as seen in mechanistic terms to the self 
as experienced by the person, in more phenomenological terms. Freud's theory, based 
on humans as instinctually motivated, gave rise to more mechanistic views of the 
mind as divided into parts that he called the id, the ego and the superego (Freud, 1923). 
Winnicott (1965a) and Fairbairn (1952) reflect in their writing the shift to an interest 
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in the' person's experience of themselves, their sense of self and their experience of 
themselves in relationship. 
Alongside this has been a shift away from thinking about a person's psychological 
problems in terms of neurotic symptomatology and definable neuroses. Instead 
psychological problems are viewed as reflecting a person's disordered subjectivity' 
(Mitchell, 1993) or their `problems in living' (Storr, 1979) or their `pseudonorrnality' 
(Winnicott, 1960b). This represents a shift from a concern with symptoms to a concern 
with whole persons (Mendes and Fine, 1976) and therapy is seen as about the fostering 
of wholeness rather than the undoing of repression (Holmes, 1998). The shift has 
involved a move away Freud's view of the people as drive-regulating animals to a 
view of people as meaning-generating animals for whom problems focus around a 
lack in capacity to generate and assign meaning to experiences. A lack of authenticity 
or meaning to living and too great an adaptation to society is part of the problem of 
`pseudonormality' (Mitchell, 1993). 
Our self-knowledge is seen as necessarily partial. Phillips (1995: 6) wrote of an 
enlightenment Freud who was involved in a project of self-knowledge which 
embodied a perspective on the self as a "knowable set of constituents". This Freud, he 
argued, described the ways in which we refuse knowledge in order to protect 
ourselves with ignorance. While we may be unacceptable to ourselves we are not 
unintelligible. He also wrote of a "post-Freudian Freud" who subverted the whole 
possibility of self-knowledge with the notion of the unconscious in relation to which 
one can not be an expert. This Freud, Phillips argued, requires us to consider what we 
use our `knowledge' to do. 
There has been a shift in the view of the therapist's participation from the possibility 
of a one-person-psychology to an awareness of the nature of intersubjectivity. This is 
in keeping with wider cultural understandings about the inevitability of participation. 
Therapy is seen as involving two active participants who co-construct the encounter. 
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Mitchell (2000: 26) wrote that "the analytic relationship is no longer usefully 
understood as the sterile operating theatre Freud believed it could be... the analyst is 
not a blank screen". Psychodynamic theory increasingly explores the nature of the 
intersubjective encounter between therapist and patient. Holmes (1996) wrote of a 
shift in view from the therapist as like a parent figure to the therapist as a sibling who 
co-constructs the encounter. Scharff and Scharff (1998) emphasise how the therapist 
brings to the encounter their own matrix of relationships with which understanding of 
the particular patient starts to be framed. 
The phrase, the `betweenness ofpeople', used by Clarkson (1994), speaks to the ways 
in the literature that therapists have tried to explore the area of intersubjectivity. 
Stolorow (1988: 332) wrote : 
Clinical phenomena .... cannot be understood apart from the 
intersubjective 
contexts in which they take form. Patient and analyst together form an 
indissoluble psychological system, and it is this system that constitutes the 
empirical domain of psychoanalytic enquiry: 
Therapists explore their counter-transference feelings thus making use of their 
connectedness to the patient (Symington, 1985). The term counter-transference is a 
wide-ranging term that covers both the blind spots in the therapist that are thrown up 
by the therapy as well as the therapist's disciplined use of their subjectivity as a source 
of information about the patient (Hinshelwood, 1999). Freud initially gave the concept 
a negative sense but Heimann (1950) developed it as a positive contribution which 
required the therapist not to clear their mind so much as to "sustain the feelings which 
are stirred up in him" and to make use of them reflectively. Winnicott (1971) wrote of 
the "potential space" that the therapist offered the patient. 
Ogden (1994) suggested there are three subjectivities involved in the therapy; the 
analyst's, the analysand's, and the analytic third. The last refers to the intersubjective 
experience created by the analyst and analysand together. He postulated a dialectical 
movement between subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the therapy. As the focus of 
25 
analysis is on the patient's experience so the reverie is explored for its information 
about the patient and the intersubjective experience of analyst and analysand, seeing 
in the reverie and what emerges from it indications of what may be the as yet 
unarticulated and perhaps also not yet felt experience of the analysand. 
Sandler (1976) wrote of the way the patient attempts to dictate the interaction with the 
therapist using a complicated system of unconscious cues. Through reflection on this 
process an underlying sense may become available to therapist and patient. Sandler is 
clear that the therapist also enacts roles and each therapist will have susceptibility to 
their own particular set of internal roles. Counter-transference, in this view, has 
become less about feelings and more about enactment. 
Symington (1985) developed the idea of patient and analyst forming a `corporate 
identity'. The analyst found in time their role allocated, as in a drama, by the patient 
and therapy proceeded as a process towards creative awareness of and disengagement 
from such roles. The single system and changes to it take place at a pre-verbal level 
and are sensed before they can be talked about. Such change, he argued, required an 
"act of freedom" on the part of the therapist. 
Ryle (2003) argued that we seek out people who will reciprocate our established 
relationship procedures. What is important in the therapy is the way that the therapist 
does not always reciprocate and this experience leads to attempts to identify and make 
accessible to the patient's awareness the nature of their problematic relationship 
procedures. 
Stem et al (1998) believed that, more than `mutative information' (as in 
interpretations offered by the therapist), patients need a `mutative relationship'. The 
main aim of therapy is to alter the intersubjective environment to create something 
new for the patient whether or not this is understood consciously. They suggest that 
throughout infancy and through our later lives we are building up a sense of `how to 
be with someone' which they call `implicit relational knowing'. It is built through 
interactive, intersubjective experiences and leads to what they call a `shared implicit 
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relationship' with a person. Within the therapy there are `now' moments which are 
particularly `lit up' and which pull a patient and therapist more into the present. If 
seized by both parties they can become a `moment of meeting'. Such moments create 
a `disjoin' in `implicit relational knowing' which opens a space for something new. 
Fessler (1983: 44) saw therapy as a "speech event" and offered a compelling 
description of how meaning emerges in therapy from the attempts each party makes to 
hear and be heard. He emphasised how therapist and patient each respond to what they 
have understood the other to be saying. Meaning does not originate in either party but 
"through their parallel attempts to be heard and understood". 
Narrative 
I found pointers in the literature to the potential significance for therapists of the 
concept of narrative. McLeod (1997) surveyed the place of narrative in therapy. In 
particular at this stage I took on board Bruner's distinction (1986) between 
paradigmatic and narrative ways of knowing. 
Paradigmatic knowing refers to what we think of as scientific knowledge that deals in 
generalities and abstract propositions. Narrative knowing refers to the way we talk 
about our experiences, in the particular, from the inside. The distinction is also 
thought about by Hobson. (1985) as the difference between `knowing about' and 
`knowing', or, in Buber's terms (2000), between an `I-It' and an `I-thou' relationship 
to knowledge. 
At this stage of my research the potential implications of the concept of narrative for 
my research were only beginning to be seen by me. The importance of the concept of 
narrative grew through my experience of the interviews. 
Key Theorists 
I sought to survey and organise the contributions of specific key theorists to the 
professional knowledge of the psychodynamic psychotherapist. This was difficult to 
do succinctly and clearly without an organising principle that would bring some 
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clarity. Later in the research process I found that the concept of narrative provided me 
with just such a frame and I have summarised here the thinking of key theorists in a 
way that employs my later understanding of narrative. I am jumping the gun by doing 
this. However this way of viewing the contribution of these theorists has become so 
much a part of my thinking that it would feel artificial to present them in another 
form. 
At this stage I have presented here an outline of the contribution of key theorists 
within the British School to the development of Object Relations theory. As already 
mentioned I have been selective in that I have outlined the thinking of Freud, Klein, 
Bion, Winnicott, Fairbairn (and Bowlby). Employing my later understanding of 
narrative I have approached their theory as understandable in terms of three narratives 
or stories which they tell: 
o life is like........ a psychodynamic narrative 
o psychological problems are the result of....... a developmental narrative 
o treatment of such problems requires.......... a treatment narrative 
Sigmund Freud 
In his narrative Freud described : 
o our inescapable individuality 
o the evolutionary, instinctual heritage that motivates us 
o our need to accept our instinctual nature and use our reason to tame it 
o the objectivity that his theory would provide for a therapist 
o the capacity of a therapist to stand outside the therapeutic encounter 
Freud's Psychodynamic Narrative 
In his thinking Freud was informed by Darwin's understanding of our evolutionary 
heritage and the classical view of the `self'. Freud emphasised our inescapable 
individuality and the way our subjectivity is shaped by our drives (also referred to as 
`instincts'), which are blind impersonal forces (he referred to as the `id') that cluster 
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around sexuality and aggression. Our more conscious self (which he called our `ego') 
is a secondary development and can only borrow its energy from these drives in the 
way a rider steers a horse (Freud, 1905b, 1923). 
The central task in our psychological life is to wean ourselves off our infantile hopes 
and wishes with the help of our reason and rationality. We need to leave the nursery 
behind (Mitchell, 1993). So Schafer (1980a: 30) wrote of Freud's Darwinist story: 
[which] begins with the infant and young child as a beast, otherwise 
known as the id, and ends with the beast domesticated, tamed by 
frustration in the course of development in a civilisation hostile to its 
nature. 
We begin life as unsociable babies who seek gratification of our drives but soon 
discover the conflict that can exist between the search for pleasure and the reality of 
the environment. We have to learn to accommodate the society on which gratification 
depends. The tension and anxiety this creates within the mind is expressed in 
psychological symptoms which point in coded form to the underlying conflict. There 
is a price to pay for being `civilised' (Freud, 1930). 
In order to cope with the impulses we find within us which feel unacceptable to us we 
practice `forgetting'. The account we give of ourselves contains gaps and 
inconsistencies and contradictions due to our defensive manoeuvres in the service of 
our self-esteem. Phillips (1995: 4) wrote: 
To be a person is to be a stranger to yourself..... To sustain a version of 
ourselves and to protect ourselves we work at ignorance...... A neurosis is 
a way of not knowing what one wants, a refusal of knowledge. 
As an enlightenment man Freud advocated the place of reality over pleasure, the 
rational over the irrational and reason over emotion. This is expressed in his famous 
phrase "where id was, there shall ego be" (Freud, 1933). This all reflects Freud's rather 
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stoic view of living where the hope is to transform a patient's "hysterical misery 
into 
common human unhappiness" (Freud, 1933). In the "Future of an Illusion" 
Freud 
(1927) described how he saw life as "too hard" and bringing too many pains, 
disappointments and insoluble tasks as if in the plan of creation we were not intended 
to be. happy. 
Freud's Developmental Narrative 
For Freud the Oedipus complex was a `one-size-fits-all' developmental narrative 
(Phillips, 1999) which provided an x-ray vision into the reality of subjective 
experience (Freud, 1905b). It is experienced broadly between the ages of three and six 
years but it's resolution, or lack of it, has lasting effects. Freud wrote to Fliess 
(1987: 271) that 
A single idea of general value has now dawned on me. I have now found, 
in my own case too, [the experience ofj being in love with my mother and 
jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early 
childhood. If this is so we can understand the gripping power of Oedipus 
Rex. 
He further wrote (Freud, 1900: 364) : 
It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulses 
towards our mother and our first hatred and murderous wishes against our 
father. Our dreams convince us this is so. 
In this `complex' a boy becomes sexually possessive towards his mother and aware of 
his father as a rival and a possible source of retaliation for his wishes. This creates a 
fear of `castration'. The boy is led to give up on his hopes towards his mother, take on 
board the father's perceived view and turn his sexual energy in time more outwards 
and away from more incestuous desires. The female complex is less developed by 
Freud. He suggests the attraction occurs between the daughter and father and the 
daughter experiences `penis envy' (Freud, 1905b). 
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Freud's Treatment Narrative 
Freud made the assumption that a one-person psychology was possible. He saw the 
therapist as an objective observer, standing outside of the problem and exposing the 
reality of it by interpreting in. Conversely he saw the patient as a subject who 
misperceives and projects the past onto the therapist. He did not regard the personality 
of the therapist as of significance. 
The therapist's neutrality he saw as crucial to the -emergence of hidden impulses and 
providing a screen on to which they can be projected. The therapist could then 
interpret what he saw. Restraint rather than expressiveness was deemed to be required 
(at least in Freud's theory) and a certain hard-edge was required in the application of 
the model. Freud wrote : 
The doctor should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should 
show them nothing but what is shown to him (SE, XII 118). 
Therapy, for Freud, involved the development of insight, through therapist 
interpretation. Such insight would allow the patient to take more control of their lives 
by bringing infantile wishes and impulses out into the open so that they could come 
under more conscious, rational control. The patient needed to accept consciously 
what was within them. In particular the therapist interpreted to the patient the 
transference (Freud, 1905 a) which represented a displacement on to the therapist of the 
constellation of childhood impulses and relationships. So now the neurotic problem 
could be lived (i. e. re-enacted) in the therapy which made it more amenable to 
change. Therapy had the sense of something `done to' the patient rather than an 
empathic `being with' the patient. 
The rational thinking, for Freud, would be done in the therapy by the therapist who 
enjoyed a privileged and objective vantage point The patient's conscious narrative 
would contain gaps, inconsistencies and puzzles. The understanding that unconscious 
drives lead to repression meant that the patient narrative could be filled out and sense 
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made of what would otherwise be an incomplete account. Freudian theory can be seen 
as offering a fulfilment of the narrative (Phillips, 1999) 
As Fonagy and Target (2003) relate, Freud moved from considerable therapeutic 
optimism (1916) to a later pessimism (1937) about the positive effects of analysis: 
Through the overcoming of these resistances the patient's mental life is 
permanently changed, is raised to a higher level of development and 
remains protected against a fresh possibility of falling ill (SE, Vol 17: 448- 
463). 
One has the impression that one ought not to be surprised if it should turn 
out in the end that the difference between a person who has not been 
analysed and the behaviour of a person after he has been analysed is not so 
thorough-going as we aim at making it and as we expect and maintain it to 
be (SE, Vol 23 : 209-253). 
Comment on Freud 
In his account Freud displayed a limited sense of his theory as being located within a 
time and culture. Rather he emphasised his objectivity and the scientific basis of his 
theory. His one-person psychology, with it's heavy emphasis on the therapist's 
restraint and non-gratification of the patient, stands in stark contrast to current views 
of intersubjectivity. No doubt his practice did not always follow his theory in this 
regard (Gay, 1988). The `self for Freud was `bestial' but could be `tamed' and 
civilised in time with `Reason' providing the counter-culture to our instinctual 
heritage. A mature and rational acceptance of our nature was regarded by Freud as a 
requirement for healthy living. 
However, in order to summarise I have inevitably written as if there were one 
Freudian view rather than several. Phillips (1995) pointed to a very different strand in 
Freud's work, which he calls a `post-Freudian Freud', within the account generally 
given of his work. He drew attention to the subversive nature of the concept of the 
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unconscious, not just as subversive of our self-image but also subversive of Freud's 
epistemology (to which Freud did not apply it). Freud, he wrote, drew attention to a 
problem with `knowing' in contrast to the enlightenment's emphasis on the power of 
reason. 
This led Phillips (1995: 7) to write that "to be an expert on the unconscious is a 
contradiction in terms" and "this other unconscious .... is a way of 
describing both the 
limits of what we can know and the areas of our lives in which knowing and the idea 
of expertise, may be inappropriate". In this regard Freud was subversive of the whole 
notion of objectivity. 
Melanie Klein 
In her narrative Klein described : 
° instincts as psychological forces 
° our innately conflicted nature 
° life as a crisis requiring of us to face psychic reality, tolerate our aggression and our 
experiences of loss and ambivalence 
° the need in therapy for the therapist to interpret conflicts and, for later Kleinians, 
for the therapist to provide containment of conflicts 
Klein's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Klein's narrative combined both drive and relational ideas and she was in this way a 
bridge to object relational thinking. Her thinking about living the good life sits firmly 
within the classical view of the self, drawing, as Freud did, from a sense of our 
evolutionary heritage as creating within us an innate conflict. For Klein life requires 
the management of extremes of terror and anxiety that are psychotic in their intensity. 
Life is conceived as "a series of events : events that have to be endured, experienced 
and overcome" (Cassie in Dryden, 1996: 53). This is a biological `given' so our very 
nature pitches us into a struggle between our love and our hate and healthy living 
requires of us as honest an acknowledgement as possible of our deeply mixed, 
ambivalent feelings. Our hate creates anxieties about our murderousness and our love 
leads us to repentance for our hate. We are pulled towards splitting and projection as 
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forms of disowning of the intolerable. In health there is a move towards 
integration 
and containment of the range of our feelings (Klein, 1940,1946,1957). Psychological 
health involves the ability to see beyond our own projections (Gomez, 1997). 
Klein's thinking went through phases in which she emphasised alternately sexuality, 
aggression, depressive concerns and envy. Greenberg and Mitchell (1983: 130) 
summarise her final thinking in this way : 
Klein's final vision of the human condition is of man struggling toward 
the integration of himself and his experience of others despite the 
suffering it necessarily entails, against the pull toward fragmentation 
created by his own destructiveness and envy. 
So Melanie Klein's psychodynamic narrative suggests a strong and important ethical 
sense running through us which demands costly work within ourselves to achieve a 
sufficiently stable sense of integration. 
Klein's Developmental Narrative 
The normal development of infants can be regarded as a combination of 
processes by which anxieties of a psychotic nature are bound, worked 
through and modified (Klein, 1952: 81). 
For Klein, a baby is born in a state of primitive anxiety engendered by innate 
destructive impulses of which it is aware and with which it is struggling. These 
impulses bring with them a terrifying fear of psychic annihilation. The self emerges 
from this conflict (Salzberger-Wittenberg, 1970). 
The infant experiences these impulses in an internal phantasy world where the anxiety 
is played out in graphic form in which there is no distinction between thought and 
deed (Segal, 1957). Two dominant concerns are created; a concern the `self will be 
annihilated (which she called a paranoid concern) and a concern that damage will be 
caused to others (which she called a depressive concern) (Klein, 193 5,1946). 
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In order to cope with such intolerable feelings the infant adopts a range of strategies. 
Emotions and people (or parts of people) may be split into `good' and `bad' aspects. 
Feelings are also projected or introjected and this conveys a sense of the in-out nature 
of our experience, the interweaving of the internal and external. These processes can 
be creative or pathological. Klein believed that whole objects can be internalised in 
the second quarter of the first year of life (Klein, 1935). 
Projective Identification (Segal, 1964) is a central concept in Kleiman treatment that 
tries to do justice to the clinical experience whereby it appears that a patient has 
projected unbearable aspects of themselves out onto other people or onto objects 
outside of themselves in a way that leaves the other person feeling them vividly. 
However this depletes and fractures the patient's self as well as distorting reality 
(Rosenfeld, 1964). 
In time the infant may learn to tolerate its own destructive feelings and so hold such 
bad and good feelings together inside without resorting to excessive splitting and 
projection. This constitutes achieving the `depressive position' in which a child can 
acknowledge it has loving and hating impulses towards its caregivers (Salzberger- 
Wittenberg, 1970). 
Klein 's Treatment Narrative 
One key aim of Kleiman therapy for Steiner (1996: 1075/6) is to help the patient to 
reintegrate projected parts of him/herself. The patient is helped to : 
utilise his own mental assets more optimally, so that he can struggle to 
resolve his conflicts in his own personal way. 
I will argue that the reversibility of projective identification depends on 
the individual's capacity to face psychic reality and in particular to 
confront the reality of loss and go through the mourning process that 
results from this confrontation. 
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To achieve this, patient anxieties are heard, projections and attacks received without 
retaliation and all these processes interpreted back to the patient (Gomez, 1997). Klein 
gave more emphasis to the role of interpretation whereas later Kleinians (Bion, 1967b) 
emphasised more the role of emotional holding that therapist played. 
Klein (1955) believed that children could be worked with analytically. In place of the 
technique of free association she substituted the unstructured play of children in the 
belief that childien's phantasies are literally played out and re-enacted in a visible 
way. 
Klein (1950: 78) set out her criteria for termination: 
My criterion for termination of analysis is, therefore, as follows: have 
persecutory and depressive anxieties been sufficiently reduced in the 
course of the analysis, and has the patient's relation to the external world 
been sufficiently strengthened to enable him to deal satisfactorily with the 
situation of mourning arising at this point. 
Comment on Klein 
Klein, in her writing, took a very limited view of the context of her theory. Her focus 
on the internalised and fantasised world of the childhood appeared to leave her out of 
touch with the interpersonal, social and cultural context of the therapy (Gomez, 1997). 
As such she over-emphasised her objectivity and her theoretical stance and built in 
distance between herself and the patient. Her style has been criticised as being too 
technical and mechanistic and under-emphasising of the interpersonal encounter in 
therapy (Symington, 1986). Her emphasis on interpretation was more in keeping with a 
`doing to' style of therapy but later Kleinians have emphasised more the role of the 
therapist in providing containment for the patient, more a `being with' function 
(Bion, 1967b). Her sense of the need to face psychic reality puts her firmly on the side 
of the need for acceptance of what is within us rather than a focus on environmental 
provision. 
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In her theory Klein stares in the face the more bleak and terrifying aspects of 
psychological life as she explores the idea of the self as managing the terrors and 
anxieties that she saw as inherent in. living. Perhaps more obviously than for others 
Klein illustrates the notion that `theory is biography'. Her grim story of life's struggles 
(Grosskurth, 1986) suggests her theory reflected the losses and conflicts that dogged 
her life: 
Klein was thus in a continuing state of mourning through much of her life. 
She used her pain to investigate in detail the early states of loss, guilt, 
loneliness, envy and persecution that make up her theories. (Gomez, 
1997: 32). 
Wilfred Bion 
In his narrative Bion described: 
° the importance of our capacity as individuals to `think', `know' and `choose' 
° the key choice that we make whether to face or evade mental pain 
° how the experience of being contained emotionally by another person promotes our 
psychological growth 
° psychosis as a response to environmental failure 
0 the dangers of the therapist having a premature sense of objectivity 
Bion 's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Bion was a radical thinker whose contribution is harder to define. Where Freud and 
Klein began with their reality of `drives/instincts', Bion introduced a more mystical 
dimension into psychodynamic thought with his notion of `0' as the ultimate reality 
which is unknown and unknowable (Symington and Symington 1996). He saw his aim 
as exploring how `thinking' develops (Bion, 1988a) and he felt he had found in 
psychoanalysis as good a tool for this as was available, though it had limitations. He 
took an explicitly phenomenological approach (Rustin, 1991) with his concern to give 
attention to the subjective experience of the patient and of the therapy session. 
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For Bion (1988a) a healthy psychological life requires that we are exposed to `truth' 
which leads to emotional growth. This involves `thinking', `knowing' and `choosing', 
all words that have specific meaning for him. `Thinking' is the emotional experience 
of trying to get to know oneself and others. `Knowing' involves an engagement, rather 
than a knowing about. The `choosing' is between evading mental pain or tolerating it 
and trying to modify it. The experience of thinking and knowing creates links within 
ourselves and with others. Bion set out to explore how `truth' evolves and how it is 
blocked and this became his central focus (Symington and Symington, 1996). 
Bion (1962: 42) wrote: 
A sense of reality matters to the individual in the way that food, drink, air 
and excretion of waste products matter... Failure to use the emotional 
experience produces a .... disaster in the development of the personality; I 
include among these disasters degrees of psychic deterioration that could 
be described as death of the personality. 
Bion's Developmental Narrative 
The foundation of healthy psychological development lies in the capacity of a carer to 
receive and contain the infant's distress and, in this regard, Bion is a fully relational 
thinker: 
If the infant feels it is dying it can arouse that fear in the mother. A well- 
balanced mother can accept these and respond therapeutically : that is to 
say in a manner that makes the infant feel it is receiving its frightened 
personality back again but in a form that it can tolerate - the fears are 
manageable by the infant personality. If the mother can not tolerate these 
projections the infant is reduced to continued projective identification 
carried out with increasing force and frequency (Bion, 1967b: 114-5). 
Without such containment a hate and fear of contact with emotional reality may 
develop along with the destruction of the parts of the mind capable of thinking 
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(Bion, 1959). As such a psychotic part of the personality will come to be dominant 
(Bion, 1970). 
Bion 's Treatment Narrative 
The therapist works to promote the ability of the patient to `think' and to `know'. This 
involves the patient in choosing to face their pain in order to progress (Bion, 1962). 
Classical technique is used including free association and interpretation. Bion had a 
radical sense of the need to be open to the immediate experience of the patient rather 
than allow pre-existing assumptions to muddy the scene. He wrote: 
the psychoanalyst should aim at achieving a state of mind so that every 
session he feels he has not seen the patient before. If he feels he has, he is 
treating the wrong patient... [by this approach] his interpretation should 
gain in force and conviction because they derive from the emotional 
experience with a unique individual and not from generalised theories 
imperfectly `remembered' (Bion, 1967a: 19). 
The therapist, in Bion's view, works to provide an experience of containment that was 
missing to the patient in their earliest relationships so allowing more for the 
experience of `thinking' and `knowing'. 
Comment on Bion 
With Bion psychodynamic narratives can be seen moving in the direction of a far 
greater awareness of the professional knowledge as perspective and the intersubjective 
nature of the encounter. Bion voiced a-deep wariness of the dangers of the therapist 
feeling a premature sense of objectivity about their understanding and then any 
imposition of that on to the patient (1967a). He advocated great restraint on the 
therapist's part until an experience had had time to be absorbed and learnt from in it's 
own terms. An interpretation he viewed as a contribution to making meaning rather 
than the final word or something that was in itself right or wrong. His view of the 
containing role of the therapist suggests a strong element of `being with' is a 
necessary part of the therapist's stance. Bion described what could be called the 
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culture of the `avoidant self, a self that needed a counter-culture of 
facing up to 
psychological realities, through which growth within the personality could occur. 
Bion (1991) emphasised the need for each therapist to test out and to discover 
psychoanalysis for themselves in practice. He was not afraid of being innovative and 
voiced the dangers of being hard-edged in practice in a conformist way. Bion (1970) 
described a process whereby an idea would emerge through a mystic figure. In 
encountering the Establishment, the mystic finds himself viewed as a threat and his 
ideas, once so refreshingly open, turned into a closed system of thought. In his words: 
there are always No-alls about the place waiting to imprison/deify any 
thought or idea that causes trouble (Bion, 1991: 135). 
Donald Winnicott 
In his narrative Winnicott described how : 
° becoming a creative person is a developmental achievement 
° failures in maternal care lead to the `arrested development' of the `self 
° false adaptations are made to society 
° the opportunity may be needed for the patient to `regress' creatively with the 
therapist playing the part of `mother' 
Winnicott's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Winnicott moved the focus of psychodynamic theory from constitutional conflict to 
environmental provision, from nature to nurture (Mitchell, 1988). The roots of 
psychopathology lie in a failed environment with the parent as the villain of the piece 
rather than a `bestial baby'. It is as if the infant's `self has been stillborn or failed to 
thrive due to the failure of caregivers and it is in need of rebirth or re-animation. "The 
analyst will need to play the part of mother to the patient's infant" 
(Winnicott, 1960a: 163). 
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Healthy living psychologically involves a capacity to generate meaningful experience, 
to feel authentic and creative and spontaneous. Winnicott refers to this as living from 
one's `True Self which he calls "the experience of aliveness" (Winnicott 1960b). 
However becoming a person in his sense of the word is something that should not be 
taken for granted. Rather it is a developmental achievement. An alternative is 
something that could be described as `pseudo-normality' (Mitchell, 1993). It represents 
a false adaptation to society, an inability to generate authentic and meaningful 
experience, an inability to be creative and spontaneous. In Winnicott's terms the 
individual then lives from their `False Self and this became Winnicott's central 
diagnosis. So we can be well adapted to society and out of touch with ourselves. 
Winnicott is emphasising that health is more than the absence of illness or the 
presence of sanity. 
Winnicott further describes healthy living by way of paradox. We need to be able to 
be intimate but autonomous, available but not engulfed, individual but not isolated, 
and able to move fluidly between our subjective experience and objective reality 
(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). He emphasises the ability to play as being at the heart 
of creativity (Winnicott, 1971). Reality is encountered through a mixture of fantasy 
and actuality. This stands in contrast to Freud's emphasis on the giving up of illusions. 
Winnicott's Developmental Narrative 
Infants. need `good-enough mothering'(Winnicott, 1960a). The baby is reliant on the 
mother for it's sense of existence and for the opportunity of healthy self-development: 
The child lives within the circle of the parent's personality and... this circle 
has pathological features (Winnicott, 1948: 93). 
The mother initially adapts the world as it were to the infant's needs creating 
something of a sense of illusion for the infant of oneness and of it's own capacity to 
create what it needs (Winnicott, 1947). This allows a sense of coherence and 
continuity of self to develop. In time the infant can gradually and helpfully be 
displaced from this position towards a greater awareness of others and their needs. 
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The infant needs an authentic, personal response from the mother because: 
A baby can be fed without love, but lovelessness or impersonal 
management cannot succeed in producing a new autonomous human child 
(Winnicott, 1971: 127). 
When mothering is not good enough it is as if the infant's `self has been stillborn or 
failed to thrive and it is in need of rebirth or re-animation (Winnicott, 1956). The twin 
dangers to the infant's sense of self lie an unresponsive or impinging parenting. These 
lead to the infant developing a false self as a protective barrier within which the 
infant's `true self is cocooned (Winnicott, 1960b). While this protects it also prevents 
further growth and the experience of authentic and creative living. It is in this sense 
Winnicott (1950: 213) warned against the possible "false assumption that the patient 
really exists".. Where Freud talks of not extending our time in the nursery Winnicott 
thinks more in terms of the infant having to manage a premature expulsion from the 
nursery (Mitchell, 1993). Where Freud took subjectivity for granted, Winnicott takes 
it's development as problematical (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). 
Winnicott (1963) distinguished two roles for a mother. In one role she is the 
environment mother who holds the child while the child is calmer. In the other role 
she is the object mother who receives the infant's fantasised attacks when the child is 
disturbed. 
Winnicott developed the idea of `transitional phenomena' (Winnicott, 1971) whereby 
the infant invests significance in an object, such as a teddy bear or a blanket or its 
thumb. The object appears to hold an emotional significance as if it represents a 
parent's care in portable form and not dependent on the parent's immediate presence. 
This allows the infant some psychological movement away from total dependence 
(Gomez, 1997). The object exists for the infant in a transitional realm between the 
infant and the external world in what is also referred to by Winnicott as "potential 
space". Such space can be immensely valuable and enriching to the infant's 
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development. The value continues in adulthood. Healthy development involves the 
capacity for creative use of `potential space' as well as movement from absolute 
dependence towards independence and from fused and merged relationships to 
differentiated relationships (Winnicott, 1960a). 
Winnicott's Treatment Narrative 
The experience of subjectivity itself is the issue in treatment for Winnicott which he 
contrast with Freud's approach: 
We disagree with Freud. He was for curing symptoms. We are concerned 
with whole living and loving persons (Winnicott quoted in Mendes and 
Fine, 1976: 361). 
Therapy provides a setting and a relationship that can be structured around the 
patient's subjectivity (Winnicott, 1948) and in which "the analyst will need to play the 
part of mother to the patient's infant" (Winnicott, 1960a: 163). 
The therapist offers the therapy and their own self as a transitional space, a potential 
space for transitional experiencing. The patient needs to feel psychologically held and 
contained and interpretations by the therapist convey this. Winnicott (1988: 61-62) 
wrote: 
a current and well-timed interpretation in an analytic treatment gives a 
sense of being held physically that is more real (to the non-psychotic) than 
if a real holding and nursing had taken place. 
In the transference relationship, the original maternal failure is re-enacted and so the 
point at which development was arrested can be reworked with a healthier conclusion. 
It is an important theme of Winnicott's that the therapist needs (for reasons of health) 
to be experienced in a graduated way as failing the patient, just as the mother needs to 
be gradually experienced as less constantly attuned to the growing baby's need. 
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The concept of the False Self (Winnicott, 1 960b) also applies to therapists who may be 
too well adapted to the culture of psychotherapy. The therapist needs to respond 
authentically to the patient just as the mother needed to. Spontaneity and creativity are 
needed and these can not be taught or found in books or mentors. In fact a pre- 
occupation with technique by a therapist could represent a `false-self response from 
the therapist (Symington and Symington, 1996). 
Comment on Winnicott 
Winnicott brought an emphasis -on mothers and the feminine into a psychotherapy 
that had had a very masculine emphasis under Freud (Gomez, 1997). His views 
emphasised the role of the environment and intersubjectivity in contrast to Freud and 
Klein. He combined science and art in his approach (Davis and Wallbridge, 1981). 
At the same time Mitchell (1993) saw Winnicott as holding a realist stance in the form 
of a deep conviction about the objectivity of his views, that he really was uncovering 
the `raw experience' of the patient (Mitchell, 1993). In Winnicott's model, the 
therapist does not take a more fully relational and interactive position with regard to 
the patient. The therapist still stands outside of the process and the therapist acts not 
so much as a participant observer but as a pre-cipitant observer. The therapy room is 
populated by a subject and a facilitator (Mitchell, 1988). 
Winnicott's stance as a therapist was very explicitly one of `being with' the patient. 
He was remarkably `soft-edged' in his application of his model, making himself 
unusually available to his patients out of hours and combining therapy with 
subsequent supervision. The `self for Winnicott had arrested in its development and 
the deficits in its culture needed to be made good with new experience. 
Gomez (1997) suggested Klein and Winnicott held two sides of a split. Where Klein 
held a more pessimistic sense of the experience of life and particularly of childhood 
(in keeping with the classical model), Winnicott held a more optimistic view (in 
keeping with the Romantic tradition). 
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Loyalty to what had gone before in psychoanalysis was professed by Winnicott but he 
effectively redefined and reinvented analysis in his own way: 
He [Winnicott] recounts the history of psychoanalytic ideas not so much 
as it developed, but as he would like it to have been, rewriting Freud to 
make him a clearer and smoother predecessor of Winnicott's own vision 
(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983: 189). 
Guntrip (1975) commented that Winnicott was more revolutionary in practice than in 
theory. Winnicott himself wrote (1965b: 94) how "mature adults bring vitality to that 
which is ancient, old and orthodox by re-creating it after destroying it". 
Ronald Fairbairn 
In his narrative Fairbairn described : 
° our primary need as human beings for relationships 
° our loyalty to our earliest relationships and our unhealthy tendency to repeat their 
pattern and distort our self-image 
° healthy movement through stages of dependency from infantile dependence 
through towards `mature dependency' 
° the importance of the relationship with the therapist 
° the need to be open to new experience 
Fairbairn 's Psychodynamic Narrative 
As human beings our deepest need is for emotional contact and our deepest dread is 
the loss of such contact (also referred to as `separation anxiety'). We live all our lives 
to differing degrees with the consequences of an early sense of maternal deprivation 
(Fairbairn, 1944). 
The roots of our psychological difficulties lie in the loyal attachment we develop as 
infants (as a result of the experience of maternal deprivation) to our earliest 
relationships and their patterns (Fairbairn, 1943). We absorb, identify with and define 
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ourselves in terms of our earliest experiences of relationships. The degree of our pre- 
occupation with earliest experience is in proportion to the level of deprivation 
experienced. We maintain what Fairbaim (1943) variously refers to as an "obstinate 
attachment" or "unceasing devotion" to them. They are stored as "frozen dramas" in a 
"closed internal world. " We remain locked into these early experiences and patterns 
of deprivation. We set up current relationships to re-enact the original difficulty in a 
self-defeating pattern. We are pre-occupied with them at the expense of external 
relating (Grotstein, 1994). 
Where the childhood emotional deprivation was most severe the individual 
experiences an existential sense of emptiness, deadness and futility which Fairbairn 
refers to as a `schizoid state' (Fairbairn, 1940). 
We are psychologically healthy when we can absorb and learn from new experience 
and be able to differentiate past experiences from present experiences (Gomez, 1997). 
The task is to separate from both our actual parents and the parents and relationship 
patterns of our internal world. This allows for new and richer relations to develop 
though for some the fear of loss and dread of the emptiness is too great for such a risk 
to be taken (Mitchell, 1988). 
Fairbairn's Developmental Narrative 
We develop through our intersubjective experiences and where they are nourishing the 
infant is able to work through the stage of infantile dependency, through a transitional 
phase towards a state of "mature dependency" (Fairbaim, 1952). This involves an 
increasing capacity for more complex inter-subjective relating, from primary 
identification to the capacity for differentiated relationships with more equal give and 
take. 
The infant learns to manage the limitations of the personalities of the caregivers by 
distorting themselves and their self-image so as to leave the parent in the best possible 
light as a damage limitation exercise (Gomez, 1997). An `objective' assessment of the 
parent, even if it were possible, would create too much insecurity given the level of 
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dependence the infant experiences. This distortion is at the expense of inner security 
and a sense of wholeness: 
The child shapes, structures, and distorts his own experience, behaviour, 
and self-perception to maintain the best* possible relatedness with the 
parent; psychopathology is a consequence of disruptions in these early 
relations. The personality of the child shapes itself in complementarity 
with the personalities of the parents (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983: 179) 
Fairbairn's Treatment Narrative 
Fairbairn argues that the patient seeks help with recovering or developing the capacity 
for real and meaningful contact with others (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Progress 
is made through and is dependent on the relationship with the therapist. In Fairbairn's 
view an intersubjective encounter between patient and therapist is at the heart of the 
therapy: 
In my own opinion, the really decisive factor is the relationship of the 
patient to the analyst ... not just the relationship involved in the 
transference, but the total relationship existing between the patient and the 
analyst as persons .. the existence of such a personal relationship in outer 
reality not only serves the function of providing a means of correcting the 
distorted relationships which prevail in inner reality and influence the 
reactions of the patient to outer objects, but provides the patient with anopportunity, 
denied to him in childhood, to undergo a process of 
emotional development in the setting of an actual relationship with a 
reliable and beneficent parent figure (Fairbaim, 1958: 6/4). 
Therapy involves both a `being with' the patient but also a `doing to' in that the 
therapist has to force their way into the patients closed internal world, and "effect 
breaches of the closed system which constitutes the patient's internal world, and thus 
to make this world accessible to the influence of outer reality" (Fairbairn, 1958: 7). 
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The therapist finds himself assigned roles according to the patient's internal `frozen 
drama' and necessarily enacts some of these while seeking to understand what is 
happening (Gomez, 1997). Attempts at disengagement are likely to be another form of 
participation as there is there is no option of standing `outside' (Mitchell, 1988). There 
are only, forms of participation, many of them unintended. Fairbairn moved 
psychoanalytic practice towards a more intersubjective position. The task then of 
therapy is to find a way of observing these forms of participation and explore new 
ways of relating that go beyond the script. If the relationship with the therapist can be 
broadened then so can others. The aim is to make a connection between patient and 
therapist and so help the patient reconnect with himself and with others, to loosen the 
grip of the closed internal world. The classic stance of analytic neutrality could, 
Fairbairn believed, feed the schizoid position by the analyst's avoidance of contact 
(Fairbairn, 1958). Some measure of radical change is sought rather than a process of 
acceptance. 
Fairbairn (1958) argued for a soft-edged element to the application of the therapeutic 
method in recognition that the method was made for the patient, not the patient for the 
method. As such it would be necessary to adapt it to avoid the implication of the joke 
that "the operation was a success but the patient died" (Fairbaim, 1958: 6). 
Comment on Fairbairn 
Fairbaim's situation of relative isolation in Edinburgh from the mainstream of the 
psychoanalytic movement perhaps provided the space in which to formulate his theory 
from such a radically different starting point (Gomez, 1997). He abandoned theory 
built around the concept of instincts and placed instead relationships at the heart of his 
theory. He brought to therapy more account of its intersubjectivity. He combined a 
`being with' and a `doing to' though he himself was a very reserved man and 
restrained in therapy (Gomez, 1997). Guntrip (1975) suggested Fairbaim was more 
radical in theory than in practice. 
The attempt to summarise Fairbairn's developmental narrative highlighted how much 
emphasis he placed on the earliest years of life to account for later psychological 
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problems. Rutter (1981) argued that, while psychological problems in later life may 
clearly relate to early childhood experiences, they are equally clearly related to and 
dependent on later experiences. Fonagy and Target (2003) believed that 
psychodynamic theory needs to develop more understandings of psychological 
problems based on experiences in later childhood, adolescence and adulthood. This 
critique is not unique to Fairbairn but belongs with the range of psychodynamic 
developmental theory. 
John Bowlby and Attachment Theory 
The Attachment narrative described : 
0 our primary need for a secure attachment with an attuned other person 
° how insecure attachment patterns are replayed by the person in their subsequent 
relationships 
° how security allows for exploration 
° the therapist as providing a secure base in therapy from which the patient can 
explore painful areas of experience 
° how securely attached adults have the capacity to tell coherent stories 
The Attachment `Life' Narrative 
We need the experience of being securely attached in our lives: 
All of us, from the cradle to the grave, are happiest when life is organised 
as a series of excursions, long or short, from the secure base provided by 
our attachment figures (Bowlby, 1988: 62) 
If we have experienced such security as children we carry within ourselves a self- 
esteem and an expectation that there can be enjoyable explorations and relationships 
to be made in the world (Bowlby, 1988). If not, we are forced to develop less healthy 
defences that represent an attempt to keep some proximity to others. So we are forced 
to sacrifice exploration for the sake of security. Insecurity takes the form of patterns 
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of relating that have a quality of being either ambivalent or avoidant or 
disorganised 
(Holmes, 1993). 
As adults we replay our attachment patterns with others "as though there 
is a 
compulsion to find an object with whom the drama of attachment - however painful - 
may be re-ettacted" (Holmes, 1996: 104). 
Psychological health is displayed in the capacity for `narrative competence' which is 
the ability to give a coherent account of one's life. Such an ability points to the fact 
that the experiences of the narrator have attained within them a coherence of meaning 
and a sense of ownership (Holmes, 2001). 
The Attachment Developmental Narrative 
Infants need an attuned other who can offer a secure attachment: 
Whether a child is in a state of security, anxiety, or distress is determined 
in large part by the accessibility and responsiveness of his principal 
attachment figure (Bowlby, 1973: 20). 
Where this occurs the infant is able to internalise an inner security in the sense of 
carrying around their positive experience in a way that allows for expectations of 
further positive experiences and close relationships (Bowlby, 1969). Attachment 
behaviour has -clear timescales for the internalisation of attachments centred mainly on 
the first three years. By about the fourth year critical patterns have been laid down in 
the infant (Bowlby, 1969). 
The- concept of `attunement' refers to what is originally a parental task of being open 
to the infant in their need and individuality: 
Attunement is, by its very nature, non-controlling, following rather than 
leading, affective rather than instrumental. It is `aimless' in the sense that 
it cannot legislate in advance what will emerge from the playful and 
so 
spontaneous encounter between therapists and patients (Holmes, 
1998: 237). 
The Attachment Treatment Narrative 
The therapist offers a reliable, attuned and responsive presence and so seeks to create 
a secure base for the patient in the therapy (Bowlby, 1988). The experience of being 
provided with a secure base allows the patient to `do' the business of exploring. From 
this secure base the patient is able to begin to explore difficult experiences and 
tolerate the emotion that is aroused by re-engaging with them. The therapist in turn 
needs to tolerate protest and anger from the patient. Once a secure base in the shape of 
the therapist has been sufficiently internalised, the patient is able to leave therapy 
(Gomez, 1997). 
Narrative competence and coherence is promoted by the therapy in so far as it allows 
raw experience to be objectified and meaning created around it. Holmes (1993: 150) 
wrote: 
making the unconscious conscious can be reformulated as knowing and 
owning one's own story ... narrative turns experience into a story which is 
temporal, is coherent and has meaning. It objectifies experience so that the 
sufferer becomes detached from it, by turning raw feelings into symbols. It 
creates out of fragmentary experience an unbroken linear thread lining the 
present with the past or "future. Narrative gives a person a sense of 
ownership of their past and their life. 
Comment on Attachment Theory 
I have included a summary of the thinking of Bowiby and his followers though it is 
not an object relations theory in itself, as he said: 
I am with the Object Relations school but I have reformulated it in terms 
of modem biological concepts. It is my own independent vision (Bowlby 
quoted in Grosskurth 1986: 404). 
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Bowlby brought together the differing fields of psychoanalysis and evolutionary 
biology. Attachment theory's more empirical footing met his desire for a more 
scientific status to psychoanalysis and it expressed his belief in the central role of the 
environment in the creation of psychological problems (Gomez, 1997). 
Attachment theory is explicitly relational and intersubjective. The `self in crisis is an 
insecure self suffering a deficit of attention. The therapist `being with' the patient and 
providing a secure base is seen as allowing the patient to `do' the necessary exploring 
of their feelings and needs in the therapy. The clinical implications of attachment 
theory are as yet under-developed. 
As a theory it can seem too spatial and concrete which does not do justice to subtler 
emotions or to the concept of emotional absence (Gomez, 1997). The meaning of loss 
may be as important as the fact of loss. Perhaps it is not loss per se but the meaning 
given to it that is important to comprehend. Perhaps too the general handling of a 
child is as important as the specific events that occur (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). 
However, Bowlby put the maternal firmly within psychoanalytic discourse though 
paradoxically he had little to say about fathers perhaps reflecting the absence of his 
father in his childhood (Holmes, 1996). 
Secure attachments, according to the theory, allow the infant to explore more of their 
world, safe in the knowledge they can return to the care giver when they need to. I was 
struck by a parallel with attachments to a model of work. Where attachment is secure 
a therapist can explore beyond the model, needing neither to cling to the model in an 
enmeshed way, nor be avoidant and indiscriminate in the affection given to models. A 
secure enough hard-edged to attachment to a model would allow softer edges to be 
explored. 
For Holmes (1993) attachment theory is not another model to set alongside other 
models. Rather it offers a commentary on other models and Holmes thinks of it more 
as akin to one of the common factors described by Frank (1974). 
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Professional Knowledge and Professional Development 
Initially I was interested in whether professional knowledge was employed in different 
ways according to the stage of development of the therapist. As the work proceeded 
this ceased to be a focus but within the literature on developmental stages I found 
studies very relevant to the central themes of this research that reflected on the 
creativity and personal/professional integration or otherwise in the therapist's use of 
professional knowledge. 
Creativity and integration 
Skovholt and Ronnestad (1992) suggested that where a therapist's professional 
development proceeds along healthy and progressive lines, the therapist grows 
towards a `professional individuation' in which a rigidity of approach gradually 
declines and concepts and working style become increasingly personally congruent. 
`Continuous professional reflection' becomes the central developmental process and 
internal wisdom is relied on more than external expertise. In what they saw as a long, 
slow, and erratic process there is movement from "received knowledge towards 
constructed knowledge", a "decline of pervasive anxiety" and a "realignment from a 
narcissistic position to a therapeutic position. " 
Fleming (1953) suggested that positive professional experience facilitates a movement 
from imitative learning to creative learning. Hogan (1964) suggested a movement 
through levels fr om a very dependent stance, through a struggle between dependency 
and autonomy to a level of security and autonomy in which the therapist could see and 
address their own personal and professional needs. 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) described five developmental levels of expertise: novice, 
advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expert. Progression required, they 
argued, an increasing capacity to learn from and be guided by one's own experience. 
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Conformity and avoidance 
The idea of development as always progressive was questioned by Jablon (1987) and 
Zukar (1979). The stage of being a beginner may be one in which a therapist is more 
open, healthily naive and less institutionalised into a profession. 
Skovholt and Ronnestad (1992) described their findings of four typical orientations 
towards a conceptual system in students that reflect the struggle to choose and own a 
conceptual approach out of which a student therapist's clinical reasoning emerges: 
o The laissez-faire orientation involves a lack of engagement and choice perhaps 
requiring some personal development and maturing to enable progress to be 
made. 
o The suspended judgement orientation reflects the student's need for time 
before "a genuine commitment to a conceptual approach can be made. " 
o The true believer orientation reflects a commitment made without going 
through the struggle and search for a personally and professionally integrated 
position (though it may have involved this and so be healthier). 
oA multiple attachments orientation may parallel the laissez-faire stance in a 
struggle or lack of struggle to engage and choose. 
Skovholt and Ronnestad (1992) argued that trainings could only go so far in preparing 
a student for the reality of practice. They suggested the hazards of practice can result 
in the therapist, post-training, becoming overwhelmed with anxiety leading to the 
danger their professional practice is marked by "stagnation", "pseudo-development" 
and "premature closure". This can be thought of as a state of arrested professional 
development. Stagnation involves: 
The absence of Continuous Reflective Experiences and the fending off 
from experiencing anxiety arising from confrontation with challenges and 
complexities which the therapist is not able to handle (Skovolt and 
Ronnestad, 1992: 124). 
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`Pseudodevelopment' involves being guided by the work of others rather than 
choosing one's own professional identity. `Premature closure' involves interupting the 
reflection process in order to defend the therapist from the taxing challenge of 
assimilating the experience. 
Loganbill, Hardy and Delworth (1982) suggested that a recovery towards creativity 
and integration involved initially a stage of confusion when awareness had grown of 
wider thinking and the therapist's current limits. This was followed by a stage of 
integration where new but more flexible understanding was forged and strengths and 
limitations more openly addressed. 
Summary 
I have surveyed in this chapter the conceptual tools available to psychodynamic 
psychotherapists through an exploration of object relations theory and shifts within it 
towards postmodern, intersubjective perspectives. I have also looked at the relevance 
of developmental stages for the use of professional knowledge. 
In the next chapter I move on to look at the question of the status of professional 
knowledge and what grounds there might be for viewing it as a dependable body of 
knowledge. 
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THE STATUS OF PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
In this chapter I have addressed the question whether therapists can find a basis for 
viewing their professional knowledge as being a dependable body of knowledge. Such 
a need reflected the shift in our culture away from what now seems to be a naive 
belief in the possibility of a simple correspondence between theory and `reality'. Fact 
and value are now understood to be intertwined. As such therapists employ "truth 
without certainty" (Christopher, 1996). 
Phillips (1995: 6) referred to the Freud who was engaged in an enlightenment project 
that involved `knowing' in an objective sense. He argued that while, for Freud, we 
might find the truth about ourselves to be unacceptable, we were not per se 
unintelligible to ourselves. The self could be seen as an object whose constituent parts 
could be known. Freudian theory provided a kind of psychological x-ray into the 
foundational level of experience. The therapist, through their professional knowledge, 
enjoyed a privileged position when it came to knowing and understanding. 
Kuhn (1962) and other writers drew attention to the way our understanding of the 
status of knowledge had undergone profound shifts since Freud began formulating his 
ideas. Scientific knowledge, he argued, was not objective in some pure sense and did 
not hold a direct and simple correspondence to reality. On the contrary, fact and value 
were intertwined. 
Christopher (1996: 18) argued we need to recognise the way that "values are 
intersubjective, unavoidable, and inextricably intertwined with facts" and he referred 
to "counseling's inescapable moral visions". Christopher (1996: 33) quoted Bickhard 
(1980): 
the concept of knowledge as objective, to which we then attach values, 
purposes, goals, and so forth is mistaken. Objective knowledge is a myth. 
All knowledge is motivationally structured. 
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Mitchell and Greenberg (1983) asserted that psychodynamic theory rested 
(as did all 
theory) on untestable assumptions such that they were better thought of as 
involving 
"metaphysical commitments" or, in other terms, `acts of faith'. Mitchell (1993: 48) 
questioned the nature of the dilemma this had raised for therapists and whether 
it 
opened the door to a different type of knowledge: 
The shift from a view that the analyst knows the Truth to the view that the 
analyst knows one (or more) among various possible truths about the 
patient's experience has created a crisis of confidence in psychoanalytic 
theorising and a crisis of authority in the psycho-analyst's self-image. The 
certainty and its consequent hopefulness that pervaded traditional psycho- 
analytic theorising have become inaccessible to contemporary analytic 
theorists or clinicians. Is this a problem? Is uncertainty a cause for 
nihilism and dread, or the basis for a different sort of knowledge? If the 
content of what analysts know is not the Truth, is the authority that 
analysts can claim diminished ? 
Mitchell's questions - in particular the question, "Is this a problem? " - went to the 
heart of my research question. So I focused my literature search on an exploration of 
the question whether the professional knowledge that informed the therapist could be 
viewed as a dependable body of knowledge and, if so, in what way and with what 
criteria. 
Much of the literature I reviewed was concerned with this inability of therapists to 
claim anymore a simple correspondence between their theory and `reality' and 
whether it had left therapists with only a relativist position available or whether 
there was a path "beyond objectivism and relativism" (Bernstein 1983). 
McLeod (2001: 28) provided a working definition of epistemology: 
epistemology... refers to the way in which people gain knowledge about the 
world and come to regard some beliefs as true and others as false. 
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Ways of 'Knowing' 
In the literature I found described the three traditional `ways of knowing', namely the 
empirical, hermeneutical and phenomenological approaches. I explored what 
contribution they might make to the question of the status of a therapist's professional 
knowledge. 
Empiricism 
Gellner (1985), Popper (1974) and Grunbaum (1984) were among those who 
criticised psychoanalytic theorising for failing what they regarded as empirical tests 
that would offer a validation of a professional knowledge base and practice. Truth in 
their view required an empirical demonstration of correspondence. 
These writers opened up for me the question of the extent to which a therapist had to 
be able to lay claim to a solid empirical foundation for their professional knowledge 
for it to be seen as a dependable form of knowledge. 
Counter-arguments to the views of Gellner, Popper and Grunbaum came from many 
sources. Rustin (1987: 109) wrote of the relativity of empirical methods and argued 
that empiricism as a method belonged more to the natural sciences than the human 
sciences: 
there is no natural law that all aspects of reality must be equally amenable 
to investigation by the empirical methods favoured by certain philosophers 
of science. Some dimensions may exist yet only be accessible by 
particular, and in certain respects, contentious and problematic methods of 
investigation. 
Mitchell (1998: 8) suggested science produced empirically verifiable knowledge while 
social sciences produced: 
knowledge (e. g. the concept of unconscious processes) that is verifiable 
through plausibility and enrichment of common sense. Different types of 
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knowledge. require different forms of confirmation to establish their 
credibility. 
Nagel (1995: 31) argued similarly that real life. is more complex than empiricism is 
We to take account of 
Much of human life consists of complex events with multiple causes and 
background conditions that will never precisely recur. If we wish to 
understand real life, it is useless to demand repeatable experiments with 
strict controls ... [In any particular case] we simply 
have to decide whether 
this is an intuitively credible extension of a general structure of 
explanation that we find well supported elsewhere, and whether it is more 
plausible than the alternatives - including the alternative that there is no 
psychological explanation. 
Bhaskar (1978,1979) described what he called "generative structures" which were 
more than could be observed but which could be deduced from their effect. Rustin 
(1987: 125) saw this as a good description of the status of concepts such as `the 
internal world' or `the unconscious'. He argued that the natural sciences routinely 
depend on the measurement of such `indirect' effects and that pragmatic criteria, 
rather than idealised criteria are needed for judging the validity of psychodynamic 
ideas and practice: 
The demonstration by the `new sociology of science' of the degree to 
which all science depends on consensual procedures and on acceptance of 
the expertise of qualified observers should make one wary of an idealised 
view of the natural scientific method conceived as commonsensical in its 
methods of observation, open and democratic in its access to findings, and 
freely competitive in its modes of selection between competing 
hypotheses. There is no point in judging psychoanalysis by a normative 
standard to which virtually no scientific work conforms. 
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Mitchell (1998) believed empirical studies could only shape theorising but not 
decide on the basic assumptions in the context of which theorising takes place. Such 
assumptions are shaped by a therapist's professional community and life experience. 
Empirical studies are of value to and necessary for practice, he argued, but empiricism 
has set up a false standard against which to measure the dependability of the 
knowledge that underpins a therapist's clinical reasoning: 
I do not regard my model as empirically derived and objective, although it 
has certainly been shaped by empirical data and would likely be shaken 
and somewhat changed in response to disconfirming empirical data and 
any growing consensus of clinicians regarding some other viewpoint. I 
regard my model as one among many possible and valid ways of viewing 
Psychopathology, one that reflects both the interpretative community that I 
was drawn to and trained in, and also my own past and distinctly 
subjective experience (Mitchell, 1998: 20). 
Hermeneutics 
The hermeneutic approach emphasised the way that knowledge was created through 
acts of interpretation which were seen as "bringing to light an underlying coherence or 
sense within the action, behaviours or utterances of a person or group" (McLeod, 
2001: 22). A therapy patient could be viewed in these terms as a `human text' with 
whom and for whom a hermeneutic perspective could be employed usefully. 
The notion of perspective was central to a hermeneutical approach. As individuals we 
are immersed in our culture and need to accept that, while also reaching out to or into 
the text or subject to learn what it has to tell us from within its world. This approach 
seeks to develop understandings rather than explanations. 
A degree of relativity was explicit in a hermeneutic stance with knowing seen as an 
active process of composing, arranging, interpreting and constructing. Mitchell 
(1998: 16) wrote that "consciousness comes into being through acts of construction 
either by others or, through self-reflection, by oneself'. Kermode (1985) felt that 
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commented that the past. was constructed in the here and now rather that 
reconstructed. Viderman (1979) suggested that experiences did not have a structure of 
shape in themselves. Schafer (1980b: 3) argued that : 
a version of the past can only be a narrative about past narratives. And the 
past towards which we might adopt a fatalistic attitude is not more than 
one contemporary historical narrative that, for certain purposes, we take to 
be true and final. 
Dennett (1991: 136) wrote of the way it is not possible to lay claim to a canonical 
version of events : 
Just what we are conscious of within any particular time duration is not 
defined independently of the probes we use to precipitate a narrative about 
that period. Since these narratives are under continual revision, there is no 
single narrative that counts as the canonical version, the "first edition" in 
which are laid down, for all time, the events that happened in the stream of 
consciousness of the subject, all deviations from which must be 
corruptions of the text. 
While a degree of relativity was explicit, there was a fierce debate about the extent of 
it. Mitchell (1993) suggested some look to hermeneutics to solve the dilemma of 
`truth' by giving up on correspondence altogether and accepting that `truth' is created 
and not found. Erwin (1997) argued that, with more radical constructivism, we are left 
only with `fictionalism'. In such a view our experience constitutes the world. Such a 
view entirely discounts the correspondence theory of truth. Neimeyer (1993) 
suggested as his criteria for constructivist validation the importance of internal 
consistency, social consensus, viability and multiplicity. Therapy became, for him, 
similar to art and poetry. 
Sass (1988) criticised such views as involving the "subjectivisation of reality", if truth 
is regarded as only self-referential. He located such views in what he saw as a 
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postmodern sense of perspectivism and the current power of the image over the 
substance. It had led to a postmodern loss of reality and a potential loss of depth. 
Holmes (1992) sought to locate psychotherapy as between art and science, not 
wanting to lose touch with either. 
Gadamer (1975) further emphasised how interpretations needed to be created out of 
an awareness of the cultural and historical context of the issue. Warnke (1987: 107) 
described how in a hermeneutical study "understanding ... involves a transformation of 
the initial positions of both "text" and "interpreter" in a "fusion of horizons" or 
consensus of meaning". The approach was described as much deeper than the making 
of simple acts of interpretation. It presupposed that an act of engagement had been 
made by the interpreter. 
The hermeneutic approach could be viewed as requiring therapists to acknowledge the 
constructed nature of their professional knowledge and the need for an engagement 
and for an awareness of context. It did not necessarily require, I felt, a therapist take a 
purely relativist position with regard to their knowledge base and its dependability. It 
could be regarded as a disciplined way of knowing. 
Phenomenology 
The phenomenological approach sought to set aside assumptions and examine 
phenomena in an open-minded way, pulling away the particular so as to allow the 
essence of the phenomenon to be experienced. It was well applicable to personal 
experience. For early phenomenologists it represented a search for the objective (i. e. 
correspondence) and not the relative. McLeod (2001: 40) suggested therapy is similar 
at times : 
There are points in the therapy when most therapists will encourage their 
clients to bracket off their assumptions about their problems, describe 
their experiences in detail, express their sense of their experience in fresh 
language, and, in general, `overthrow and build anew' their understanding 
of self and relationships. 
63 
Rustin (1987) also saw parallels in a reaction within psychoanalytic practice against 
theory and theorising for its own sake. He suggested there had been a refocusing on 
the here and now so that in significant ways the question of origin or archaeology of 
the problem had been `bracketed out' in favour of a focus on the experience of the 
present: 
Theoretical reasoning for its own sake seems to have been devalued in this 
tradition, except where a precise and emotionally resonant embodiment of 
theoretical concepts in phenomena of experience can be given"...... There 
has been a reaction against mere `theorising' and model-building 
unsupported by the evidence of analytic `experience', and a great deal of 
attention is given in training to the development of what might be called 
`observation skills' to ensure that concepts and theories are as securely 
and consensually as possible anchored in their perception of psychic 
events (Rustin, 1987: 114). 
Post-Kleiman psychoanalysis, Rustin (1987) felt, had embraced the value of a 
phenomenological (and hermeneutical) view. The clearest example was in the work of 
Wilfred Bion (1967a) who stressed the value of `not-knowing' and the importance, 
with deeply disturbed patients, of clearing out from the mind (i. e. bracketing off) all 
theory and preconceptions: 
Bion came to feel that in order to make any progress with analysis of 
psychotic disturbance it was necessary to empty the mind of theoretical 
preconceptions, which became in these conditions merely defences against 
what had to be experienced in feeling before it could be thought about, 
known before it could be known about (Rustin, 1987: 153). 
Mitchell (1993) suggested some look to phenomenology to `solve' the problem of 
truth by privileging the patient's truth. If we can not naively privilege the therapist's 
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account then some phenomenologists look to privilege the patient account and view it 
as the truth, the patient's truth. Schwaber (1990: 238) advocated such a stance : 
the closer we can stay to their [the patient's] experience of the moment 
(the closer we stay to the data), the less we are tempted to teach another 
truth, the more deeply our patients will be able to observe and face their 
own. 
However, Mitchell (1993) saw this as an attempt to return to the naive realism of 
Freud's day and quoted Dennett (1991: 96) in support: 
If you want us to believe everything you say about your phenomenology 
you are asking not just to be taken seriously but to be granted papal 
infallibility and that is asking too much. You are not authoritative about 
what is happening in you, but only about what seems to be happening in 
you, and we are giving you total, dictatorial authority over the account of 
how it seems to you, about what it is like to be you. 
Crotty (1996) was concerned that the radical tradition within phenomenology is lost 
when phenomenology is reduced to more simple description of subjective experiences 
without a critical questioning of the assumptions we have taken for granted within 
them. 
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism 
There was a search described in the literature for a stance "beyond objectivism and 
relativism" (Bernstein, 1983), for middle ground between "anachronistic objectivism 
and irresponsible relativism.... a position neither uniquely objective or idiosyncratically 
subjective"(Mitchell, 1998: 26). 
I looked for definitions of objectivism and subjectivism in the context of 
psychotherapy. Hobson (1985) pointed me some way towards evolving my own 
working definition in terms of Buber's (1937) distinction between `I-Thou' and 'I-It' 
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relationships. Objectivism implied a belief that people could be characterised 
in terms 
of observations made in other contexts and employing existing classifications, 
definitions and frames of normality. An objectivist view drew on the perspectives of 
already existing cultural knowledge and found them sufficient. It implied the 
possibility of having a `God's- eye' view of `reality' (Haraway, 1988). Subjectivism or 
relativism took as it focus what was particular, unique, a "universe of one" (Erickson, 
1958). It could be thought of as privileging an "I-Thou" type of knowing, a 
perspective gained from the experience of being with someone. Subjectivism implied 
a lack of correspondence with `reality', a relativism in which truth was seen as self- 
referential and one's participation framed the whole picture. Mitchell (1998) viewed it 
as a swing of the pendulum against objectivism. 
Nagal (1974: 178) suggested that "at present we are completely unequipped to think 
about the subjective character of experience without relying on the imagination - 
without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject". 
Christopher (1996: 24) wrote of the need to define a third way beyond objectivism and 
relativism: 
As counsellors, we need to continue efforts made by philosophers to find a 
path of understanding "beyond objectivism and relativism"..... we must 
acknowledge that there are no ahistorical, neutral, or strictly objective 
criteria that counsellors can adopt. However, this does not necessarily 
thrust us into a debilitating relativism in the face of which we must 
conclude that every moral vision or way of life is equally "good" and that 
there are no grounds for criticising values and practices that we deem 
oppressive, racist, sexist, or otherwise unworthy ... we need to define a 
middle ground or third way beyond objectivism and relativism based on a 
search for truth and moral insight with full awareness that no final or 
certain formulations of them are possible (or even desirable). 
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Pragmatic Rationality 
Barker et al (1994: 11) drew my attention to Hamlyn's (1970) four fundamental 
epistemological positions or criteria: 
° the correspondence theory of truth according to which a , theory could 
be regarded 
as true if it `matched' or `corresponded' to reality. 
° the coherence theory of truth according to which a theory could be regarded as true 
if it was logical and internally consistent. 
° pragmatic and utilitarian criteria according to which a theory could be regarded as 
for practical purposes "true" if it was useful and produced practical benefits. 
° criteria based around consensus according to which truth could be viewed as 
intersubjectively validated in that knowledge was shared and held by a group. 
Bernstein (1983) disagreed with the notion that the loss of simple correspondence had 
led to a free for all. The lack of a direct correspondence between theory and reality, he 
argued, had not led to relativism but to the development of different criteria for 
making judgements based around use, consensual appeal and economy of explanation. 
He referred to this as the employment of a "pragmatic rationality". It appeared to me 
to have involved an interweaving of Hamlyn's (1970) four criteria. 
Combining Criteria 
A critical realist perspective in the literature implied that a measure of correspondence 
did not have to be abandoned. O'Hear (1991) argued that we have to be critical 
realists at the end of the day as without an assumption of a relatively stable world 
independent of us we could not hope to categorise our experiences. 
He quoted Newatt's analogy that "knowledge is a ship on which we are afloat which 
we can therefore only change plank by plank". As a critical realist O'Hear (1991) 
made the assumption that both a real world exists with regularities but that our 
knowledge of it is necessarily uncertain and tentative. He argued we can still be 
realists about our perceptions without naively accepting that everything is as it 
appears. 
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Rustin (1991) also argued strongly. for a realist position and felt that without the 
premise of a `deep interior structure' a therapist has nothing different to offer a 
patient: 
What seems to distinguish psychoanalysis from other `talking cures' is its 
postulation of `deep structures' of mind unavailable to common sense 
observations, and the equipping of its practitioners with concepts and 
theories which, under specified observational conditions, can grasp hold 
of this ulterior level of meanings (Rustin, 1991: 126). 
The idea of unconscious states of mind, systematically and `intentionally' 
hidden from the patient's conscious awareness, is the crucial hypothesis 
which prises open the possibility of bringing the patient fresh insight 
about himself. The essential theoretical hypothesis is that there is an 
ulterior structure. Without this the analyst will have nothing to offer 
beyond sympathy and common sense, resources which many patients will 
already have tried to the point of exhaustion among their friends and 
relations before seeking professional help (Rustin, 1991: 121). 
O'Hear (1991) described a move to a social basis for knowledge. He argued that we 
know that the earth moves around the sun but we probably could not prove it 
ourselves. However that was not a problem if we moved away, from individualistic, 
atomistic accounts of knowledge supported by traditional philosophical definitions of 
knowledge in which each knower would ideally have reasons for what he knew. Such 
a view was being replaced he suggested by a view of knowledge as a socially 
constructed systematic body of statements with no absolute foundations. 
Habermas (1968) pointed to the common world we all shared. Our culture and society 
all pointed, he felt, to a sense that we were able to understand each other a sufficient 
amount of the time and that we shared ways of constructing our understandings of 
experience within a culture. This was a commonality into which a therapist could tap. 
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Nagel (1974: 19) suggested: 
a view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on 
the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world, or on 
the character of the particular type of creature he is. The wider the range of 
subjective types to which a form of understanding is accessible - the less it 
depends on specific subjective capacities - the more objective it is. 
Rorty (1991) suggested a shift from the question `what is truth? ' to the question `what 
are we justified in believing? ' Phillips (1997: 131) suggested a shift from the question 
`is there an unconscious? ' to the question `in what sense are our lives better if we live 
as if there is an unconscious? ' He also suggested a shift from the question `what is a 
sel#? ' to the question `what do I use the idea of a self to do? ' 
A shift in such questions reflected for Mitchell (1998) a shift in understanding of the 
mind from something regarded as preformed, distinct and there to be revealed, to a 
view of the mind as ambiguous and too complex for simple reductionism 
(Mitchell, 1998). 
In Practice 
Fonagy and Target (2003) have referred to the process that underpins the development 
of practice as `enumerative inductionism'. Therapists, they argued, accumulate 
observations about particular patients and attend to them selectively in the light of 
their previous experience and their clincial theories, values and philosophies. Theory 
used in practice reflects what is found to be useful clincially rather than what is 
deemed to be `true' in itself. 
Fonagy and Target (2003) did not argue that this is inappropriate, so long as the 
therapist recognised how much induction was being used as a basis for theory and 
clinical reasoning. Theory develops according to what is found to be clinically useful 
rather than by a standard of whether it can be deemed true. They emphasised how 
most human reasoning shares. this flaw of an inattention to what might disconfirm a 
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theory. They quote the quip as having some validity that "psychoanalytic clinicians 
understand the word data to be a plural of the word anecdote" 
(Fonagy and 
Targer, 2003283). 
They held firmly to the point of view that clinical theory is not something deductions 
can be reliably made from. Rather it is a `heuristic' device, a way of enquiring and 
opening out issues and it should not be elevated into the status of clinical `law'. 
Christopher (1996) employed the image of a `hermeneutic dialogue' in considering 
how truth or understanding was arrived at in a therapy. He saw counselling as "an 
encounter between moral visions : those of the counsellor and those of the client" 
(1996: 22). He described working earlier in his practice with the imperative of 
privileging the patient's moral vision and working to avoid any imposition of his own 
views. However, he concluded this idea of neutrality was itself part of a moral vision 
that he found increasingly problematic. He commented (19.96: 22) that: 
this relativism disempowers us as counsellors..... we are caught between 
wanting to respect the moral visions of the clients and needing to be able 
to make some normative evaluations or discrimination between what is 
proper and improper or what is psychologically healthy and pathological 
in human behaviour... there is no simple answer. 
He referred to Gadamer's (1975) idea of a "fusion of horizons" emerging from a 
dialogue and suggested there needed to be a dialectic. This, Christopher argued 
(1996: 22) would involve an openness to the possible truth or validity of anther's 
moral vision, giving it a "provisional authority ..... to challenge our own. 
" However it 
would also involve a testing "in a critical manner whether the possible insights gained 
from openness really do make better sense of a person's concrete situation or reveal 
hitherto hidden features of it". He suggested such an ongoing dialectic between the 
two stances. The task is "to respect the client's moral visions while subjecting them to 
the challenge posed by the current understandings of mental health and the good life. 
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The counselling process can thus be fruitfully viewed as a form of hermeneutic 
dialogue. " 
Ogden (2003) employed poetic vein in an attempt to describe the nature of `relative 
truth' and the way something that is experienced as relatively emotionally true is 
discovered and altered within the analysis. Psychotherapy involved, he argued, 
coming to say "something that feels both true to the emotional experience of any 
given moment of an analytic session and utilisable by the analytic pair for 
psychological work" (Ogden, 2003: 593). Relative emotional truths he regarded as 
"very close to the music of what happens" or "a momentary stay against confusion" 
as opposed to absolute truth. Such human emotional truths were universal and 
timeless but at the same time they also idiosyncratic and specific to a moment. They 
were independent of the investigator -a thought finding a thinker - and had a reality 
independent of their formulation. So thinkers did not create truth, they described it. 
However in the process it was altered (Ogden, 2003: 597): 
what is true is a discovery as opposed to a creation, and yet, in making 
that discovery, we alter what we find and, in that sense, create something 
new. 
The analyst's idea of truth was a speculation, in Ogden's view (2003), until it was 
brought into relationship to something external to the analyst i. e. grounded in a world 
outside the mind of the analyst. So Bion (1967b) felt it took at least two people to 
think. For Ogden (2003: 605) the question of who is the author of a relative emotional 
truth was not relevant: 
if there was an author, it was the unconscious third subject of analysis who 
is everyone and no one -a subject who was both Mr V, and neither of us. 
For Mitchell (1993), psychoanalytic theory was "tested" in the clinical setting and 
revised, adopted or dropped but there were consensual standards. In a move away 
from a focus on what a therapist or patient knew, Mitchell (1993) suggested the task 
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was to help a patient with their capacity for meaning making and that psychoanalytic 
theories were emotionally powerful ways of organising experience and aiding the 
process of meaning making: 
For me the analytic process is about expanding and enriching the patient's 
experience of his own mind and facilitating his capacity to generate 
experience that he finds vitalising and personally meaningful 
(Mitchell, 1993: 24). 
Theories of mind such as those of Melanie Klein, Winnicott, Leowald, 
Kohut and others do not portray the actual, universal structure of mind, 
but they do provide emotionally powerful ways to organise experience 
(Mitchell, 1993 :7 5). 
The kind of knowledge and authority that I believe today's analytic 
clinician can justifiably claim is an expertise in meaning-making, self- 
reflection, and the organisation and re-organisation of experience. 
(Mitchell, 1998: 2). 
Summary 
At the beginning of this chapter I raised the question whether therapists could find a 
basis for viewing their professional knowledge as being a dependable body of 
knowledge. Such a need reflected the shift in our culture away from what now seems 
to be a naive belief in the possibility of a simple correspondence between theory and 
`reality'. Fact and value are now understood to be intertwined. As such therapists 
employ "truth without certainty" (Christopher, 1996). 
I found in the literature arguments, persuasive to me as a clinician, that this did not 
need to lead to an `epistemological quagmire' for therapists. Rather the employment 
of a "pragmatic rationality" (Bernstein, 1983) was available to therapists, involving a 
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critical realist stance (O'Hear, 1991) and an interweaving of Hamlyn's (1970) four 
epistemological positions. 
The empirical, hermeneutical and phenomenological approaches could be thought of 
as providing differing emphases and as each offering a valuable perspective in 
studying psychological life without the need to be tied into any one. The empirical 
stance called for a grounding (where possible) in what was visibly demonstrable. The 
hermeneutical stance pointed to the way all understanding was from a perspective that 
needed to be engaged with. The phenomenological stance advocated a search for the 
essence of a phenomenon by setting aside all previous assumptions and this offered a 
valuable ideal. 
The professional knowledge that therapists hold can, it is argued here, be seen as 
neither solely relative nor solely objective nor entirely pre-existent of the therapy. 
There are criteria (Hamlyn, 1970) which, when interwoven, allow for a critically realist 
stance to be held. 
73 
74 
THE USE AND MISUSE OF PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
At the beginning of my research I explored the literature for critical debates about the 
use of professional knowledge in practice in order to develop a base in the literature 
from which to assess the interviews. I found critiques emerged from within and 
without the profession. The debate in the literature was fierce and, for some, such 
critiques had the status of `fundamental flaws' that invalidated practice. For others, 
such critiques pointed to `blind spots' that therapists needed to attend to in their 
practice. Those critiques that relate more specifically to epistemology are addressed 
within the chapter on the status of professional knowledge. 
The four main areas 'of critique particularly relevant to my research concerned the 
limitations of the body of knowledge that informs the practice of therapists and the 
employment of that body of knowledge. Critics charged that psychodynamic 
psychotherapists (among others), in their use of their professional knowledge, 
employed an inappropriately individualistic focus. They displayed a lack of awareness 
of the intersubjective nature of the encounter in therapy. They assumed too great a 
measure of objectivity on the therapist's part. They lacked a sensitivity to issues of 
power and influence. 
Clinical individualism 
A lack of cultural awareness 
The professional knowledge of psychodynamic psychotherapists was charged with 
lacking an awareness of the way that the experience of identity is culture-dependent. 
Maclntyre (1981: 216) and Bruner (1990: 34) wrote respectively: 
I can only answer the question "What am I to do ?" if I can answer the 
prior question "Of what stories do I find myself a part? " 
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When we enter human life, it is as if we walk on to stage in a play whose 
enactment is already in progress -a play whose somewhat open plot 
determines what parts we may play and towards what denouements we 
may be heading. 
There were examples in the literature where authors started with a focus on society 
rather than the individual and so suggested ways in which our identity and experience 
were socially constructed. However these were not within the mainstream of 
literature that psychodynamic psychotherapists drew on. 
Cushman (1990) wrote of the modem self as an "empty self' fashioned to be so by the 
needs of the modem consumer economy. Lasch (1984: 229) described what he saw as 
`the narcissistic personality of our time'. He felt it to be well suited to the needs of 
bureaucratic institutions which "put a premium on the manipulation of interpersonal 
relations, discourage the formation of deep personal attachments, and at the same time 
provide the narcissist with the approval he needs in order to validate his self-esteem". 
Gergen (1994) saw the modem self as a "saturated self', bombarded with information, 
perspectives and opportunities which led to a sense of `self as fragmented and 
inconsistent. Seabrooke (2004) described the way he felt we are tantalised by a 
society which excites us with all the possibilities apparently available to us but leaves 
us then facing the impossibility of stuffing "eternity into a single human life" and "at a 
loss to know where to start". 
An uncritical relationship to individualist ideology 
Critics took psychotherapists to task for the way their professional knowledge 
reflected uncritically the individualist ideology of our culture so that fundamentally 
social problems had become `privatised'. 
Kvale (1992) pointed to the grip of individualistic ideologies in a culture where there 
appear to be no truths outside of man. Self-realisation, he argued, had become the goal 
of life. 
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Clarkson (1993) wrote of therapy's "interiority", its "ethical solipsism" and its "self- 
absorption". Banton et al (1985) linked individualism with the rise of capitalism. 
Leonard (quoted in Spinelli, 1994) saw Freudian instinct theory as treating social 
factors as ahistorical and not about particular systems of social organisation and 
oppression. Pilgrim (1992) felt Freud placed in the centre of his understanding of what 
it means to be human not a social struggle but an "intra-personal instinctual struggle". 
Masson (1992) levelled the charge against Freud of underplaying the reality of sexual 
abuse in favour of fantasy. 
In response, Holmes (1993) argued that while pre-war therapy might be accused of 
neglecting the environment and privileging the internal that could not be said of post- 
war developments in which the likes of Bowlby, Fairbaim and Winnicott had all 
explicitly sought to describe and theorise about the role of the environment. The 
reality of sexual abuse was not now questioned, Holmes (1993) argued, but the debate 
had moved on to an evaluations of its impact and treatment. 
Holmes and Lindley (1989: 14) suggested psychotherapists privilege the personal and 
private in a way that is paradoxically neglected in our individualist culture. They 
argued that therapy: 
restores the inner, private world of the individual and his family to what 
Habermas calls the `public sphere'...... an area of social reality, subject to 
change, open to analysis and discussion. The feminist movement, which 
undoubtedly has psychotherapeutic roots, however critical it may be of the 
chauvinistic aspects of therapy, is an example of a social force that has 
brought a particular segment of `private life' into the realm of public 
debate. Similarly, psychotherapy, both in its private encounter with the 
patient and in its public face, has responsibility for a part of human 
experience that, in our society, only it takes seriously. 
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Frosh (1986) argued that therapy does have radical potential both as theory and 
practice. He suggested it provided a person with "a position within discourse". The 
radical potential he saw in therapy was located in its capacity to "interrogate" the 
power structures of society that we find within ourselves and help alter our stance 
towards them. He argued that: 
if personality is socially organised then so is personal distress; 
investigating the desires and anxieties of individuals leads irresistibly to 
social critique ... the position taken here is that psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy can operate to interrogate and alter the internalised stance 
taken up by each individual with. respect to the social world 
(Frosh, 1986: 39). 
Gomez (1997: 212) saw Object Relations Theory as being still part of an individualist 
outlook while also looking to move beyond it. She pointed to a paradox at the heart of 
object relations theory, namely that it "focuses its attention on individual experience 
while defining the essence of this experience as beyond the individual". She saw the 
language used for the self as mainly spatial and physical in tone and suggested that 
reflected the culture in which the theory was born and its wish and need to experience 
the `self as solid and firm. She regarded this as a comforting illusion. Gomez (1997) 
felt it unreasonable to expect object relations theory to have shed its culturally 
individualist roots completely but saw the need to work towards developing a wider 
and more relational language for the self. 
Misdiagnosis and Conformity 
A lack of cultural awareness and an uncritical relationship to the dominant 
individualism of our culture, had led therapists to a misdiagnosis of social problems 
as individual problems thereby indirectly promoting a conformity in patients. 
Masson (1992) argued that such an ideology promotes resignation and pathologises 
any protest. Smail (1987: 11) felt psychotherapy to be "at best ... a temporary comfort, 
at worst a distraction" because of it's tendency to convert "real powerlessness into 
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personal inadequacies" and read "socio-political advantage as inner strength". 
Marcuse (1966) saw therapy in practice (though not in theory) as a "course in 
resignation" which aimed at returning to the individual "the capacity to function in a 
sick civilisation without capitulating completely". Szaz (1979) criticised therapists, 
from a libertarian standpoint, for being undisclosed agents of social control, hiding the 
imposition of their values beneath the cloak of objective professionalism. 
Frosh (1986: 53) wanted to avoid a reversal of the order of causality between the 
individual and society which he saw occurring within object relations theory: 
The idea that social processes may in some way produce psychological 
processes - that they may be constitutive of psychic structure - is outside 
the scope of object relations theory. Thus the proposals [of the theory, 
especially Fairbaim's] concerning mature relationships suggest that it is 
possible for them to occur whatever the social structure or, more 
accurately, without reference to the social structure in which they are 
embedded. 
There was some acknowledgement from within psychotherapy of a neglect of the 
social and political dimensions of life. Samuels (in Dryden, 1 992: xv) wrote of the need 
to confront: 
psychotherapy's neglect (denial, repression) of the political factor in 
human experience and the manner in which the political dimension 
inflects all of human experience..... In order to make a contribution to 
political analysis, depth psychology must face the problem that it is not 
possible to depict a person divorced from his or her cultural, social, 
gender, ethnic and above all economic and ecological context. 
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An Intersubjective Encounter 
Therapists were criticised for having been slow to take on in their thinking the 
importance of the therapist's personality, values and influence. 
A slow but significant growth was described by some observers in the 
acknowledgement in psychoanalytic theorising of the role and place of the therapist's 
personality. Alice and Michael Balint (1939) argued that the mirror-like attitude of the 
therapist was now open to challenge whereas previously such a challenge would have 
been regarded as an act of desertion. 
Mitchell (2000: 26) wrote of the realisation that "the analytic relationship is no longer 
usefully understood as the sterile operating theatre Freud believed it could be... the 
analyst is not a blank screen; the analyst's feelings, including passionate feelings, are 
inevitably part of the process and, often, usefully so". However, he argued, not all 
therapists have taken on board what he referred to as the `revolution in theory', with 
some still seeing themselves much more as observers than participants. 
Klauber (1981) suggested this might relate to a fear that the perceived objectivity of 
the therapist might be misconstrued as having been undermined by such a recognition 
of the intersubjectivity of the encounter. Fairbairn (1958: 6) wrote of the relationship 
between patient and therapist analyst as being the "really decisive factor" and he was 
referring not just to the transference relationship but "the total relationship existing 
between the patient and the analyst as persons". 
Benjamin (1995) argued that there was still some way to go for therapists to take on 
board a fuller vision of the intersubjectivity of the therapy encounter. She described a 
tendency for subjects to be collapsed into objects and saw this as a problem a 
relational theory should aim to cure. She paraphrased Freud that "where objects were, 
there subjects shall be". She outlined a concept of "mutual recognition" that we have 
of each other and asked "where is the theory that tracks the development of the child's 
responsiveness, empathy, and concern, and not just the parent's sufficiency or 
failure? " (Benjamin, 1995: 46). 
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Lakin (1988: 58) believed that "therapists are not trained to understand how their 
values and orientations are reflected in their interventions" and commented on how 
little research had been conducted into the process of `value induction' whereby 
patients come to adopt the therapist's values. 
McLeod (1998: 264) described the dilemma for therapists of how to be "powerful and 
influential without imposing [their] own moral values and choices". 'Erikson 
(1976: 52) wrote similarly that : 
therapists may not escape the task of acknowledging that they must make 
value judgements about what they deem healthy and what they deem 
pathological. Thus practitioners must create an ethical niche for 
themselves by clarifying their ideologies of healthy conduct. 
McLeod (1998: 295) further wrote of the therapist's work as being "moral work from a 
value position". Taking intersubjectivity seriously would involve the therapist in being 
aware of their values and how they informed their use of professional knowledge in 
their practice. 
Assumptions of Objectivity 
Therapists were criticised for making excessive claims for the objectivity of their 
professional knowledge in practice. Their expertise was at times idealised resulting in 
a surfeit of objectivity being attributed to the therapist. Holmes and Lindley (1991: 12) 
suggested critics like Popper, Eysenck, Geliner and Medawar: 
portray psychoanalysis and many therapies as latter-day religions 
masquerading as science, immune to criticism or falsifiability. 
Weldon (1993) described therapy as a new religion whose law is "know thyself' and 
which preaches "follow us and you will be healed". Therapists will tell you how to 
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live and what to feel. It had become, she felt, a whole industry which was in danger: 
of becoming a controlling and ravening monster.... These are the gods, the 
priests of our new society, the therapists. I fear we trust them at our peril. 
Therapists like anyone else are prone to error (Weldon: 1993: 5). 
An inflated view by therapists of their professional knowledge had led to closed 
systems of thought that were too self-referential. Spence (1993: 7) wrote of the risk of 
"making `discoveries' that are little more than projections". Bruner (1993) was critical 
of the way psychoanalysts became bound together suggesting it would have been 
better if Freud had left for his colleagues "the gift for ensuring there were always 
interesting strangers in the house. " 
Storr (1997) recounted many examples of `guruism' among therapists and a 
willingness on the part of some people to be so led/dominated. Holmes. (1996) posed 
the question as to who has agency and authority in the process of story telling and 
story making in therapy. A danger at the end of the day, he argued, was that the 
therapist would impose their own story on the patient, attributing too much objectivity 
to themselves. He suggested that enmeshed therapists tended to impose their own 
narratives on patients. 
Mitchell (1998) voiced criticism of what he saw as `authoritarian' objectivity which 
he associated with an earlier Freudian sense that the therapist knows best what is 
going on in the mind of the patient. He suggested the pendulum had swung towards at 
times an avoidance of any truth claims. He argued for a "democratisation" of the 
analytic relationship and redefined his expertise: 
I believe my expertise lies not in knowing what is there in him [the 
patient], but in devising ways of construing his experience that are 
potentially helpful, and also in enquiring into what happens between us 
when he is confronted by my ideas about him (Mitchell, 1998: 25). 
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Phillips (1995) saw us as living in the age of the expert, a time when people crave the 
advice of the expert, someone who must know and understand. He linked this to what 
he called the `enlightenment Freud' who was involved in a "project of self- 
knowledge which Phillips saw as the problem : 
The project of self-knowledge is itself the problem, the symptom 
masquerading as the cure; as though we have turned the self into an object 
(the project of the enlightenment Freud) even an idol, and psychoanalysis 
can now help us to unlearn this modem religion of selfhood 
(Phillips, 1995: 7). 
Phillips (1995: 17) further felt the post-Freudian Freud could help us unlearn this. He 
wrote how "to be an expert on the unconscious is a contradiction in terms" and "this 
other unconscious... is a way of describing both the limits of what we can know and 
the areas of our lives in which knowing, and the idea of expertise, may be 
inappropriate". States of conviction (perceived objectivity), he felt, need to be open to 
the questions "what are we using them to do? " and "why do we want to be convinced 
of things? " and "what do we find in states of uncertainty? " (Phillips, 1997: 132). 
Mair (1992,1988) criticised psychotherapists for failing to recognise the relativity of 
their professional knowledge. It is based, she_ argued, not on knowledge but on the 
myth of knowledge. Description is mistaken for explanation and hypothetical concepts 
are reified. Therapists hide their ignorance in "elaborate conjectures ....... which are 
presented as hard data" (Mair, 1988: 138). She argued that therapists are faith healers, 
though reluctant to admit it. Various studies, she felt, had shown that therapists were 
the key ingredient in therapy rather than their theory or technique so that : 
[therapists] are not a vehicle for valuable theories of human functioning, 
rather the theories are a vehicle for them. Theories bring therapists to their 
patients, confident that they have the expertise to help patients, prepared 
to invade their privacy and willing to offer themselves as a model, guide 
and friend (1988: 148). 
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Spinelli (1994) was critical of therapists for mystifying their theory and themselves 
and saw this is a common criticism of all professions. Dorothy Rowe (1995: 1) 
castigated all those who set themselves up as experts : 
The secret of life is that there is no secret. All that you need to know about 
life is there for you to see... However down the centuries, many people 
wanting power have tried to keep the secret secret. 
The `non-specific' hypothesis offers a challenge to the various schools of therapy in 
their evaluation of their knowledge base. Frank (1974) argued that the value of 
therapy lay not so much in its specific perspective and techniques as in some non- 
specific factors common to the various types of therapy. He identified these as the 
creation of a supportive relationship, the provision of a rationale by which the patient 
can make sense of his or her problems and the participation by both client and 
therapist in healing rituals (McLeod 1998). Luborsky's et al research (1975) suggested 
similar success rates across the therapies despite differences of theory and technique. 
The research of Hattie et al (1984) suggested that relatively inexperienced therapists 
can be as effective as those with more training and experience. The research of 
Llewelyn and Hume (1979) suggested that clients rated the non-specific factors over 
the particular model. 
McLeod (1998) cautioned against jumping to the simplistic conclusion that these 
common factors summed up all that was effective in counselling. In keeping with a 
wider understanding of professional knowledge he argued there was an ongoing 
interweaving of non-specific factors with the therapist's personality and his or her 
espoused model. Roth and Fonagy (1996) suggested the outcome is best if the 
therapist is firmly rooted in their model but also flexible to a particular patient's 
needs. Holmes (2001) emphasised the need for therapists to provide for patients both 
structure (as in a model) and attunement to the patient. 
Rowan (in Dyden, 1992) criticised Mair for writing as if the only options for a 
therapist were to be a scientist-practitioner or faith healer. He questioned why Mair 
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did not describe further options. It is as if for Mair there was no ground for a measure 
of objectivity in therapists. 
Samuels (1992: xiv) wrote: 
if we choose Mair as the therapist of psychotherapy, then the question of 
identity.. 
. 
is deepened. What is psychotherapy? Is it art, craft, science, 
religious ritual, a combination of these, or something sui generis? And 
where within psychotherapy is this question to be discussed? 
Power and Influence in Therapy 
Meares and Hobson (1977) described the therapy relationship as an equal and yet 
asymmetrical conversation. They wanted to acknowledge the capacity in it for harm. 
The therapist may deny their own involvement and practice in a defensive or offensive 
way by being intrusive, derogatory, faceless, invalidatory or by sending contradictory 
signals. The potential is there for a persecutory spiral leading to the patient being 
discharged if the therapist responds to a patient's failure to improve with retaliation. 
Rennie (1994) raised the question as to whether open dialogue is really possible in 
therapy for the patient or whether the patient feels only able to be deferential. Enns et 
al (1995) described how apparent examples of the `recovery' of what are then 
questioned as `false memories' have raised questions about the place of suggestion in 
therapies. 
Weldon (1993) described attending a meeting of therapists and coming to a shattering 
"revelation" that they all presented as "thwarted novelists" unaware of their desire to 
impose their stories. 
Bion (1967a: 18) described a radical attempt not to impose his stories on patients. He 
wrote of the need for therapists to bracket out their assumptions and approach each 
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session "without memory or desire". He advocated that therapists "do not remember 
the past session" and "avoid any desires for results, `cure' or even understanding". 
Phillips (1997) felt therapists needed to be able to distinguish authoritative statements 
from authoritarian statements. The key, he felt, was in whether they were useable by 
the patient. He felt therapists needed to be "tenacious without being authoritarian". 
Disagreement would have to be faced with the differences put on the table. But he this 
should be; 
without having to decide now, or necessarily ever, which one of us is 
right. In fact the question of right and wrong is exactly the problem. What 
we have to see is who can produce a story, or a version that we can make 
something of what we want (Phillips, 1997: 138). 
Samuels (in Dryden, 1992, xiv) argued that 
what we need is an effective basis on which to examine the possibility of 
unwarranted and undesirable influencing of the client/patient. If we are 
carrying out that kind of examination, then psychotherapy may be able to 
live more easily with the idea that a degree of suggestion is unavoidable 
and may not be a wholly negative phenomenon. 
Power was a central concern within all these critiques. However assumptions about 
the nature and distribution of power varied between the critiques. Masson (1992) 
equated power with oppression and appeared to see only two positions in therapy, the 
therapist as an abuser and the patient as a victim. He commented how "within the 
therapeutic setting, emotional power, at the very least, is almost absolute". I would 
argue he has conflated the unequal with the abusive. 
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Frosh (1986) did not hold an exclusively top - down view of power but saw power as 
being created at all levels in a system - though not equally. Craib (in 
Dryden, 1992: 247) wrote in response to Pilgrim : 
I find the early struggles in psychotherapy have more to do with the 
patient's attribution of power and knowledge to me rather than any power 
or knowledge I actually possess. 
Embleton Tudor and Tudor (1994) suggested a variety of responses to the issue of 
managing power in relationships. One response was defeatism in the face of the 
difficulties (and they referred to Masson). Another was to ignore the power issue in 
some form of egalitarian denial. Another was to try and share it equally as in forms of 
co-counselling. Another was to try to give power away. They themselves concluded 
that "although power relationships may be inadequate, invasive or even abusive, our 
perspective is that they are not per se deforming" (1994: 389). 
Summary 
Misuses of professional -knowledge in practice were well described by critics though 
at times I felt that `straw' figures of therapists were being set up only to be knocked 
down. Where critics allowed a validity to psychotherapeutic practice, concerns were 
expressed that the professional knowledge of the therapist was : 
° too individualistic in its focus. 
° inadequately informed by an intersubjective perspective 
° given too great an objective status 
° lacked sensitivity to issues of power and influence 
How compelling such critiques are felt to be is dependent on the perspective of the 
reader. As a practising psychotherapist I was drawn to Craib's (in Dryden, 1992: 248) 
87 
awareness of the tension in professional life in which there is a need to avoid 
complacency while not setting an unattainable standard : 
The dangers and benefits of belonging to a profession go together, and the 
paradox is that without the dangers, there can be no benefits. The problem 
is always to hold on to both sides at the same time. The baby of 
. psychotherapy 
can not be separated from its dirty bathwater; we have to 
remember that the baby is there and the bathwater is dirty. It seems to me 
this is a condition of any professional life. 
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ENQUIRY 
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METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter I describe for the reader how I set about exploring in a systematic, 
critical and discovery-orientated way the phenomenon of a therapist's use of their 
professional knowledge in practice and how I evaluated my findings. I have not 
sought to unfold my account as it happened chronologically from my point of 
departure with its many twists and turns on the way - though I have alluded to these. 
Rather I have opted to tell it from the perspective of where I arrived as this will offer 
the reader a more coherent account. It has inevitably involved an element of 
reconstruction. 
I began this research with the aim of exploring how Psychodynamic Psychotherapists 
used their professional knowledge in their everyday practice. I had found this to be a 
hazardous area full of ambiguity, uncertainty and stress for myself. My conversations 
with colleagues and my reading of the psychodynamic literature strongly suggested I 
was not alone in experiencing it in this way. 
I came to understand my 'foreshadowed problem' (Malinowski 1922/1984) as having 
focused on the difficulty I perceived for therapists, working within a postmodern 
culture, of finding an appropriate status for and conception of the use of their 
professional knowledge in practice, given that they were no longer able to claim a 
simple correspondence between their theory and the mind of a patient (Mitchell, 1993). 
As the research progressed I developed and refined my aim and the language in which 
I expressed it. 
This research has been focused on the practice of Psychodynamic Psychotherapy 
within the National Health Service in what may broadly be called the South Trent 
Region. In this region four Psychotherapy Departments have collaborated over the 
past twenty years to provide training in Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for their own 
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staff. Their collaboration over this period has helped to shape a culture of NHS 
Psychotherapy in the region. The therapists I interviewed were all employed within 
one of these four Departments as I am also. All but one had been involved with the 
South Trent Training either as student or trainer. I judged them to be well integrated 
into the clinical practice of Psychodynamic Psychotherapy within the NHS in the 
South Trent Region. 
A Qualitative Approach 
I made an early decision that the kind of enquiry that I was looking to conduct would 
be better explored through a qualitative approach to data (Silverman, 2000; Barker et 
äl, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
McLeod (2001: viii) suggests that qualitative research "involves doing one's utmost to 
map and explore the meaning of an area of human experience". In my research I was 
not looking for `objective data' to quantify but rather to explore and interpret meaning 
and practice in relation to the phenomena I was investigating (Barker et al, 1994). 
Qualitative methodology allows for the discovery and exploration of subjective 
meanings and handles and values more complexity, ambiguity and difference, all of 
which I felt would be crucial ingredients in my research. Qualitative research is more 
in keeping with the idea of exploring a phenomenon within everyday life and the 
conversations that comprise our interactions (Barker et al, 1994). 
Qualitative research for me sits within a postmodern perspective with its emphasis on 
the multiplicity of possible meanings that we ascribe to experience. The distinctive 
type of knowledge that qualitative research generates is familiar to therapists, McLeod 
(2001: viii) suggested, in that it is "holistic, nuanced, personal, contextualised, [and] 
incomplete". It can elucidate new ways of understanding others or a phenomenon. If 
conducted well, it can be clinically significant (though not necessarily statistically 
significant). The emphasis within qualitative research is on exploring how knowledge 
'is constructed, rather than discovering a knowledge that is objective, singular and 
waiting to be found by a single reliable method. So within qualitative research there 
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are many "competing traditions" (McLeod, 2001) which reflect the many different 
ways that meanings can be constructed with no one way as being able to lay claim to 
being `the way'. A degree of relativism is intrinsic to a qualitative approach, though 
not, I will argue later, to the extent that one can not be a `critical realist' (Cook and 
Campbell, 1979) in outlook. 
Such research incorporates the understanding that it is not possible to stand outside of 
one's research in some apparently neutral position. Rather the qualitative researcher 
has to locate him/herself within the research and ask questions about their own 
participation and the way it is shaping the research (Bannister et al, 1994). In fact it 
makes intense personal demands on the researcher in a way that McLeod (2001: 10) 
described (while not wanting to over-romanticise this aspect) and which my 
experience had supported : 
Qualitative enquiry generates uncertainty, ambiguity, a sense of the 
unknowability of things, a loss of boundary between self and other. These 
are experiences that can not easily be contained within a set of 
standardised research procedures, or, to put it another way, should not be 
so contained. It is the willingness to enter fully into the process of inquiry, 
a willingness to draw upon, (or risk) one's integrityas a person, that gives 
the best qualitative research its `edge'. 
Assumptions 
McLeod (2001) argued that there is an interconnection between the question of what 
is the nature of reality (ontology), on what basis can we `know' about `it' 
(epistemology) and how can we enquire into and learn about `it' (methodology). In 
this chapter on my methodology I need to state. the pre-conceptions (about ontology 
and epistemology) that I have brought to this research and that have provided a shape 
to the analysis. 
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Ontology 
I have brought to this research an assumption (an `ontology') that a real world exists 
that has regularities to it and can be known but not in a certain way. Rather 
`knowledge' has to be acknowledged to be partial and situated. This belief is referred 
to as `critical realism' (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 1 share O'Hear's belief (1991) that 
we have to be `critical realists' at the end of the day because, without an assumption 
of a relatively stable world independent of us, we can not hope to categorise our 
experiences. Being `realist' about our perceptions, he argued, does not mean that we 
naively assume everything is as it appears. With this position, knowledge is viewed as 
being "intersubjectively testable" (Cook and Campbell, 1979) and in that sense a 
finding can be replicated (Barker et al, 1994). 
Social constructionism (Gergen, 1985,1994; Berger and Luckman, 1966) provides a 
different starting point as it asks not what is actually there in the world (ontology) but 
focuses instead on the way we come to ascribe meaning to experience (epistemology). 
I take the stance of being a `critical realist' who also sees `knowledge' as being shaped 
by societies and cultures. However I retain the critical realist viewpoint that there are 
criteria for deciding on the merits or `situated reality' of such constructions (Barker et 
al, 1994). I have explored this further in the chapter on the status of a therapist's 
professional knowledge. 
As part of my beliefs about the `nature of reality' (my ontology) I hold a humanistic 
perspective on the individual person as "a self-aware agent striving to achieve 
meaning, control and fulfilment in life" (McLeod, 2001: 106). 
Epistemology 
In my research I have been informed by the traditions of hermeneutics (Taylor, 197 1; 
Gadamer, 1975) and phenomenology (Moran, 2000; Osbourne, 1994) both of which 
underlie qualitative research (McLeod, 2001). Very broadly, phenomenologists attempt 
to set aside assumptions and pre-conceptions and live within what is being explored to 
become in touch with its `essence' which may then take them beyond current 
frameworks of understanding. A hermeneutical perspective takes the line that our 
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assumptions and our pre-conceptions can not be laid aside but must be taken into the 
equation. Our perceptions and those of the `text' being studied need to achieve a 
`fusion of horizons'(Warnke, 1987), a speaking to each other of the two worlds. 
I have tacked between these two forms of `knowing' in my research because they 
both, in their separate ways, contribute to developing understandings and counter- 
balance each other. One invites us to step out of our situated pre-conceptions while 
the other invites us to engage with them. These are both tasks which the researcher 
needs to attempt, as too does the therapist when sitting with a patient. 
Data Gathering 
I have outlined my approach to data gathering by a focus on the following: 
° interviewing 
° interviewing as conversation 
0 selection 
° case study as frame 
° semi-structured interviewing 
° transcribing 
Interviewing 
Within the array of qualitative methods of enquiry I chose to explore the phenomenon 
of the use of professional knowledge in practice through interviews with NHS 
Psychodynamic Psychotherapists working within my `local' South Trent culture. 
Interviewing within qualitative research has parallels with the work of therapy as both 
involve the encouraging of story telling and the construction of understanding from 
the stories and their form of telling. 
Direct observation of a therapy was never an option to me. Psychotherapy is rightly a 
private process and the presence of a researcher would, I felt, be too intrusive. 
Studying published transcripts of therapy sessions qr video or audio records of 
sessions conducted by therapists would have produced more distance in the research 
by taking me away from the immediacy of my local culture of psychotherapy and the 
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immediacy of personal contact with an informant. Surveying by questionnaire a group 
of NHS Psychotherapists would not, I felt, have allowed me to explore enough of the 
complexity and ambiguity of the phenomenon and would again have introduced a 
distance between the therapists and myself. 
To me this area of research required a conversation with an informant in order to 
explore it and this led me to the method of interviewing. I was uncomfortable with 
the idea of interviewing a therapist and their patient outside of the therapy to obtain 
their separate accounts of the therapy as that too would have effects on the therapy 
that are difficult to calculate and therefore harder to justify ethically. 
I chose to interview NHS psychotherapists from the four South Trent Psychotherapy 
Departments and therefore base my research on therapist's accounts of their clinical 
practice (Kvale, 1996; Patton, 1990, Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). As a therapist myself, I 
am comfortable with the format of interviewing. My work centres around therapeutic 
interviewing and I value it as a rich and personal way of learning about others and 
about their experiences. I felt confident that I would be able to obtain the agreement of 
colleagues to such an interview and that this method would offer an accessible and 
ethical way of exploring the therapist's use of their professional knowledge. 
I conducted eight in-depth, semi-structured interviews which lasted up to an hour and 
a half. I taped and subsequently transcribed them myself. I did not set out with the 
number of interviews as set at eight but found that the number allowed me enough 
opportunity to compare and contrast and learn from differences. I have regarded the 
interviews as providing a therapist's narrative account of two therapies with a focus 
on their use of professional knowledge. 
Interviewing as conversation 
Interviewing as a form of conversation may reflect the perspective that conversation 
can be conceived as "a basic mode of knowing" (Kvale, 1996: 37). Rorty (1979: 389) 
suggested that "conversation [is] the ultimate context within which knowledge is 
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understood". Knowledge in this view emerges between people in conversation. 
Similarly Shotter (1993: vi) wrote: 
conversation is not just one of our many activities in the world. On the 
contrary we constitute both ourselves and our worlds in our conversational 
activity. For us they are foundational. They constitute the usually ignored 
background within which our lives are rooted. 
A research interview has been described as "a conversation with a purpose" and "a 
special type of conversation aimed at gathering information" (Barker et al, 1994: 87), 
whose purpose "is to obtain description of the life world of the interviewee with 
respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena" (Kvale, 1996: 5). A 
qualitative research interview generates not objective data to be quantified but 
meaningful relationships to be interpreted (Kvale, 1996: 11). It gives the opportunity to 
explore the subject's point of view and take on their experience. Open-ended 
questioning is seen as characteristic of such qualitative research interviews as they 
allow issues to be explored in their complexity and ambiguity with less overt control 
set by initial questions (Barker et al, 1994; Kvale, 1996). Conversely such open- 
endedness generates a lot of data and the potential for "data overload" (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). 
Kvale (1996: 13) described the many varieties of interviews and commented that 
"there is no common procedure for interview research". His book was a response to 
the need he perceived for much greater clarity in the use of interviews for research. In 
particular he wrote of the need to steer between a `no-method approach' to 
interviewing with a spontaneous `let's-see-what-comes' style and an `all-method 
approach' that structures any freedom out of the interview. 
Selection 
I chose my informants with the criteria that they had completed a formal training in 
Psychodynamic Psychotherapy and were immersed in the culture of NHS 
psychotherapy in the region. I sought a balance of gender and some range of 
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professional background (i. e. social worker, nurse, doctor, occupational therapist but 
not in this instance psychologist). But I am not arguing that my choice of therapists as 
informants has allowed me to consider them to be in some way a balanced or 
representative sample per se of local NHS therapists. They are best seen as comprising 
eight individual case studies. 
Case study as frame 
I argue that the case defines the object of a study (Stake, 1994) and is not in itself a 
method of study. As such it can be employed with qualitative or quantitative 
methodology. It can be described as a "bounded system" (Smith, 1978) or "a frame for 
determining the boundaries of information-gathering" (Stoecker, 1991: 98). 
Case study has been defined by Yin (1984) and Stoecker (1991) in ways which, with 
one exception, reflect my understanding. Yin (1984: 23) described case study as " an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used". Stoecker (1991: 108) 
defined it as "a research frame with structural and historical boundaries, an integral 
theory component, an involved rather than distanced researcher, and multiple methods 
which include collaborative methods. " I distance myself from these definitions around 
their insistence on "multiple sources of evidence" and "multiple methods". 
Stake (1994) suggested three principle types of case study that he found inseparable 
in practice but helpful at least in clarifying a researcher's thinking. With an `intrinsic' 
case study the researcher is seeking better to understand this particular case rather than 
intending it to illustrate a phenomenon or be used primarily for wider generalisation. 
With an `instrumental' case study the researcher is using the case to gain further 
insight into an issue, phenomenon or aspect of theory and to that extent the case is 
looked at to help with this wider interest. With a `collective' case study the researcher 
is extending the principles behind an `instrumental' case study to the study of several 
cases. 
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Eckstein (1975) referred to the `heuristic' case study which explored a particular 
problem through the case in order to understand its complexity and what theory and 
principles emerged from it. Stake's `instrumental' and `collective' case studies (1994) 
are similar and, with Eckstein's heuristic case study, come closest to my own 
approach. However these types of case study point to a -balance to be struck and a 
tension to be held rather than resolved. 
A semi-structured interview 
My interview schedule of questions is appended (appendix A). I began with an initial 
question about the length of time the therapist had worked in NHS psychotherapy and 
a guess at the number of patients seen for therapy. I then sought to ground the 
interview in the therapist's practice with particular patients and so avoid (at least until 
nearer the end of the interview) more hypothetical questions about their practice. 
So I structured the main body of the interview around the request to talk about two 
particular patients, one whom the therapist regarded as more psychologically `healthy' 
and one who the therapist regarded as less psychologically `healthy'. This provided a 
contrast that helped clarify how the therapist experienced themselves as organising 
their professional knowledge about their patient's psychological difficulties. I could 
then ask whether and how they felt they had shared their professional knowledge with 
these patients (and vice versa) and, therefore, how they felt they had negotiated 
`knowledge' with their patient. In this way the style of the therapist's participation 
became clearer to me. 
Later in the interview I asked more general questions, in particular about their own 
values and life philosophy which they took with them into the session. These more 
abstract questions could be addressed I felt after the interview had been well grounded 
in two clinical examples. I found these to be among the most moving parts of the 
interview. I also followed up with a question about what they perceived to. be the 
limits of the psychodynamic approach for these and other patients. 
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Transcribing 
I opted to transcribe fully for myself the tapes of the interviews. By doing so I got to 
know the full content of each interview very vividly. However in transcribing an 
important immediacy of the experience of the interview as a conversation is lost. 
Kvale (1996: 166) commented that "to transcribe means to transform" and 
conversation is "frozen into a written text". The interviews move from being an oral 
event to the form of a written language, from speech to prose. Ong (1982) has 
suggested that oral expression tends more to the situational, participatory and 
empathic while written expression tends more to the analytic and distanced. McLeod 
(2000) has experimented with using poetic stanza to capture better the feel in writing 
of a conversation. 
In transcribing the interviews from audiotapes I `tidied up' the English both 
advertently and inadvertently, taking out some repetitions and gaps. I am comfortable 
with this as I was not aiming at a conversationally exact transcript. I then selected 
from within the transcript for a summary of the interview in line with my research 
focus. For reasons of patient confidentiality I am not free to reproduce the whole 
transcript. To that extent the reader lacks some opportunity to make their own 
assessment of the interview's content and compare it with my own and that is 
unavoidable in this context. 
A Participant and an Observer 
I work as an NHS psychotherapist and therefore I am part of the culture which I have 
explored. Atkinson and Hammersley (1994) described a range of positions for the 
researcher along the participant-observer continuum from complete observer through 
to complete participant. 
My own position with regard to these is complex. I am part of the culture that I have 
been exploring. I undertook the South Trent Training which involved a process of 
socialisation into practice through the provision of supervised practice, personal 
therapy and theoretical seminars. I had a pre-existing relationship with my informants, 
some of whom I trained with while some were trainers to me and others have been 
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supervisees. My informants language was and is my own. This research has been 
driven partly by my need as an `insider'. 
While conducting the research I experienced myself as being in the position of a 
participant working to be more of an observer. The translation competence 
(Spradley, 1979) I needed was one of learning to think and speak about psychotherapy 
in languages other than its and my own. In interviews with informants there was a 
danger I might think I knew what they were talking about too readily because we 
shared a common culture, in which we could implicitly think in terms of "people like 
us" (Mcleod, 2001). I have been a participant trying to be more of an observer or rather 
I have been a participant and an observer, but had to work far more at the latter to gain 
some critical distance. 
Van Maanen (1988) identified three different genres in qualitative writing. The first he 
called the `realist tale' in which a third person voice is used and the report reads like a 
documentary in which the author is visible only as the voice of authority. The second 
he called the `confessional tale' in which the author is more visible while still 
maintaining an aura of scientific authority. The third he called the `impressionist tale' 
in which the author included themselves and blurred the boundary . 
between 
themselves and those who act as informants. 
Patton (1990) referred to two `typologies' that needed distinguishing in research 
accounts. There were `indigenous typologies' that were expressed more directly by the 
informants. Then there were `analyst-constructed typologies' generated more by the 
researchers perspective and language. Patton (1990: 358) referred to the "legitimate 
charge of imposing a world of meaning on the participants, that better reflects the 
observer's world than the world under study". 
Silverman (2000: 122) distinguished between `realist' and `narrative' accounts. The 
former seek to describe the "gritty" reality of other people's lives while the latter try to 
generate plausible accounts of the world. I saw these two as to be held in tension 
within a single account. 
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Given my involvement in the very culture I have studied I have inevitably told an 
"impressionist tale" and constructed a mixture of "indigenous" and "analyst- 
constructed" typologies. I have mixed a realist and narrative perspective. By involving. 
my informants in a feedback process I have sought to be sensitive and inclusive 
though I still take responsibility for what I have produced. 
I acknowledge my partiality within this research process (Abramson, 1992) but do not 
feel it requires defence as such. It has been my own involvement in the research 
question that has inspired and driven the research. It has felt to be an asset to the 
research but I have needed to keep in mind the limitations (by way of `bias') it has 
also imposed and take these into account in my findings. 
Two factors have been important `drivers' for me in my participation in this research. 
Firstly, after nine years of immersion in the practice of NHS psychotherapy I felt I was 
becoming `short-sighted' in my practice. I needed a chance to step out and take a 
longer view. This dynamic of immersion needing to be followed by an overview from 
a fresh vantage point has happened before in my life. At the start of this research I felt 
the need to locate my experiences within a wider context and understanding so that I 
could better see where I had been and choose more where I wanted to go with my 
practice. 
Secondly I have a deep ambivalence within me about the use of `knowledge'. I have 
had difficult experiences of other people's `knowledge' (ideology) being imposed on 
me as `truth' which created a feeling of intense `claustrophobia' in me. I have also had 
the experience of working or living without a framework of conviction to react to and 
define myself against which left a feeling of intense `agoraphobia' in me. In the 
context of this research, I was aware that a therapist's use of their professional 
knowledge could be too smothering of another's viewpoint or be too vague. So this 
research has reflected and been a response to my own needs in important ways. 
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Ethics 
Three key areas stood out for ethical consideration in this research: 
° the need for informed consent on the part of the therapists 
° the need to preserve an appropriate level of confidentiality for the patient and 
privacy for the therapist 
° the need to weigh up potential benefits and harm in the conduct and outcome of the 
research 
Informed consent 
I began with a conversation with therapists who I wanted to interview about the 
research project asking whether they would be willing to participate. I took care to 
explain the purpose and style of the interview and to obtain informed consent. I 
prepared and sent to each a letter outlining my research and what I was asking of 
them. At the beginning of the interview I went over again the nature of the research 
and the interview and asked informants to sign a consent form (Appendix B). I clearly 
stated that the therapist could withdraw themselves from the research at any point, that 
patient material would be anonymised and the therapist given a pseudonym. I clarified 
that the patient material would be used only as a route to understanding the therapist's 
use of their professional knowledge and would not itself be a focus. 
Following the interview I sent each therapist a transcript of their interview and invited 
comments. Subsequently I sent each a copy of the final form in which their interview 
had been summarised and analysed along with a copy of my provisional findings and 
a fuller summary of what the research was about. I invited comment to what was a lot 
of paperwork. I made further changes for one therapist to increase the anonymity of 
the patient material. Otherwise no concerns were expressed with the form and content 
of my summary and analysis of their interview. 
Confidentiality 
The use of patient material in the interviews to inform understandings of the 
therapist's use of their professional knowledge raises significant ethical questions 
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(Tuckett, 2003; Bloch and Chodoff, 1993). In 1995, the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) argued that (Tuckett, 2003): 
Patients have a right to privacy that should not be infringed without 
informed consent. Identifying information should not be 
published ...... unless .... the patient gives written 
informed consent. 
Complete anonymity is difficult to achieve, and informed consent should 
be obtained if there is any doubt. 
The Editors of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis differed as they felt that 
seeking consent could itself be unhelpfully intrusive of the therapy. They argued for 
different rules for psychotherapy (Tuckett, 2003). 
Casement (1985: 224-227) addressed this dilemma with sensitivity. On the one hand 
patients have the right to expect their therapy to be treated as confidential, with the 
usual provisos that information may be shared where there is identifiable risk to the 
patient or others (NHS Code of Confidentiality on Confidentiality, 2003). The use of 
material from a patient's therapy in research is clearly contrary to this expectation. On 
the other hand therapeutic practice has developed and improved through the sharing of 
clinical experiences. 
One solution to this dilemma is never to use patient material. However the quality of 
the practice of therapists with patients present and future arguably benefits 
enormously from the sharing of experience between therapists. Another solution is to 
use patient material only with their explicit consent. This `solution' is not without its 
own difficulties. To talk about research within the therapy may in itself be 
experienced as intrusive and may "rock the boat of therapy" (Casement, 1985) in a way 
that is very destabilising of the therapy. A further solution might be never to use 
material from current therapies. However time delays do not address the fundamental 
issue of patient confidentiality. 
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I have gone ahead and designed and conducted interviews that make use of patient 
material. I have not enquired whether patients were informed and their permission 
sought. I left that question to the therapists involved with them. I acknowledge that my 
position has some ambiguity. However I have gone ahead in this way because I felt 
that my stance and the form in which the patient material has been used can be 
defended in ways I now describe. 
I feel I have preserved sufficiently the confidentiality of the patient material in the 
interviews. I kept the full transcripts of the interviews to myself with the exception of 
sharing parts of them with my supervisors. The patient material that has been included 
in the final version of this thesis has been reduced and anonymised. I left out specific 
features that might lead to any possibility of identification. As mentioned, I conferred 
with my informants about the final form in which their patient material would appear. 
In one instance this led to a request early on to reduce further the level of patient 
information which I duly did. I consulted with the local NHS Ethics Committee who 
made no objections to my research from the point of view of patient confidentiality. 
My main focus in the research has been on the therapists themselves, with patients and 
their material in a supporting role only. The therapists themselves have appeared in 
anonymised form in the final document in order to preserve what has felt like an 
appropriate level of therapist anonymity. The pseudonym I gave each therapist was 
also one way of reducing any risk of the patients being identifiable given the 
accessibility this thesis should have. 
I do believe that research focusing on the actual practice of therapy, rather than more 
abstract questions of theory, is vital to the ongoing professional development of NHS 
Psychodynamic Psychotherapists and therefore to patient care. 
Potential Benefits and Potential Harm 
I weighed up the potential for benefit and the potential for harm in this research as it 
applied to different groups. I considered the NHS psychotherapy patients about whose 
therapy I was informed by their therapists. I hope that, were they (or any other NHS 
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patients) to read this thesis, they would find the patient material sufficiently .. 
anonymised such that they felt their privacy had been adequately protected. I also 
would hope they felt their material had been used creatively for a better understanding 
of therapy to the benefit of practice. 
I considered the therapists who gave up time to act as informants for me. Barker et al 
(1994) described the `critical researcher' who works with informants as equal subjects 
rather than as passive providers of data. Cameron et al (1992) described research as 
needing to be `on', . `for' and `with' subjects. My very participation as an 
NHS 
Psychotherapist has made my role as critical researcher inevitable. In reality I have 
had to work harder to shed a potentially too sympathetic position towards the 
therapists I interviewed. 
Selecting Within the Data 
Selecting from within the data involved me in a process of exploring and `playing 
with' potential frameworks for selection before settling on one framework that 
provided a `fit' with my research design and aims. 
Developing a framework 
I undertook my analysis broadly in two stages. These stages, I found, were interwoven 
rather than distinct but nevertheless there was value in considering them separately. 
The first stage was descriptive in that I immersed myself in the narratives and got to 
know them as well as possible. I then moved on to an interpretative stage 
(Murray, 2003). This latter stage involves what Ricoeur (1991) called "appropriation" 
whereby you come to own and put your stamp on the material. 
Atkinson and Hammersley (1994: 3 1) commented on the re-working of questions and 
categories that I found went on in my analysis of the interview data: 
much of the effort that goes into data analysis is concerned with 
formulating and reformulating the research problem in ways that make the 
research more amenable to investigation. 
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This stage of "appropriation" was undoubtedly the hardest part of the research. Strauss 
and Corbin (1990) have suggested that categories emerge from any one or a 
combination of three sources; the analyst, the literature or the informants. This has 
matched my experience of a continual and necessary interplay between these three. I 
had at times to leave aside the interviews and search the literature and refer to my own 
practice in order to gain perspective on the interviews. As a researcher who is also a 
therapist I have been informed by my own practice in which ideas have been tested 
out. 
Within a case study there is a tension between the researcher's theory (that shapes the 
enquiry) and the uniqueness of the case itself. The researcher employing a case study 
frame explores both the common and the particular. Stoecker (1991: 102) described 
this tension as involving a "tricky decision" just how much to rely on theory, and thus 
risk missing important idiosyncrasies of particular cases, or restrain theory and thus 
risk over-emphasising the idiosyncratic". 
Stake (1994: 238) described the damage that can occur when the tension is resolved 
too much in the direction of theory: 
Damage occurs when the commitment to generalise or create theory runs 
so strong that the researcher's attention is drawn away from features 
important ' for understanding the case itself..... the case study researcher 
faces a strategic choice in deciding how much and how long the 
complexities of the case should be studied. 
Cochrane (1987) argued that research that does not employ a guiding theory is just "an 
accumulation of anecdotes". Stoecker (1991: 102) described the need to develop a 
theory of the idiosyncrasies of a case. 
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I read the transcripts of the first three interviews with three questions 
in mind. These 
questions had emerged from my initial interest in the values and organising 
frames of 
understanding which therapists brought to therapy and how these were negotiated : 
° what core theor ies/philosophies of life and healthy psychological living 
did the 
therapist espouse in the interview and how did they describe their role for them? 
° how did the therapist talk about the process of negotiating understanding with 
patients, with what degree of conviction did they convey their understandings to 
their patients and to what extent were they apparently ready to be `corrected' by 
their patients? 
° iri what ways did the therapist see themselves as having changed over the years in 
the way they employed their professional knowledge with patients? 
There were several further `evolutions' of my categories which I have not recorded 
here. Subsequently my developed and final categories for the analysis came together, 
through further reading in the literature about the concept. It was important to me that 
categories should be `action-oriented' so that professional knowledge would be 
viewed as an active process of construction of frames for thinking about a patient and 
their treatment. 
A settled framework 
Phillip's account (1999) of the place of narrative in therapy helped me design a frame 
for my analysis. My interviews, I decided, constituted narrative accounts, constructed 
in the interview with myself, of therapist's use of their professional knowledge with 
two of their patients. I adapted Phillip's framework (1999) for subdividing a narrative. 
° the `psychodynamic narrative' became the therapist's own account of the central 
tasks and struggles in psychological living and of what a person needs to do in 
order to be living the therapist's version of `the good life'. 
°I retained the idea of a `developmental narrative' which described the therapist's 
view of the developmental origins of the patient's psychological struggles. 
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°I retained the idea of a `treatment narrative' which described the therapist's view of 
how psychological difficulties should be treated. 
°I added to Phillip's subdivision a narrative of `attachment' in which I analysed the 
therapist's description of their relationship with and developing attachment to their 
professional knowledge. 
I did not consciously attempt to replicate my findings by exploring each interview in 
the light of the findings from the previous interview. Clearly though this would have 
occurred implicitly. 
Interpreting the Data 
There is a confusing array of methods of analysis available to the researcher (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994; Barker et al, 1994). No one method of analysis, I found, could 
simply be pulled off the shelf and applied in simple, pre-determined form to my 
research. No one method has been sufficient or appropriate in itself. For me the 
method has emerged in response to the unfolding task I had set myself. Every design, 
and therefore every interpretation of data, has its limits with inevitable questions to 
follow about its validity (Barker et al, 1994). "Creative compromises" are required 
with an accompanying awareness of "the implications of the choices made" 
(Shapiro, 1989). 
I found the metaphors of being a `bricoleur' and engaged in a process of patchwork 
quilting' resonated well with my experience of this research. Denzin and Lincoln 
(1994) describe the `bricoleur' as a researcher who is flexible in method and strategy. 
They quote Weinstein and Weinstein (1991: 161): 
The meaning of bricoleur in French popular speech is `someone who 
works with his or her hands and uses devious means compared to those of 
the craftsmen....... the bricoleur is practical and gets the job done. 
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According to this viewpoint the researcher has to fashion his/her own versions that 
suit the needs of the task. Methods in this sense are context-dependent as Dentin and 
Lincoln (1994: 2) suggested in a vein that is in keeping with my findings: 
The bricoleur understands that research is an interactive process shaped 
by his or her personal history, biography, gender, class, race, and ethnicity, 
and by those of the people in the setting. 
Rather than producing grand theories the researcher "cobbles together stories" 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). In the same way Saukko (2000) wrote of the patchwork 
quilt which does not present a simple, continuous and unified picture. Rather varying 
themes and. ideas are stitched together in a way that allows for both resonances and 
disjunctures to be seen. 
Retrospectively I would describe my method of analysis as being one in which I 
looked for `patterns in the narratives' of my informants and used elements of 
different methods to help me with this do this. 
Options considered on the way 
I began by employing grounded theory for my analysis but came up against what I felt 
to be its limitations. I `sat with' and `immersed myself in' the transcripts and tapes of 
the interviews. Grounded Theory involves an `immersion' and saturation in the data 
and constant comparison and testing of ideas within the data. It involves an attempt to 
`bracket out assumptions in order to be open to new understandings: 
The goal of the analyst is to generate an emergent set of categories and 
their properties...... the analyst codes for as many categories as might 
fit...... as the analyst gets deep into the data, he discovers that all data can 
be subsumed as an indicator of some category in the analysis...... a total 
saturation occurs : all data fit (Glaser, 1978 : 56-60). 
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I sought to ground myself in the data but instead found myself ground down by the 
data. Useful categories would not organise in my mind and I found the quantity of 
data in the interviews to be quite overwhelming. I felt Glaser's description (1978: 56) 
to be very idealistic. 
Ethnography (Spradley, 1979) focuses. on the way `reality' is constructed within 
cultures through communal actions such as rituals and other social practices of the 
culture. This was not in keeping with my exploration of the phenomenon of the use of 
professional knowledge. Narrative analysis (Mishler, 1986; Riessman, 1993) offered an 
emphasis on the story-as-a-whole as the primary data and the way `reality ' is 
constructed through language. However my focus was not on analysing the story-as-a- 
whole for it's narrative style or approach, noting tone and emphases and sub-plots 
within the narrative. In retrospect I would say I have employed a `narrative-informed' 
analysis. 
Discourse analysis (Parker, 1999; Potter and Wetherell, 1995), conversation analysis 
(Edwards, 1995; Miller and Silvermann, 1995) and narrative analysis each invite a 
researcher to look at the way meaning is constructed through our `talk' and they are 
approaches that psychotherapists have hardly started to utilise (McLeod, 2001). 
However discourse analysis and conversation analysis in particular both come from a 
social perspective that emphasises social agency and deconstructs psychological ways 
of viewing. While valuable, this does not fit well with my assumptions and the 
assumptions of psychodynamic psychotherapy. 
Evaluation 
Barker et al (1994: 80) suggest five criteria for the evaluation of qualitative research: 
° There should be an openness as regards the assumptions and orientation of the 
researcher. 
° The method adopted should be described with sufficient clarity to allow another 
researcher to replicate the work. 
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° Enough data should be available for the reader to make their own judgement as to 
the validity of the themes and categories the researcher has identified from the 
data. 
° The researcher should have demonstrated ways in which they have sought to 
validate their results. 
° The results should be credible and have opened out and made sense for the reader 
of the phenomenon. 
I have been guided by the above in my approach and have addressed the first three 
criteria already in this chapter. I describe now my perspective on the validity and 
credibility of my findings. 
Validity 
As a researcher I have necessarily addressed the question of the internal and external 
validity of my findings. Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 100) defined internal and external 
validity in the following way: 
internal validity [is] the degree to which findings correctly map the 
phenomenon in question; external validity [is] the degree to which 
findings can be generalised to other settings similar to the one in which 
the study occurred. 
Judgements about the validity of my findings will depend on the stance taken by the 
reader with regard to specific critiques of case study which have emerge from more 
traditional criteria as to what constitutes validity. I now set out critiques of case study 
validity, responses to these critiques and my own stance in relation to them. 
Critiques of the validity of case studies 
Case studies have been criticised as valid contributions to knowledge for being merely 
descriptive, lacking internal validity through being biased and lacking external 
validity through being incapable of generating findings that can be generalised. 
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Stoecker (1991: 89) suggested some sociologists have viewed case study as "little 
better than journalism" and a collection of "anecdotes". Fonagy and Target 
(2003: 283), in considering how influential case study has been within psychoanalysis, 
suggested that "there is some truth to the quip that psychoanalytic technicians 
understand the word data to be the plural of the word anecdote. " 
The criteria for validity in these criticisms are those employed within the traditional 
metaphor for the process of scientific discovery. This describes the scientist making 
observations, inductively organising a theory from these observations, formulating a 
prediction from the theory and then verifying (or not) the prediction and therefore the 
theory by further experiment or observation (Abramson, 1992). The emphasis is on 
what is typical and normative. According to this criteria the internal validity of the 
case study is compromised by `researcher bias'. The researcher lacks a `scientific 
distance' from the data and has no built-in corrective for this (Bromley, 1986, 
Becker, 1968). (Additionally case study researchers are deemed too retrospective in 
their conclusions and arbitrary in their definitions). The external validity of the case 
study researcher is compromised by the researcher's inability to demonstrate that their 
findings can be generalised (Berger, 1983) which only wider probability samples can 
provide. 
Responses to the critiques 
One response has been "to try to inject scientific rigour into the case study" (Stoecker 
1991: 92). To meet the charge of a lack of internal validity, `triangulation' has been 
advocated (Bromley, 1986), continual data collection (Kazdin, 1981) and comparisons 
with competing theories (Campbell, 1975). To attempt to tackle the limits of external 
validity the use of case comparison has been suggested (Platt, 1988) along with 
multiple methods and multiple sources (Yin, 1984 and Stoecker, 1991) 
An alternative response has been to highlight how case study research cannot and 
need not meet the criteria set for it in these traditional terms. Case study researchers, 
it is argued, need to renegotiate the terms of the debate and the assumptions on which 
they are based. For Abramson (1992) case studies did not generate verifiable 
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predictions and constituted a "weak experiment". He advocated avoiding 
"unnecessary window dressing" in an attempt to "falsely inflate the scientific 
appearance of a case study" so that it meets these traditional scientific criteria. 
Silverman (2000) questioned the assumption of a definitive version of reality to be 
uncovered within data and argued that a researcher cannot just aggregate data to get to 
an overall truth. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 199) wrote that "one should not 
adopt a naively "optimistic" view that the aggregation of data from different sources 
will unproblematically add up to produce a more complete picture". Kvale (1996: 4) 
advocated the metaphor of the traveller who reports in narrative form of his travels, 
rather than the metaphor of the miner who uncovers knowledge. 
The researcher employing case study can, then, ask the reader to judge the validity of 
the research not by whether the researcher has generated findings that can be viewed 
as `typical' or `normative', but rather whether the researcher has generated findings 
that are `plausible' (Stoecker, 1991) and display a "theoretical cogency" 
(Mitchell, 1983). Validity is to be judged not by the capacity to predict but by the 
capacity to explain. This criteria centres not so much on a claim that the research 
produces findings that correspond to `reality' so much as on a claim that the findings 
are coherent and consensual (Hamlyn, 1970). 
The need for and logic of an unbiased `scientific distance' is questioned as 
observation is always `theory dependent' (Chalmers, 1982) and requires "a creative 
leap from data to explanation" (Stoecker, 1991: 93) in order to produce theory. 
`Scientific distance' is a form of "disembodied knowledge" (Haraway, 1988) and a 
"denial of connectedness" (Stoecker, 1991). Scientific theorising develops within 
paradigms that shape theorising (Khun, 1962). While the data offered in case studies 
will be marked by "forgetting, blending, personal bias, and factual distortion" 
(Abramson, 1992), the data offered in quantitative surveys, are also marked by a 
degree of bias as questions posed mean different things to different informants 
(Stoecker, 1991). 
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The attempt to be objective, if taken too far, may mean we miss out on seeing the 
idiosyncratic responses of ourselves and our informants. So Stoecker (1991: 96) 
suggests we should perhaps develop "a theory of the idiosyncratic rather than a theory 
of the general" and look to ourselves for some measure of validity: 
Only when we recognise our personal involvement, and our `subjects' 
personal involvement in the research process, do we understand how our 
feelings and perceptions affect our analysis... Rigorous, accurate 
research..... requires the self-conscious involvement of the 
researcher..... the less we know of the experience of a situation, the less 
we are able to tell whether our explanation works (Stoecker, 1991: 106). 
A valid case for case studies 
I share the views expressed above that researchers employing case studies as a frame 
do not have to meet traditional scientific criteria of validity. I hope the reader will 
judge my findings rather on the basis of their `plausibility' and `theoretical cogency'. 
My participation, also referred to as `bias', is something for me to take account of in 
my findings rather than something that invalidates my findings per se. 
Mine has been `intensive' research rather than `extensive research' (Harre, 1979; 
Sayer, 1984) in that my emphasis has not been statistical with a -sole focus on the 
`normative'. Rather I have explored the more particular and specific and sought to 
move outwards from that starting point. 
I do not share the argument made by several writers that the general can be found in 
the particular at all times. Sacks (1984: 22) wrote, "tap into whomsoever, wheresoever 
and we get much the same things". Eisner (1981) argued that "the general resides in 
the particular" and Burawoy (1979) that the case contains "the essential principles of 
the whole". While I see a measure of truth in this, I am cautious about it being too 
simplistic a position. Silverman (2000: 109) cautions that "this solution is really only 
appropriate to the most basic research on social order guided by theoretically 
sophisticated positions like Sack's own conversation analytic approach". 
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In my findings I have sought to `extrapolate' from the particular case studies 
(Alasuutari, 1995). By `extrapolation' in this context I mean a process of inferring 
more widely from a limited range of known facts. I have shared Silverman's stance 
(2000: 99) that "it is usually far better to celebrate the partiality of your data and 
delight in the particular phenomena that it allows you to inspect". 
I view my findings as a contribution to enlarging the scope of knowledge about human 
lives (Pletsch, 1985); as inductive input that is relevant to the formation of theories and 
hypotheses (Abramson, 1992); and as "a small step towards grand generalisation" 
(Stake, 1994). 
In order to avoid being unduly idiosyncratic in my research and findings I located my 
research questions within the literature. I involved my informants in my findings by 
providing copies of the analysed interviews and draft findings. Over the seven years of 
this study I tested out themes against practice, both my own and that of my colleagues. 
This has meant my findings were open to being refuted by my experience and my 
perception of the experience of my colleagues. There has been a continuous loop of 
feedback between my interviews, my reading and my ongoing practice as a therapist 
in a community of local NHS psychotherapists. Eight interviews have allowed a 
measure of comparison to be made across the interviews and a chance to note 
deviance of perspectives. 
Credibility 
Stake (1994: 241) argued that "knowledge of the case faces a hazardous passage from 
writer to reader" and that "the writer needs ways of safeguarding the trip". Barker et 
al's (1994: 80) fifth criteria for evaluating qualitative research was that "the results 
should be credible and have opened out and made sense for the reader of the 
phenomenon". 
One way of "safeguarding the trip" is by offering the reader a space for discovery 
learning as well as propositional learning (Eisner, 1985). So, on the one hand, the 
researcher teaches in a didactic way what they have learnt in the form of 
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`propositional knowledge'. On the other hand, the researcher also teaches by 
providing an opportunity though the narrative account for the reader to enter 
vicariously the world of the research and live within it through a form of experiential 
knowledge (Geertz, 1983; Polanyi, 1962; Stake, 1994). In part the trip that needs 
safeguarding involves a highly personalised research project which then meets a 
highly personalised response in the reader. Stake (1994: 242) commented: 
Case researchers pass along to readers some of their personal meanings of 
events and relationships- and fail to pass along others. They know that the 
reader too will add and subtract, invent and shape - reconstructing the 
knowledge in ways that leave it differently connected and more likely to 
be personally useful........ 
Meanings do not transfer intact, but take on some of the conceptual 
uniqueness of the reader, but there is expectation that the meanings of 
situation, observation, reporting, and reading will have certain 
correspondence. 
I inevitably make an internal judgement on the credibility of my research and its 
findings. My submission of this thesis to the University of Derby for a Doctorate has 
expressed my internal judgement. Externally credibility rests to some extent on my 
capacity to convey to the reader an account that is experienced as `plausible' and 
containing `theoretical cogency' both in terms of propositional knowledge and 
experiential knowledge. 
At this point arguments previously made in this chapter come to the fore about the 
limits of employing solely correspondence theories to judge credibility. Hamlyn 
(1970) offers three other criteria for judging credibility, namely coherence, consensus 
and pragmatic usefulness. I have addressed these in the chapter on the status of 
professional knowledge and argue there and here for credibility to be judged through a 
combination of the these four positions in interplay. No single criteria is sufficient in 
itself as each has value but each is fallible (Barker et a1,1994). 
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Summary 
In this chapter I have described for the reader how I set about and conducted a critical 
investigation into the way in which eight local NHS psychodynamic psychotherapists 
described their handling and management of their professional knowledge with a 
patient. I have outlined the qualitative approach I employed to gather my data and the 
ethical issues involved in the study. I have outlined the `natural history' of the 
research and the'nature of my participation in the research. The categories and method 
I employed for my analysis and the status of these findings has been described. 
In the next. chapter I have presented the interviews in the form of therapist narratives 
of living the `good life' psychologically, the development and treatment of 
psychological problems and what I have termed an attachment narrative. 
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THE INTERVIEWS 
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Interview with Martin 
In the interview Martin gave an account of 
° how he approaches the construction of an understanding of the patient's difficulties 
in psychological terms and works to establish whether a therapeutic alliance is 
possible. 
° his professional knowledge in practice as reflecting "tentative understanding 
expressed with a reasonable degree of conviction". 
° the need to assess realistically the possibilities of change and the significant risk of 
deterioration and alter treatment as required. 
° the need to recognise the limits of understandings and not confine himself to 
psychological understandings that do not take account of biological and social 
factors. 
° the importance for psychologically healthy living of not allowing the inevitable 
disappointments of life to prevent the enjoyment of what life may also offer. 
° an understanding of the building of a `closed internal world' in which traumatic 
experiences may be held `incommunicado' and prevent the present being seen in its 
own terms. 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient One was described as a woman who was "quite an energetic and 
organised person" and who had a career and a relationship. However she 
experienced a level of mild to moderate depression that meant that she paid an 
`eternal price' of feeling bad about herself. At the time of the interview Martin 
was in the process of providing six sessions of therapy that he hoped would be 
enough in themselves to engender some hopefulness and possibilities for change 
given that the patient appeared to him to have the capacity to tackle 
psychological difficulties. So this patient was presented as the psychologically 
healthier of the two. A central issue was described as her tendency to avoid 
conflict due to early experiences (unspecified) that had led her to repress her 
assertion. Martin hoped that in six sessions she might become more able to 
detach past responses to her assertion from the present possibilities and so be 
`launched' towards a different relationship with her own assertion. 
Patient Two was described as a woman who, around the time of giving birth, 
`remembered' experiences of being sexually abused as a child. She was felt 
initially to be suffering from a `moderate depression' and referred for 
psychotherapy. She was assessed and taken on by Martin. However she became 
increasingly depressed, retarded, unable to sleep and had some thoughts of 
suicide. She then described delusions and alternated between being convinced of 
their reality and knowing they were delusional. She had not disclosed these 
delusions up until this point. Both Martin and the patient linked the worsening of 
her mental state to the attention being given in the therapy to her previously 
repressed and deeply upsetting experiences. She became unable to dissociate her 
present situation from her past experience and Martin arranged for her 
admission to psychiatric hospital. If Martin had known at the start that she was 
already experiencing delusions then he would not have offered therapy. Once it 
became clear, then the patient was steered away by him from uncovering, 
exploratory therapy towards a different type of containment. 
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Martin's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Martin describes a psychological task of managing the difficulties of life in a way that 
allows us to enjoy the good things life offers. He expresses concern that a culture of 
disappointment or disillusionment might gain the upper hand in our internal worlds. 
He expresses this in these terms: 
Well that pain and disappointment are part of life, that it's often a 
struggle, that in a broad sense hatred is inevitable not necessarily I think 
because of a biological endowment but it results from the impossibility of 
providing a perfect environment, but that those difficulties can be 
managed in a way that allows the better things to be experienced and 
owned and lived so that on balance it's worthwhile and that you have to 
accept the flawedness of the world and the people in it and not be so 
totally disillusioned by it that you can't experience also the joy and 
pleasure, the love in the world. This stuff sounds like Desiderata or 
something doesn't it? 
It is important to be able to see the present in its own terms rather than automatically 
viewing the present through the lens of previous experiences. Martin refers to this as 
"the capacity to dissociate the past from the present" and "to detach the origins from 
the present". In Object Relations terms this task can described as the management of 
our internalised bad objects in a way that does not allow them to overwhelm or 
dominate our internalised good objects. 
Our lives involve the interpenetration of three spheres; the biological, the 
psychological and the social. It is important to keep a perspective that includes 
awareness of the influence of all three rather than over-privileging and over- 
objectifying one. There is a tension to be held. between being too soft-edged or too 
hard-edged about a psychological perspective: 
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But I suppose in my way of thinking there is likely to 
be something within 
the [second] patient and who knows possibly with a strong biological 
basis that predisposes her to psychotic breakdown and some patients 
become terribly obsessional [while] others become very significantly 
phobic .... why should someone 
become psychotic as opposed to any other 
thing that can happen with people to break down to various illness 
patterns? I don't think the answer can be wholly psychological. I don't 
think it can but that does not mean to say I have got the answer. But my 
inference and my guess would be that there is a biological component. 
A realistic assessment of the possibilities of change is needed: 
..... for people with this sort of problem ....... 
it seems that the illness has 
woven its way into their personality so they become rather depressive 
personalities, so that a careful assessment needs to bear in mind that 
change is difficult and the last thing people like this need is another 
experience of failure. 
Sometimes you fmd with people like this particularly as they reach middle 
years that they are so bedded into social and interpersonal structures that 
their room for manoeuvre, for change, is very limited. They may be 
struggling with some real physical impediments to striking out on a new 
course...... change is not always possible, it really isn't. 
Martin refers to the `stress diathesis model' which he links to the metaphor of 
architecture. The reality of the flawedness of life means that we all have `fault lines' 
in our psychological development. These can be thought of as predispositions or 
weaknesses that sufficient stress can open up so causing severe mental pain. In 
architectural terms our foundations carry an number of weaknesses that severe 
weather might expose but benign weather may leave quite undetected. Severe stress 
may overwhelm the defences of repression in the closed internal world in an 
uncontrolled way and lead to breakdown. 
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Martin's Developmental Narrative 
Within the psychological realm Martin draws on the thinking of Fairbaim for his 
developmental narrative. Fairbairn emphasised the impact of the very earliest years in 
creating an internal culture within a person. While Martin takes a slightly wider view 
he comments: _ 
But at least it is arguable that early experience leaves a pretty indelible 
stamp. 
The better the quality of childhood experience the greater is the development of an 
inner strength that Martin refers to as `ego strength'. So the first patient: 
.... is a person who feels bad about herself and yet in many ways her life 
actually is reasonably successful in that she works, she holds down a 
relationship in life. She has come through quite a difficult childhood with 
some chronic impingements on her development and some difficult to 
manage, if not traumatic, events. She has grown into adult life with what 
you might call a serviceable ego - psychotherapists would talk about ego 
strength - with a level of ego strength that enables her to manage many 
aspects of her life but with an eternal price to be paid in terms of low self- 
esteem and a mood of mild, sometimes moderate depression. 
He suggests that when experiences become unmanageable for the infant they are 
internalised as a form of defence and locked away in a `closed internal world' where 
old and new experiences can not be held in tension. He describes this closed internal 
world as: 
..... the repository of defensively determined introjections that the child, 
developing in a situation which he or she cannot manage, can't deal with, 
[which] causes intolerable mental pain, so it is defensively introjected and 
it is deposited in a closed internal system, so it is no longer an open 
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system, no longer something that can be modified by experience, it's a bit 
of the patient that remains immature and ground down ..... and therefore 
it 
operates at the thinking level of the immature mind and there may be 
primitive splits made between good and bad objects and the self in 
relation to those objects. 
Under sufficient stress the defences of the closed internal world can later collapse in 
an uncontrolled and terrifying way. Perhaps the greater the degree to which an 
experience can not be managed the greater the force with which it is repressed and 
held `incommunicado', as it were, in the closed internal world. The more closed the 
system the less it is open to `reality checks' and the less able a person is to respond to 
the present in its own terms. 
For Fairbairn the emphasis was on actual experiences of the world which are then 
internalised with a mixture of objectivity and subjectivity. These internalisations are 
not analogous to photographic memories but are transformed and distorted. So for the 
second patient the delusions were a representation of her sense of something 
menacing and bad inside herself. In object relational terms they were distorted part- 
objects. 
Martin's Treatment Narrative 
As both of Martin's clinical examples come from the early stages of therapy so he is 
describing his approach to organising his thinking and this shapes to some extent the 
treatment narrative he describes. 
Martin feels the need to gain a sense of the patient's difficulties and then organise his 
thinking around a diagnostic sense which provides a provisional sense of objectivity, 
as it were. He acknowledges the limitations of this approach: 
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Well I like to see the phenomena in themselves, the thing in itself, before 
trying to make a meaning of it or sense of it. The approach has grave 
limitations in terms of trying to reduce the complexity of human nature to 
the diagnostic categories. But I feel on balance that if I don't do anything 
like that I am rather at sea. So I try if possible to get some kind of 
descriptive category assigned to a patient.... kind of psychiatric..... yes, 
some sort of diagnostic sense. 
Further the patient needs from Martin "a thoughtful response", "as good an 
assessment as possible" and "not another experience of failure". 
Then there is an exploration of whether common ground can be found between 
therapist and patient in terms of seeing whether a shared psychological understanding 
of the patient's difficulties is possible. This requires the patient to have an ability and 
willingness to think in psychological terms about their difficulties: 
There is a dimension that one tries to take note of and assess called 
psychological mindedness. It's a quality of personality that varies between 
individuals and what one tries to do is see how a particular person is in 
terms of that dimension, on the basis that the more psychologically 
minded they are , the more they can make use of the psychotherapeutic 
process. And conversely the less psychologically minded..... though it's 
gradatious, it's not an absolute thing, it's not an on or off, it's one patient 
has more or less. 
I suppose central to this would be - when I am working to a 
psychodynamic model - would be the extent to which I can build with a 
patient a preliminary, prima facie psychodynamic understanding. An 
important part of that would be my offering trial interpretations, to see 
whether an understanding fits with the patient.......... What you are looking 
for in therapy is the therapeutic alliance, you and the patient have some 
sense of shared understanding of where the difficulties are, how they have 
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arisen in interpersonal terms, or for you and I in object relations terms...... 
So I am looking for the response of the patient to my observations framed 
in the form of interpretations as to what the problems are and what 
hopefully often, how they may be tackled. And if there is a sense I can 
have with a patient that they are of a similar mind, that they can get hold 
of something that makes some sort of preliminary sense to them, then I 
think that is the basis for the therapy. 
What I want to convey to a patient at the outset is the tentative 
understanding, expressed with a reasonable degree of conviction " look I 
think this is what is happening" but either implicit or even explicit is "but 
I may have got this wrong". 
Therapy focuses on an exploration of the internal (and external) world of the patient 
and requires a balance between a sense of security in doing this and a sufficient level 
of risk. The concept of `containment' is employed to describe the necessary sense that 
exploration can be managed without difficulties spilling out in an uncontrolled way. A 
key task of therapy centres around the concept of the closed internal world and the 
tendency for people to view the present in terms of past experience even when the 
links appear tenuous. Therapy involves trying to detach the past from the present : 
Sometimes you can see in a relatively short therapy some insight into the 
origins of that [problem with assertion] and an ability on the patient's part 
to detach the origins from the present. It frees them up to be more 
assertive in the present. 
Ongoing assessment is needed and Martin clearly voices the need to take careful 
account of the risk of an exploratory and uncovering therapy prompting a break down 
or being insufficient and the patient becoming unable to manage themselves. There is 
a need for therapists to notice when an alternative form of treatment might be 
necessary. Martin talks about this in terms of an alternative form of 'containment': 
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If we work with the more disturbed patients then the potential is always 
there in any of the patients of having significant breakdowns..... the 
containment that is required may need to be much wider than can be 
provided in [once weekly] psychotherapy. The process itself of 
encouraging patients to look beyond their defences can result in a 
worsening of the symptoms or ... 
illness. When a surgeon operates there is 
a bit of blood around. There has to be ... But you think, 'well the trauma of 
the operation is worth it because of the benefit that will occur in the long 
term'. You have to recognise that therapy itself - and this is one reason 
why therapists place so much value on their own experience of therapy- 
can be jolly uncomfortable and itself a disturbing process. 
It's difficult when you have to make some sort of assessment at the outset 
and during the course of a therapy as to whether or not...... the evolution of 
the therapy will be bearable and manageable by the patient. There are 
some who break down or become symptomatically much worse. You can 
make things worse as well as get better. You need as a therapist to be able 
to spot that, rethink your strategy and involve other agencies if necessary. 
I think this particular sort of patient [patient two] will be contained by say 
attending the Day Hospital for five days a week for four or five hours a 
day which is more than we can provide in a once weekly group for 
instance and I think it's a question not so much of giving up containment 
as the nature of the containment that is required and it might be a 
psychiatric hospital that is required. 
A further problem in treatment is described in terms of the passivity of some patients: 
Patients who seem passive and don't interact in a thoughtful and 
questioning way are hard work in therapy, if they can make much 
progress. So that would be another aspect of the assessment that would be 
crucial and it's linked to psychological mindedness. With an extremely 
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passive patient, one who is overawed perhaps with a sense of authority 
from the doctor/therapist is one where it might be difficult to strike a 
therapeutic balance. So I am certainly looking for a patient who can come 
back at me at some things if they think they are misunderstood. 
Therapy needs to take account of the limits to change and the capacity for insight to be 
double-edged and add to a sense of despair and failure: 
Well if you look at the long term outcome for people with this sort of 
problem [patient two] when they are mildly or moderately depressed then 
it seems that the illness has woven its way into their personality so they 
become rather depressive personalities, so that a careful assessment needs 
to bear in mind that change is difficult and the last thing people like this 
need is another experience of failure......... Sometimes it seems in talking to 
a patient that there are certain areas of their personality functioning that 
might be open to change. Sometimes you find with people like this 
particularly as they reach middle years that they are so bedded into social 
and interpersonal structures that there room for manoeuvre , for change, is 
very limited. They may be struggling with some real physical impediments 
to striking out on a new course. , 
..... or supposing that insight into their situation is necessarily very 
welcome. It may be that it adds to their sense of despair. It does not have 
to but occasionally I see that if these issues have not been carefully 
handled 
.... a patient can become even more dissatisfied with .... their 
situation at their inability to cope..... 
The more closed the system the less it is open to `reality checks' and the less able a 
person is to respond to the present in its own terms. So, with the second patient: 
So what seemed to have happened with the course of the therapy was that 
the defensive structures around this closed internal world had broken 
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down and the therapy had played a part in doing it, it had encouraged it. I 
had said "look this may be difficult..... get to the other side of it": But the 
defensive structure of her mind which was holding this closed internal 
world collapsed in an uncontrolled way, a way that she did not experience 
herself as being in control of and ..... it was no longer containable ............... 
Well, one I think that her ego strength was insufficient to bear the.. . pain 
associated with undoing of repressed traumatic memories and it fractured, 
it split off in accusatory objects and projected them into the [delusions] so 
that what I believe was that the impact of therapy was very significant in 
disturbing her mind. 
Martin's first patient appears to him to be somebody well-placed to use psychotherapy 
over a few sessions and to tolerate the more `doing to' side of therapy. He views her 
as "energetic and organised person who can tackle things". His language conveys the 
aims of treatment. Six sessions of therapy might be sufficient to "launch her", "free 
her up to be more assertive in the present", "give her enough sense of hopefulness or 
the possibility of change". 
Martin's Attachment Narrative 
Martin describes how his professional knowledge and reasoning is informed by an 
interweaving of his personal and professional experiences: 
It [my philosophy] sustains me..... well it keeps me going and if I was not 
able to keep going then I would not be able to function as a 
psychotherapist. Well I don't know if I would be able to function as a 
human being and certainly not as a doctor or therapist. 
I suppose it [my understanding] is a way of thinking about the world that 
was clarified by my psychotherapy training - the way of thinking then 
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became clothed in analytic language, became much richer because of the 
unique way it has of describing and understanding human nature but 
clearly it was there before...... It found a mode of expression. I am not sure 
but I could have, been a surgeon theoretically and done good by being a 
surgeon which would have been satisfying in the way of expressing 
something of my wish to be useful and assert the value of life but in a 
very different way from what I am doing now. 
However his attachment is a `critical' one. It involves acknowledging the limits of 
understanding in general and inherent in any one perspective on the world. No one 
view holds a monopoly of understanding but he postulates his own `law' of theorising 
whereby people attempt to assert such a monopoly: 
good ideas always get taken to the point at which they no longer are good 
ideas. Everything is pushed to the limit where it fails. Perhaps it has to do 
that. So biological understanding of the minds processes becomes patently 
absurd at some point. But so does the psychoanalytic work. 
There is a risk, he feels, of mistaking understandings for explanations: 
Well I think finally that analytic models are for understandings of human 
nature and understanding is not the same as explaining..... Well you might 
see somebody who seems in a very happy mood, boisterous, lively, joyful 
and you might think that something good has happened to them, perhaps 
they have won the pools, they have met somebody rather wonderful or 
their PhD has just been accepted or whatever. But actually somebody 
might have spiked their drink and they could not tell it. They think it's just 
a cup of coffee but there is actually something in it which is affecting 
them but they don't know it and they may be attributing their good mood 
and boisterousness to whatever. 
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Martin reflects on the domains of the biological and the psychological noting that it is 
very difficult to talk about them in a way that does not suggest a `dualistic split', that 
does not distance one from the other. He suggests that there is perhaps a biological 
component that predisposes a person to develop a psychosis rather than aphobia. He 
does not want to support the idea it is all about the domain of the psychological. 
However his view about possible biological components to the patient's illness is 
classed as an "inference" and a "guess": 
Yes particularly when it comes to what is termed the interaction between 
something biological and what is termed psychological. And we use those 
terms for convenience. However much we want to get away from the 
dualistic split in fact it's very difficult to talk about these things except in 
language which then distance themselves one from the other. Depression 
can be thought about in terms of changes in brain chemistry as well as in 
terms of conflicting forces within the psyche. 
Practically holding a position as I do, it's an aspect of our work in the 
clinic and the team as a whole that I have been particularly mindful 
of......... Why do some people, in relation to traumatic experiences which 
happen, develop neurotic conditions, like neurotic obsessional- 
compulsive disorder, why do some breakdown for instance, why do some 
people for instance develop serious personality disorders? I have not felt 
my understanding of the process has not been very enriched by 
psychoanalytic theories but there are still many areas where that 
understanding may be false perhaps because it's difficult to check out or 
where they need explanatory mechanisms of a different sort, belonging to 
a different domain, a biological domain or part of the social world domain. 
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Martin declares his own position that the brain does not determine the function of the 
mind : 
.. I locate the mind in the, brain but suppose that brain function constrains 
mind function, does not necessarily determine it but it will constrain it and 
the ways we have of understanding brain function may require a different 
a different language, a different science from the way we understand mind 
function. But I think .......... we function with the mind. 
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Summary of interview with Martin 
In the interview Martin expressed : 
° the tension to be held between competing perspectives, namely the biological, 
psychological and social perspectives and the hazards of over-privileging or over- 
objectifying one perspective at the expense of the others. 
° how his professional knowledge reasoning is informed by a mixture of his personal 
and professional experiences and so emerges from his life `situation'. 
° the importance for therapy of the two subjects involved, namely the therapist and 
the patient negotiating a shared space where they can come together around some 
measure of a psychological understanding of the patient's difficulties. 
° the potential for closed, `hard-edged' internal cultures within our personalities. 
° the need to recognise limits to change and to possible selves within the patient such 
that potential counter-cultures within the patient may be unable to thrive. 
° the hazard that the actively exploratory `doing' side of therapy might overwhelm 
the defences of a patient such that they need a different culture of therapeutic 
containment. 
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Interview with Mary 
In the interview Mary gave an account of: 
° the importance of facing `reality', both internal and external. 
° the centrality to the therapy of the lived experience with the patient. 
° the importance of being direct as a therapist and addressing risk but within the 
context of a long-term therapy relationship. 
°a fit between her theoretical base, her own philosophy and her professional style. 
° her understanding as situated in a particular place, time and set of personal values. 
° the value of being able to recognise how much is unknown and the importance of 
holding a tension between open and closed systems of understanding. 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient One was described as the more disturbed patient. She was a single 
woman involved in highly conflictual relationships and with high risk behaviour, 
designed, Mary felt, to keep at bay disturbing feelings within herself. She had 
described a very disturbed upbringing in a family permanently `on the edge'. 
Her own mental health appeared also to be `on the edge' and Mary felt her 
disturbance was powerfully re-enacted in the therapy. For Mary, the therapy was 
experienced as "hard work" and "worrying" and necessarily focused at times on 
questions about the patient's safety and risk to herself and others and whether 
Mary might herself have to intervene. (Perhaps this was similar, Mary felt, to the 
professionals who observed the patient's childhood family and debated whether 
and when to intervene. ) The patient appeared to lack a capacity to observe 
herself and to `speak reality' to herself -a role which Mary felt she had to take 
on. Therapy involved working to enable the patient to `face reality', both in 
terms of her own internal feelings and in terms of her behaviour and its effects, 
potential and actual, on others. Mary saw evidence as the therapy progressed 
that the patient was becoming better able to reflect on herself and her behaviour 
and challenge herself. 
Patient Two was described as a less disturbed patient. She was a woman with 
many obviously healthy aspects to her personality. She held down a good job, 
generally functioned well and could make and sustain relationships though not 
without difficulties. Mary understood her to have come to therapy out a sense 
that she found it hard to trust herself to a relationship and did not feel a sense of 
control and direction in her life. Her well-loved father had died in her childhood 
and Mary understood the experience of this loss as an ongoing deterrent to 
further deep attachment. The therapy relationships felt warm and engaging to 
Mary. The patient's affairs with older men were understood by Mary in oedipal 
terms. The patient was creative and responsive in the therapy as well as being 
able to voice disagreement. As therapy progressed the patient voiced her sense 
that she was becoming more able allow intimacy and more able to direct her life 
creatively. 
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Mary's Psychodynamic Narrative 
To live a psychologically healthy life we need to be able to "face reality". The `reality' 
Mary is referring to is of the disturbance and psychological need within ourselves, at 
whatever level we find it to be as well as the reality of our behaviour and our 
relationships. Mary describes this as involving a `doing' and a `being'. The `doing' is 
implied in the idea of `facing' reality and the `being' is implied in the idea of the need 
to `bear' psychic pain. She describes it this way: 
I suppose it is about facing reality. I think we all evade reality all the time 
but some more than others and yea I think it's that, facing reality and the 
pain that that involves and learning that that pain is bearable. I think a lot 
of people believe that reality is too. - too unmanageable. I suppose that's 
the main thing. 
Evading reality has consequences: 
I suppose it doesn't work not to [face reality]. People run into such 
difficulties. Obviously there must be some people who manage. I suppose 
if you are extremely rich and can organise your life in such a way but then 
I still think you damage other people so I think there is still something 
about - well, obviously there is the experience of the individual but there 
is the impact you have on those around you and if an individual is not 
facing what is going on in their life often they are damaging those people 
close to them, if they have people close to them. 
I was thinking of someone like Paul Getty who sounds like he has got a lot 
of difficulties but he is so wealthy that he can create an environment in 
which he does not have to get close to anyone. But I imagine if you 
worked for him it would be hell. So the idea that you could construct a 
life where it wasn't damaging anyone else - pretty unlikely. But not 
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everyone will come for therapy. People who come have some sense that 
something is wrong. 
Evidence for such psychological health is found in the capacity to maintain more 
equal, non-abusive relationships, to sustain meaningful employment and to live 
honestly with oneself and others. In therapy health shows itself as the capacity to use 
the therapy creatively. 
Psychological ill-health may show itself in a variety of ways; psychiatric symptoms 
such as delusions or hallucinations; in drug and alcohol abuse; in high-risk living, and 
in the making of emotionally avoidant relationships. Some people are unable to 
perceive their reality and need others to point it out to them, to provide `reality-speak' 
until such time as they are able to provide this function to themselves. This may be 
done by a friend or, in this instance, by a therapist. The facing of reality, where life 
has formerly been lived in a more manic and thrill-seeking way, may paradoxically 
lead to a sense that life feels more "boring" but "better". 
The concept that, for healthy psychological living, reality needs to be faced in an 
honest and direct way adds an explicit `moral' and `ethical' flavour to the narrative. 
Mary's Developmental Narrative 
Mary's account focuses on the role of nurture rather than nature in the development of 
psychological difficulties. (No reference is made to innate, constitutional factors. ) 
Mary's first and more disturbed patient had had a childhood described variously in 
Mary's account as "cruel", "deprived", "violent", "chaotic", "sadistic" and 
"disturbed". There is vivid privation and deprivation to be lived with in the absence 
of a loving and containing caregiver. Such realities can feel so fragmenting to a 
person's nascent sense of coherence that, Mary felt, psychotic aspects to the 
personality form. 
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A childhood lived `on the edge' may be repeated in an adult life also lived `on the 
edge'. The relationship with others, including the therapist may also share this quality. 
Some people's earliest experiences are of a more loving and supportive nature such 
that their psychological difficulties occur at a developmentally later level, when a 
sense of coherent identity has become formed. So the second patient's problems are 
seen as at an oedipal level and, for her, more normal oedipal issues had been 
exacerbated by the death of a parent while she was a child. This had led her, Mary 
hypothesised, to a pattern of re-enacting oedipal dynamics in her relationships by 
having an affair with an older married man (symbolically her father), so usurping 
another older woman (symbolically her mother). As a consequence of this early loss 
of a parent a fear had developed that intimacy would lead to unbearable loss and so 
would be best avoided. 
Mary's Treatment Narrative 
Mary states quite explicitly that her treatment narrative is a Kleiman narrative. For her 
this means she takes a very proactive and direct approach. This involves a `doing to' 
the patient and an openness on her part to the potential value of being more directly 
expressive with the patient: 
I think they [Kleiman analysts] are much more active and direct..... I 
suppose it's about technique rather than theory but obviously technique 
isn't divorced from theory but the more I know about Kleinian technique 
that seems to be how Kleinians work and certainly it was a surprise for 
me. I particularly sought out a Kleinian analyst when I was training for my 
own personal therapy and I had a fantasy about what that would be like 
and the experience was very very different and much more akin to the way 
my current supervisor supervises me which is a very direct, active, 
challenging style. 
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I think this is where supervision helps me to - because often -I don't 
know what it is like for you - I'll go to supervision and I'll sort of give 
them `you know I was thinking this and this and this' and she'll say `well 
why didn't you say it? ' I think often we hold back on what we think from 
this -fear that we are going to be imposing our view but as someone once 
said `if your therapist can't say it to you who the hell can? ' I think that is 
something I have learnt over time from this particular supervisor about 
having the courage to be more forthright. 
This involves her in various forms of "reality speak" when, to Mary, there appears to 
be significant and damaging evasion taking place. The patient does need to have 
"enough of a hold on reality" for therapy to be possible. `Reality' and `Safety' are two 
key watchwords for work with more disturbed patients: 
I said to her `I think you are very disturbed' ..:. and talked with her about 
the seriousness of her symptoms at times. 
I suppose the main thing I think we have done is confronting her with 
what she has done to herself....... constantly, repeatedly, pointing out to her 
what she is doing and the possible consequences. I think that has really 
been the main work..... standing up to her because she is very 
manipulative. 
It's probably something I've learned particularly with this [first] patient 
not to be too cautious really. Actually, I think it does help her and what 
she says about previous counsellors is that she felt they kind of beat 
around the bush and did not actually get hold of her. 
When unacknowledged oedipal struggles are perceived by a therapist as being 
repeated in relationships, the ongoing work includes bringing them to the patient's 
attention: 
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I suppose what we call conventionally oedipal issue - she had difficulties 
in her relationships with men and she tended to - she had a pattern of 
getting involved with older married men and I think part of the work was 
helping her to see that there was some sort of unconscious replay of 
revenge on the other woman, the mother. 
With a more disturbed patient the experience can be like being on the end of a 
"barrage" with a lot of work required to sift through and make some sense of what is 
happening. The level of disturbance in the patient forms part of the shared experience 
of the therapy and is re-enacted there : 
I am often sitting here thinking `now what on earth is going on, here ? 
What is this about? ' There will be loads of material and I try and step 
back and think 'what is this? ' So often it is trying to - out of this barrage 
of stuff, trying to get hold of what she is telling me, what she is not telling 
me. 
Mary describes how a therapeutic alliance may be ambivalent on both sides and may 
be deeply strained by dishonesty on the patient's part. However some repair to the 
alliance is possible when the deception can be talked about and the, reasons for it 
clarified. 
Some patient behaviour (as with the first patient) raises questions for a therapist of 
whether they need to intervene in the patient's life outside of the therapy on the 
grounds of a risk to the patient or others. Where a patient describes a life style that 
makes them unfit for the employment they are pursuing, should the therapist inform 
an employer? When drink-driving is described, should the public be protected? Where 
suicidal behaviour is described, should the patient be protected? Where childhood 
abuse is described and details provided of the abuser by way of name and address, 
should the therapist inform the police? Such issues might also be understood as a 
replay of childhood family dynamics in the sense that professionals who were aware 
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of the first patient's family may well also have debated what interventions to make 
and agonised over what to do. 
Mary sets the relationship between therapist and patient as the core of the therapy and 
initially she experiences anxiety about whether a working partnership can be formed: 
I certainly think that there has to be some way of finding a way of getting 
on together sufficiently to carry on working. I suppose that is one of the 
problems about working in the NHS is that patients don't have much 
opportunity to choose who they get..... I always get anxious starting with a 
patient and I suppose it is that kind of initial feeling around and thinking 
we we going to find a way of being sufficiently able to communicate with 
each other that we can do something useful together ?' 
The lived experience of the dynamics of the relationship is viewed as offering 
'essential clues to an understanding of the patient's internal world. Mary suggests that 
therapy involves a relationship `plus', a `doing to' stance built on the foundations of a 
'being with' stance. Interpretation and therefore insight are necessary as well as 
relationship : 
I don't think the relationship is sufficient but it is crucial and I really do 
believe it is through the relationship, through the transference and counter- 
transference - that is how therapy works. That's how I can begin to 
understand the dynamics of her is through that reaction and what happens 
between us. 
A pro-active and direct style could lead to patients acquiescing to the therapist in an 
deferential way. This does not appear to be the case for Mary with the two patients she 
described as both appeared well capable of disagreeing and answering back. ("I've 
read all that stuff - Freud - what a load of rubbish") Mary suggests that in these 
instances there was a greater risk to the patient if she was not firm enough. Both 
patients could go on `negotiating' after disagreement. Mary describes a process of 
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negotiation involving her own persistence with her view but employing both a sense 
of timing and some `evidence' to support her view: 
I suppose I'm fairly persistent ! She was someone with whom there could 
be quite a lot of humour ... I'd just laugh because the challenge [to my 
comments] was so direct. I'd tend to not pursue the point then because 
there would not be much point. But I might come back to it and say 'I 
know you dismiss what I said and think it's just ridiculous theory but' - 
so I'd put it again and again and I'd put it with evidence that might 
demonstrate that this might be a helpful way of looking at it. And she was 
the kind of person who would usually dismiss what I'd say initially and 
then she'd come back the following week and say `Actually maybe you've 
got a point' and she'd supply evidence. 
Mary describes a debate with herself over whether or not she was imposing her own 
psychodynamic narrative on her patients as if with a too great belief in her own 
objectivity. She concludes that would be too simplistic an analysis: 
I don't feel I'm imposing those because I think I will present them and she 
is well able to fight back. And also, I don't think she would keep coming 
if - she could say she doesn't understand me. Occasionally she'll accuse 
me of being middle class, having middle class values, not having an 
understanding of the kind of world that she comes from, you know - 
haven't got a clue. 
But I just feel - it can't be that simple. There must be something about the 
way that I view things that she is buying into by continuing to come and at 
times she will be quite explicit about that and say - one of the main things 
she will say is `it's boring to be normal and I miss the excitement but I 
know my life is better as a result'. 
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progress in therapy for Mary is indicated by both external factors and internal factors 
such as living 'safely', making more equal and non-abusive relationships and being 
able to be honest within oneself. Value clashes are described, for example over 
whether it is appropriate to pursue an affair with an older married man. 
The importance of consulting colleagues through supervision or team meetings is 
emphasised by Mary. It is seen as providing a form of `reality check' for a therapist. 
Mary expresses regret that it is not possible to observe a patient's progress in the years 
that follow the therapy as this would provide another form of `reality check' on the 
hypotheses that shaped the experience of therapy. 
Mary's Attachment Narrative 
Mary describes how her professional knowledge is nurtured particularly by and within 
the Kleiman community of therapists. She experiences a `fit' between such Kleinfan 
views and her own personal philosophy of life. She spells out in practical terms what 
her attachment means: 
I particularly sought out a Kleiman analyst when I was training for my 
own personal therapy..... and then choosing a supervisor who is a Kleiman 
analyst. 
Well it means that I tend to, when I get the International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, I tend to look first at the papers by the names that I 
recognise so I read more in the field of Kleiman theory. I suppose it's 
familiarity, it's a way of thinking that I am used to it, it makes sense, so I 
can immediately - whereas - in this reading group I belong to I have 
suggested a few Kleiman papers and I'm fascinated by others people's 
reaction who don't read so much, [they say] `I can't understand what they 
were going on about' or `I found this very off-putting' whereas for me it's 
a bit like talking to a colleague, we are speaking the same language. And I 
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think traditions do work that way whereas I find reading Winnicott, 
although I think he was brilliant, it's the most frustrating experience - `for 
God's sake say what you want to say'. I think the Kleinians write in a very 
direct way. It's familiarity. 
She describes how the development of her clinical understanding has involved initial 
clinical experiences becoming informed subsequently by a psychodynamic theoretical 
framework: 
I suppose I. have much more grasp of theory than I had then. I'd worked in 
the Henderson with analysts and group analysts and had supervision and 
had an individual patient in London. So I had a lot of experience and 
obviously absorbed a lot of ideas and techniques but I did not really have a 
framework for it. So that was one of the things that was wonderful, having 
the opportunity to think about and talk about - `ah that's why people 
thought that that was the way'. So it was kind of fitting together past 
experience with the theoretical framework. 
Mary describes how she had developed more confidence that she does not always 
need to feel she understands what is going on and that there are not necessarily pre-set 
correct ways of being a therapist. So in her use of professional knowledge she has 
more freedom now to experience her uncertainty and lack of knowledge : 
I don't think I've changed enormously in the way that I think about things 
but I think I have got more confident, more -I used to get terribly worried 
about what should I do or what's the correct way of doing something but I 
think I've sort of learnt -well I've got experience but I've also learnt there 
is not always a correct way. I think I have learnt that there is so much we 
don't know. 
I think I had an idea that there were people who had got it sussed - it 
sounds so naive - and it's the sort of classic thing that the older you get 
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the more you realise what you don't know. I think that's definitely true for 
me But that does not worry me. Whereas before I knew I didn't know 
things but I used to get really worried about not knowing but now I think 
`that's" how it is, you can't possibly' - in a way that is wonderful because 
there is lots to learn. I see that as one of the joys about qualifying that 
somebody said `you are OK' so it's OK not to know. 
Perspectives are seen by Mary to be situated in a time and culture which shifts over 
the years: 
I think it would be more a strong working hypothesis along with all the 
caveats that this is me functioning at this time in this society with all the 
sort, of cultural influences - so I don't imagine if I were a therapist twenty 
years from now I would be working in the same way....... I suppose what I 
always think about is I worked at the Henderson when I was first qualified 
so that's twenty five or twenty years ago - and I think we did our best and 
we worked very hard and we tried to understand and all of that but now I 
realise a lot of those patients were sexually abused and we just didn't 
think about it because the culture was such that it wasn't really thought 
about. 
And I think that's one big shift in our way of thinking and understanding 
and we do listen and believe patients now and that wasn't true when I first 
started in psychiatric work. There were a few patients who we knew were 
the victims if incest but we had no idea how widespread it was and we 
used to talk about people being hysterical and imagining and fantasies. So 
I just think there are bound to be other things that we have no idea about. 
In time we will understand better. 
Perspectives are also situated in a person so value clashes occur and Mary described 
being very challenged over doubts about the wisdom or morality of having an affair 
with an older married man: 
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And that's her choice [patient two]. I wasn't going to impose my view 
because- equally it makes you question your own thinking - maybe we all 
many our fathers or mothers or some version of them. In that sense she 
was good for me because she made me think very hard about what I 
thought and what my values were .... I think I learnt that really. You may 
have a view about what may be in a patient's best interest but you can get 
it seriously wrong. Maybe not -I don't know. That is one of the 
frustrations. I have no idea what happened. 
She sees a tension to be held between open and closed, soft-edged and hard-edged 
systems of understanding both of which have dangers. Systems that are too open or 
soft-edged can be too ill-defined to inform a therapist's clinical thinking. Systems that 
are too closed or hard-edged may be too restricting in their informing of the therapist's 
clinical thinking. She relates this to the culture of South Trent Psychotherapy 
Departments: 
But why I hesitate about saying I'm a Kleiman'. I'd hate to think I was 
narrow minded and was not open to all sorts of ideas. I try not to restrict 
myself to one view because I think that's dangerous. 
I don't think you can -I think you can talk about the culture within 
Departments. I think it varies enormously so I can comment about the 
culture in [my Department].... its version of South Trent, as I see it, is a 
mixture. There is a strong Kleinian link ...... 
but also there is a tremendous 
eclecticism..... So I think there is an open-mindedness which I suppose, 
because of my links through supervision with the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis, that is something that I think is positive about South 
Trent in contrast to quite a lot of the London trainings. 
But on the other hand I think the danger of that is that sometimes I think 
that it can get too woolly and not -I don't know how to put it -I suppose 
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it's something about boundaries and whilst I think it is important to be 
open to ideas there is something about having something that defines what 
you are doing and I think you can be too open to other ideas so that you 
are not clear what you are and what you do think. I sometimes feel that's a 
danger here. I think a worse danger is people being very closed- this is the 
way it is and that certainly isn't true in [my Department]. And I think that 
I could broaden it out and say that is one of the features of South Trent 
that there is a pretty open tolerance of difference. 
She cautions against idealising one's own abilities as a therapist and argues for 
exercising restraint in the face of such an emotional pull: 
And I suppose, kind of thinking, about my grandiosity and omnipotence 
that I thought it would be different with me than with everybody else 
because she is very seductive so there is a bit of me that thinks you know 
`I am a special person, I'm the one who understands her'. I think that is 
always a danger in this kind of work, you can get pulled into thinking `I 
understand, other people didn't'. Then it's a real reminder that you're just, 
you're not that wonderful. 
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Summary of the interview with Mary 
In the interview Mary emphasised: 
° the perspective from which her professional knowledge is drawn as situated within 
a culture and a time, and the hazard that it may only subsequently be open to 
evaluation and new perspective. 
° how the intersubjective encounter (with a patient seen as more disturbed) can be 
dominated by a powerful re-enactment of the patient's disturbance, a re-enactment 
that, for the therapist, is of a deeply disturbing intensity. 
° the way an internal culture of avoidance can be created and maintained by patients 
as a way of managing unbearable pain and the therapeutic task of fermenting a 
counter-culture within the patient based around `facing' and `bearing' 
psychological pain. 
°a firm belief in the sufficient objectivity of her perspective allied to a questioning 
and checking out of its validity within her community of therapists and with the 
patient. 
°a stance on the part of the therapist involving a `doing to' the patient but built on a 
foundation of a therapist stance of `being with' the patient. 
° the potential benefit of a direct expressiveness on the therapist's part in their 
comments to the patient. 
The need for a therapist, in their use of their professional knowledge, to hold the 
tension between soft-edged, open systems of understanding and practice and hard- 
edged, closed systems of understanding and practice. 
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Interview with Mike 
In the interview Mike emphasised : 
° his particular knowledge base and the intersubjective nature of therapy. 
the need for the therapist to be an empathic, attuned, `other' person, providing a 
`holding' environment and a `containing' relationship which offers `deep' contact 
with the patient. 
° the importance of the therapist waiting for understanding to emerge over time in 
the therapy, out of the shared experience of the therapy, rather than their seeking to 
understand processes prematurely from `without'. 
° the powerful enactment of the patient's psychological difficulties that can take 
place in therapy and that requires a response from the therapist of thoughtfulness 
and restraint. 
° the need for the therapist to have a core of healthy belief in themselves and the 
process of therapy in order for them creatively to manage the stress of therapy. 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient One was described by Mike as the more psychologically healthy patient. 
He was a professional man, married with children who came for psychotherapy 
on account of recurring depressions and crippling anxiety. Mike described him 
as a man with a "well-formed personality" with an ability to have his own clear 
views and to hold life together despite his psychological difficulties. Mike saw 
the roots of the patient's difficulties as located in a rather distant childhood 
family life and in specific traumas. During the course of the patient's childhood 
the family had lost their home, the father his livelihood and the patient his health 
for a time. Mike had a view of this patient as losing his "holding context" at 
crucial times. These experiences were seen by Mike as shaping the patient's 
inability to trust himself at all to the therapy process in the first two years such 
that therapy was experienced as "slow" and with an "awful" atmosphere marked 
by tension and anxiety. Mike understood this in time to be a recreation of the 
atmosphere of the patient's life at particularly stressed times. In time the 
atmosphere eased as if they had come through something undefined together. 
Mike saw his role as providing a `holding context' and a `containing 
relationship' and felt the patient left therapy better able to bear his disturbance. 
Patient two was described by Mike as the less psychologically healthy patient. 
She was a well-respected professional woman who had received a variety of 
psychiatric and therapeutic treatments for what was broadly called `depression' 
over the years prior to beginning psychotherapy. Her difficulties were 
constructed by Mike in terms of her being a "tortured person" working to keep at 
bay a severe disturbance inside herself, the effort of which was eating up much 
of her energy. She could be severely self-critical. Her personality seemed to have 
a disorganised and unintegrated quality. The roots of her difficulties were not 
gone into in the interview. Her marked agitation in sessions led Mike to the view 
that what she needed most from him was the provision of a containing and 
sensitive space. Mike found her disorganised presentation made it difficult for 
him to organise his thinking about her in a coherent way. Therapy was ongoing 
at the time of the interview. 
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Mike's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Healthy psychological living requires a quality of relationship to others and to our 
social context. We experience this as being 'held' and `contained'. We feel 
`contained' when we experience deep and meaningful contact with other people. We 
feel `held' when we `fit' and `belong' somewhere. `Containment' refers to 
relationship with other people while `holding' refers to our relationship with the 
nonhuman environment (Searle, 1960). Implicit in Mike's account is a sense that 
holding and containment can not be forced or manufactured to order. They develop in 
time and reflect the reality of one's situation. 
Our sense of self may feel integrated or unintegrated, organised or disorganised, 
fragile or intact. This depends on whether we have been able to internalise a 
sufficiently good experience of being held and contained. Psychological problems 
involve a continual confusion between the past and the present such that we live the 
present as if it will inevitably be a repetition of the past. 
Our difficulties may not be immediately visible to others as they are experienced as a 
deep underlying sense of disturbance inside which impairs us and "eats up" valuable 
energy. It may involve a person in a sado-masochistic relationship to their own needs, 
for which they attack themselves with self-criticism or literally with self-harm. 
Mike's Developmental Narrative 
The roots of a problem with a sense of self can often be traced back to childhood and 
the limitations of what was offered by way of a `holding context' and a `containing 
relationship(s)'. Severe disruptions to one's environment such as the loss of home are 
referred to by Mike as examples of the loss of a `holding context'. Perhaps by way of 
emphasis in this interview, Mike appears to attribute more aetiology to the losses in 
the nonhuman environment than to relationship losses. 
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The distinction between 'holding' and `containing' is not always clear. Mike appears 
to suggest that an infant's prior need is for a `holding context' before a containing 
relationship. He views `holding' as a developmental process and `containing' as a 
transformational process. He links them to Winnicott's distinction (Winnicott, 1965a). 
between. the 'environment'. mother who handles and manages the infant and the 
`object',: mother who responds to, copes with and survives the infant's urgent 
demands. 
Mike's Treatment Narrative 
The psychotherapist provides a `holding context' and a `containing mind'. Mike 
describes the `holding context' in the following terms: 
There is about providing the holding environment which is I think [that] 
the patient deserves to have a well-organised therapeutic arrangement and 
so that's easy to say but it's not always easy to do. So like they need to 
have regular, well thought out space and time and commitment to them. 
And all of that, and it's part of our philosophy to be on top of that, to do 
that as well as I possibly can. 
The `containing mind' is equated with being open to deep contact with the patient : 
I think it is something probably to do with contact, being able to make, to 
do deep and sustained contact with someone... . the patient also needs a 
mind to engage with, to project into or to help think with. And that I see as 
fundamentally the containing function of being a therapist. 
I do try to respect the patient, respect the person I'm with and I do feel I 
am here to try to understand but that the deal is that I am here for you for 
this period of time however long it might be and if it's like with open- 
ended therapy it's like mostly 'OK. I'm here for as long as you need this' 
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and only very occasionally have I said `no I'm not going to do this 
anymore'. But mostly I think even though with some patients you 
probably go through some very difficult times with them, the job, the 
nature of the contract if you will, is that I provide the time and provide the 
room and I provide my mind and I try to use those and let the patient use 
those as freely as possible. I think that's my philosophy. 
The metaphor of `attunement' is used to illustrate the process of being open to `deep 
contact' : 
Quite often, particularly in the early phase of the therapy [first patient] it 
was as though we weren't particularly attuned. It was a very painful 
experience for him, very difficult to know how to proceed here, felt very 
anxious, tense, it seemed formless and I was at a loss as to how to ease it 
for him, to find a way of saying something that might ease it for him. But, 
as we went on there were measures of, if you like, attunement that came 
out of some of my interpretations so that was encouraging from my point 
of view that I had got something that meant something to him. 
Mike conveys a very strong sense of the therapist's need to `be with' the patient, over 
and above any `doing to' the patient. This involves, he feels an openness to the 
patient's projections. So the therapy with patient one was seen as being dominated by 
projective identification whereby a deeply hurt and damaged part of the patient was 
experienced by Mike as if part of himself: 
I think what I was subjected to with the [first] patient was some of the 
awfulness of their inner world and through projective identification I think 
I was very much gripped in the awfulness of their inner world......... being 
gripped by them, not being able to move, a sense of not very much 
freedom and thinking, certainly not much emotional freedom and 
responsiveness within the therapeutic relationship. 
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So through this I was faced with the problem of how do I get to engage 
with this man ? How do I cope with this gnawing feeling of being with 
him, And it was only after we had progressed a good way through that I 
began to have a sense of what all that was about and to get my bearings 
really, if you like. 
In some senses Mike suggests that therapist and patient identities become mixed-up 
together at an unconscious level. Projections, interpersonal struggles and general 
patterns of engagement are seen as a form of communication by re-enactment, re- 
enactment of problematic earlier and current states of mind and relationships. So the 
key tool Mike describes is the use of counter-transference which emerges from his 
"reverie" and which shapes the response he makes and the stance he takes. 
Implicit in his account is the immense restraint required by the therapist in the face of 
such powerful re-enactments by the patient. Also implicit is Mike's care not to expect 
too much of the patient. He adopts, when necessary, a particularly empathic, `being 
with' stance that affirms the patient's experience, limits his own therapeutic ambition 
and seeks to find the most containing way of being with the patient: 
I did try and formulate interpretations about how difficult it was for him 
[first patient] to just allow himself to say whatever came to mind or even 
to consider that as a possibility and I tried to understand his difficulty with 
that and talk about that in terms of this struggling against allowing the 
therapy to do what it might do for him. 
So I was aware the patient [second patient] could be very easily unsettled 
and that has been a feature of my dealing with her, an awareness that. can 
unsettle the patient, I can disturb her so that makes me very careful, 
needing not to be overzealous, therapeutically over-zealous. I felt that 
from pretty early on with her, this carefulness, this caution, needing to be 
careful....... Within the sessions quite early on I got an awareness of her 
being agitated....... I'd become quite sensitive to how she is as a physical 
164 
presence and as she would come in and sit down I'd become aware of 
`how agitated is she today at the moment ?' or `how agitated is she 
becoming in the session ?' or `is the agitation easing or not ? '...... this isn't 
just side effects to medication - it isn't that at all - it's much more a sense 
there was a shaky person being physically expressed. 
So I think she would come in and one day be relatively receptive to doing 
some measure of - to engage in therapeutic dialogue if you like. And then 
on other days I think it's much more painful and I'm aware of sitting with 
a tortured person who - actually I could easily -I mustn't try to do too 
much with her......... I think my first patient in a strange way my 
formulation was very much to do with holding but with projective 
identification there was a key containing issue going on. 
Now for this patient, I think predominantly it's a containing issue and it's 
like the need for the container and the nature of the container has to 
change in that the container must be very receptive and there will be many 
many different facets of her and it's quite a challenge for my mind to find 
the right position to be with her. 
Mike views it as important to `hang in there' through the difficulties, to simply 
survive the experience together and to take a no-blame stance which is `soft-edged' in 
his expectation of the patient: 
I believe that - maybe this is one of the things that helped [the first patient] 
-I believe it didn't turn into a kind of `you are not doing it right' type of 
situation rather that `this is a very difficult struggle and you are trying to 
find a way of dealing with this strange situation'. And I think he got a 
measure of understanding about that even though it did not initially make 
it any easier. I think I had to go through something with him really. 
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The pace of the interview, its quality of story telling, conveyed and mirrored Mike's 
sense of the value and necessity of waiting. Therapy involves an experience with a 
patient that is then reflected on before an understanding emerges. Mike is wary of 
what he calls "premature thinking". He wants to approach the patient with a 
sufficiently open mind in keeping with Keat's notion of `negative capability' and 
allow reflection to crystallise into something useful. He believes that time is needed 
for these processes of holding and containing to unfold and develop sufficiently. 
Within the therapy he allows time for his own and the patient's understanding to begin 
to emerge and coalesce: 
I think I probably don't jump to formulations ........ I do do time-limited 
work and it seems to me that you are trying to force the pace and make the 
formulation. And the formulation often warps and changes and shifts 
about but nonetheless you do try and do that. But I think my sense of - my 
normal, if you like, therapeutic stance is not to make formulation but 
rather to kind of follow pieces of the narrative that emerge. 
Now somethings will naturally catch my ear more than others perhaps or 
I'm stirred up by some things more than others and those tend to be the 
things that I work on. And I do tend to make fairly lengthy notes. I'm quite 
a note taker. And I think it's in that process, that bit of taking the notes, 
that I invariably bring some kind of attempt to bear my theoretical outlook 
on whatever bit has come up. But you are right. I don't think I do try to 
make an overall formulation like one does say in an assessment or in a 
slightly different way when one does move into a time-limited groove. 
Mike reflected on how much more difficult it was to have an organised understanding 
of a patient when the patient is themselves quite disorganised : 
Part of the problem is they're not organised. They're far less organised in 
terms of their personality and themselves and their psychic sort of 
166 
structure if you like. And so, correspondingly, I think I don't have an 
organising thing that pulls it all together. 
Mike's Attachment Narrative 
Mike sees himself as temperamentally suited to the kind of approach to therapy he 
outlined in the interview. He is clear that what emerges in therapy is a co-construction, 
a particular co-creation between therapist and patient: 
I am sure there were other ways you could make sense of him [first 
patient]. But I was his therapist and I was kind of like given the job if you 
like of being with him and trying to talk with him and I suppose me trying 
to make sense of him and draw on some of my reading, the ideas that 
came to me, that meant something to me. I don't know whether I would 
call it a truth. I don't know what a truth -I think it's meaningful - my 
formulation of him I think is meaningful. I think there'd be other 
meaningful formulations... . Yes I am almost certain 
if someone else had 
been with him they would have had a different formulation and the 
therapy with him might have turned a very different shape. 
I think I feel quite privileged .... and feel 
it is quite a responsibility to have 
a particular responsibility for an individual who comes and indeed with 
the group because in other ways the same with the group therapy, that it's 
inevitably going to be somewhat shaped by me as well. I think for better or 
worse that's the way it is. I'm sure that there would be better therapists 
than me for all the patients I've seen. But I am the one they come to see 
and I am the one in the seat and in some senses it's an ordeal or can be but 
it's a privilege and a responsibility, that's the way I see it. 
He voiced a strong sense of the pressure on the therapist's/his personality that is 
inevitably part of the process. He developed the theme further in an article he had 
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written and which he sent to me. Doubts in the therapist can lead defensively to a false 
sense of their capacity for objectivity or a self-attacking relativity: 
The whole process is doubt-ridden for therapy is a world of bits and 
pieces, hints, changes of mind, conflicts and mere glimpses of truth .... self- 
doubt is rarely far from the therapist's mind and this can be especially 
uncomfortable for uncertainty is focused upon oneself. I believe, however, 
that self-doubt is realistic and therefore a healthy state of mind for the 
therapist. The desire to quickly resolve self-doubt can lead in two 
directions. Negatively, it leads to a guilty self-admonishing frame of mind, 
`I'm useless and no good at this job'. Positively, it can lead to a state of 
grandiose denial, `I know I'm right because I've got talent for this work'. 
Both a false resolutions to self-doubt and draw one away from the difficult 
task of reflecting on the true quality of one's therapeutic work. 
In order to bear self-doubt the therapist needs a core of healthy belief in 
him/herself and in psychotherapy as a treatment. This core belief provides 
the foundation for sound and secure practice. Put simply, one has to 
believe in oneself and in what one is doing. 
Alongside the uncertainty Mike describes a marked and considerable faith in and 
certainty about the value of therapy, that engagement of the type he describes can 
create shared relationship and meaning from which something useful can emerge. 
Critique of psychotherapy is made with regard to what he sees as an under-emphasis 
on the nonhuman environment: 
Psychoanalytic thinking is skewed towards understanding the human 
environment and this leaves a vast realm of human experience relating to 
the non-human, as background that is not thought about. I suspect this 
creates an analytic blind spot. 
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Summary of the interview with Mike 
Mike expressed in the interview : 
°a clear statement about his professional knowledge as a therapist, employing a 
particular perspective within an intersubjective and co-created encounter. 
°a `being with', empathic stance as being his fundamental stance as a therapist. 
° the importance of thoughtful restraint and disciplined expressiveness on the part of 
the therapist in the face of powerful emotional re-enactments by the patient. 
°a sense that he gives his treatment model an objective/realist status such that it 
`holds' him while he works, in the intersubjective context of therapy, to `contain' 
the patient. 
°a firm belief in a `true spirit' of psychotherapy and a clear form for its practice, that 
appears relatively unconflicted within Mike, that could be described as hard-edged 
in his expectations of the therapist but soft-edged in his expectations of a patient. 
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Interview with Amanda 
In the interview Amanda gave an account of: 
° two patients who portray different levels of disturbance; the greater level of 
disturbance (an underlying psychosis) requiring more the management of 
aggression while the lesser disturbance (narcissistic wounds) requiring more the 
management of dependency. 
° the importance for psychological health of being able to be kind to oneself in the 
sense of managing critical aspects of one's personality. 
0a preferred egalitarian style of therapy whereby patient and therapist are co- 
explorers. 
° therapy as an `enacted narrative' involving the experiencing and tracking of 
psychological processes, in particular the uncovering of defences and the owning of 
projections. 
° therapy as involving a necessary disillusioning of idealisations or re-owning of 
projected aggression. 
° the therapeutic relationship as providing a corrective emotional experience through 
the experience of unconditional positive regard and thoughtful enquiry 
° the need for the therapist to be realistic about the patient's potential for change 
when the patient experiences a high level of disturbance. 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient one was seen by Amanda as the psychologically less disturbed patient. 
He was described as a professional man who had had a depressive illness for 
which he could not account. He attended therapy for two years. During therapy 
Amanda felt he became disillusioned of his view that he had had a perfect 
childhood and instead came to feel himself deeply hurt by his parent's attitude to 
him. Amanda viewed him as "narcissistically wounded" and having learnt a self- 
reliance and a perfectionism. He was experienced by Amanda as re-enacting in 
the therapy his relational difficulties with dependency by adopting a superior 
stance, by struggling to acknowledge any reliance on Amanda and by his need to 
be perfect. Amanda felt she enabled him to be more tolerant and kind towards 
himself, to accept that being less than perfect did not make him unlovable and to 
allow himself to lean on his partner. Amanda felt he was unlikely to become as 
depressed again. 
Patient two was seen by Amanda as the less disturbed patient. She was a single 
woman with a long psychiatric history which included self-harm, anorexia and 
petty crime. She appeared never to have had an ongoing relationship or 
successfully held down a job for any length of time. The roots of her difficulties 
were located by Amanda in an upbringing in which she was treated with cruelty. 
Amanda approached the therapy aware from the background that therapy might 
prove too much for the patient's resources and with a sense she needed to hold 
limited ambitions for the therapy. She had been seen by Amanda for three 
months at the time of the interview. She self-harmed grossly during an absence 
of Amanda's and also presented herself as having multiple personalities. Some 
personalities appeared benign and others quite destructive. The patient's 
difficulties were seen as being re-enacted in the therapy. She was viewed by 
Amanda as having an underlying psychosis such that the world seemed a very 
terrifying place for her to be in. Amanda's therapeutic hopes were confined to 
helping the patient feel more trust in engaging with the world. Therapy was at 
too early a stage for an outcome to have become clear. 
173 
174 
Amanda's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Healthy psychological living is seen by Amanda as involving the capacity to be kind 
to oneself and moderate internal critical voices. While she voices this with regard to 
the two patients it appears to be for her a more general philosophy of living: 
I guess in ordinary everyday language I'd say that they [the patients] need 
to be kinder to themselves and by that I mean a lot of patients have 
enormous superegos, this internal critical voice. I was just thinking that 
Fairbairn calls it the internal saboteur, you know. And they've never 
questioned that. When they come into therapy that's usually looming quite 
large. If you can sort of feed and nurture the ego, not in a way that sort of 
gives positive strokes that are sort of empty but if you can help it develop 
and grow then I think this superego loses some of its power......... and I 
think the more damaged they are, the bigger the more critical objects are. 
Different levels of disturbance `set' different psychological tasks for living, Amanda 
felt. The first patient with `narcissistic wounds' has to learn a more adaptive and 
kinder relationship to their own dependency and limitations. For them psychologically 
healthy living involves the capacity to allow dependency and tolerate their own 
imperfections without losing a sense of their own worth. It involves accommodating 
in a kinder way the `child within'. 
The second patient who was struggling with an underlying psychosis has to learn to 
manage more creatively their own aggression and feeling of fragmentation by owning 
more of their experience and their frightening emotions. This requires the context of a 
empathic relationship with a therapist because: 
Psychosis is terrifying for the person experiencing it, that they lose sight of 
any goodness in the world and, because of the splitting that happens, they 
become terrified. The world seems like such a hostile, awful place. 
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Unbearable feelings (such as anger) may be projected out and disowned. This leaves 
the individual feeling depleted and with a fear that what has been projected will 
return. This was illustrated by the second patient: 
She projects a great deal to the point where she actually feels she does not 
exist. 
She has disowned bits of herself and how frightening it is when she thinks 
that she sees those aspects of herself in other people and expects it to be 
forced back into her. So it has been a sort of protection but it also adds to 
her fear of other people. 
Alternatively or additionally a person may turn their anger on themselves in self-harm. 
Healthier psychological living involves the taking back of projected feelings and 
tolerating them inside in a way that means they do not poison the internal world with 
self-criticism. 
Amanda's Developmental Narrative 
The concepts of `narcissistic wounds' and `underlying psychosis' capture for me the 
developmental story that Amanda told in the interview. 
Narcissistic wounds are the result of a felt rejection or distancing: 
He the first patient] had been very narcisistically wounded by his father 
who clearly found it difficult to tolerate his presence. There were some 
very painful memories of being excluded ........ the very few memories he 
had of his relationship with his mother ..... were very sparse, very 
mechanical, not intimate, not connected really and that was deeply painful 
for him. 
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Amanda employs the analogy of having a tiny boy inside the adult who is hungry for 
attention and love but who has to be hidden away from awareness out of fear such 
needs will always be rejected and the ensuing psychic pain will be intolerable. 
An underlying psychosis is described with the second patient as a result of deprivation 
and abuse on a level that had led to a fractured internal world: 
Her early years were absolutely appalling... anyone who grew up in this 
family would show a level of disturbance. 
With such patients multiple personalities might develop as with the second patient: 
I think that she was so battered by her childhood that in a way she sort of 
preserved bits of herself by this other personality ..... But I'm not sure that 
I understand it all. You know how children can have a friend and the 
friend can be very naughty and they need that little friend for a while when 
they are feeling distressed or upset about something. I suppose I've seen it 
to some extent like that. That is the more benign personalities that she 
presents to me. But when she presents the [other] personalities .... I think 
they are actually very destructive and they represent a part of her she 
doesn't want to be around. 
Amanda's Treatment Narrative 
Amanda described her treatment approach as more egalitarian with an encouragement 
to mutual enquiry or co-exploring: 
I am thinking about people like Margaret Little and Betty Joseph and 
Rosenfeld and how they try to talk with the patient `let's have a look at 
what is going on here'. And certainly I do that with patients - `my hunch 
is that this and that is going on and I think that's because you expect me to 
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be so and so and so and so'. But I try to do it in quite a conversational sort 
of style that isn't setting myself up as the expert and try to make it safe 
enough for the patient to realise that, if we can find a way to talk about 
what goes on between us, maybe we can find a way to talk about what 
goes so painfully wrong for you outside. 
The core of treatment appears to be encapsulated in Roger's notion of unconditional 
positive regard (Rogers 1957) through which the therapist encourages and supports a 
growth in the patient's capacity to tolerate their own aggression and dependency and 
become kinder to themselves: 
I guess in ordinary everyday language I'd say that they need to be kinder 
to themselves and by that I mean a lot of patients have enormous 
superegos, this internal critical voice....... If you can sort of feed and 
nurture the ego, not in a way that sort of gives positive strokes that are sort 
of empty but if you can help it develop and grow then I think this superego 
loses some of its power. 
Amanda placed great emphasis on the enactment of the patient's difficulties in the 
relationship with the therapist. The type of enactment and the ability to reflect on it 
subsequently perhaps depends on the degree of disturbance. 
With the first patient Amanda is describing the treatment of someone whose 
dependency needs had not been sufficiently met in childhood to the extent that he 
had adopted a stance of being very self-reliant and self-sufficient. He had continued 
this stance as a defence in adult life presumably out of a conviction his previous 
experience would be bound to be repeated to his cost. Enactment took the form of the 
repudiation of some of his need of Amanda: 
... how difficult it was to allow himself to be helped by me, to show any 
need of me, to have any response to breaks, those sorts of things. 
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It was very difficult to withstand his superiority...... there were times when 
he was very defended and very omnipotent. 
With this particular psychological difficulty defences (such as a superior attitude) 
need addressing in manageable ways, with sensitive timing and in the patient's 
language: 
He found it very difficult that I might see something on an angle that he 
had not perceived himself. 
And I was always very careful to use any analogies that he brought into 
the conversation so that it couldn't be -I hoped he wouldn't feel that any 
analogy that was used was derogatory in any way because he was hyper- 
sensitive to anything which could be construed as a criticism. And so I 
always tried to get behind these sort of walls and shields that - they were 
words that he used - to the feeling that might be behind it. 
And I had to be careful not to introduce my insight into that [defence] 
until I felt he was ready for it. 
One particular defence is that of idealisation, in this instance the idealisation of 
childhood experience. Treatment in therapy may involve a `disillusioning', an undoing 
of the defence of idealisation: 
And as we came to the end of therapy, he said that this picture of this 
golden childhood, that he had had when he came to therapy, had really 
moved and he was shocked by that. 
A combined process of `talking about', `enacting' and jointly observing the enactment 
may be coupled with a teaching role, principally of teaching kindness. The combined 
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effect may together enable a patient to lower some of their defences and become more 
flexible in their response to relationships: 
I think I needed to teach him how to be kind to himself. I think that 
actually be was extremely self-critical to the point where I had images of 
hair shirts and when people whip themselves on the back. He could not 
allow himself to have any human needs or frailty at all. So I think I taught 
him to be kind to himself...... I hope mainly by the way I treated him but 
also by making him question some of his attitudes towards himself and 
being curious about where they came from and how they got formed, what 
they were defending against. 
A positive outcome is seen in a more tolerant attitude, a kinder response to the 
experience of dependency and limitation and this was observed in the first patient: 
He can live with himself more and he can allow himself to have need of 
his partner and not be so self-contained.... and I think I sort of showed him 
how to give himself permission that, if he's got a few bits or foibles or bits 
that aren't perfect, it's all right. You can still be loved. 
Amanda felt that an underlying psychotic level of functioning was not uncommon 
among patients referred for psychotherapy: 
And my impression is that the patients that we deal with here, and I don't 
know if that is the same for all Psychotherapy Departments, there is often 
an underlying psychotic level of disturbance. 
However the greater degree of disturbance points to a greater level of internal 
criticism which in turn makes engagement with the therapist so problematic: 
Yes, and I think the more damaged they are the bigger the more critical 
objects are and so the more difficult it is for them to engage with the 
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therapist because they project that into the therapist and expect the 
therapist to be so critical and attacking that they are terrified. So all of 
that, all those difficulties that are arising are because they are trying to 
fend them off. 
I think that the terror and the paranoia that she has in relation to me are 
because it's her early childhood that is being re-enacted with me. 
Treatment in such a situation involves holding on to a therapeutic stance, bearing the 
visible signs of self-abuse, tracking carefully a patient's anxieties, projections and 
expectations and reflecting on this with them: 
[I need to] bear in mind that I am going to have to withstand a great deal 
of anxiety here, that she is going to provoke a lot of anxiety that is going 
to need to be contained so that she can feel that she can't knock me out of 
my analytic stance. And she has certainly lived up to that. 
In particular there is a focus for Amanda on aggression: 
There's her own inner aggression that she brought to her relationship with 
her parents and I think there was great deal of aggression towards her from 
her mother. And so what she brings into therapy is her expectation of me 
pushing something into her - something unhealthy - and her response to 
that is that, because her ego is so weak, she projects a great deal and to the 
point where she actually feels she does not exist. 
And recently we have been able to talk about how this has made her feel 
more comfortable in that she has disowned bits of herself and how 
frightening it is when she thinks that she sees those aspects of herself in 
other people and expects it to be forced back into her. So it has been a sort 
of protection but it also adds to her fear of other people ........ she has talked 
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about how it is much better if the other person is angry.... So she provokes 
me to try to make me the angry one who will reject her....... 
I guess I have thought about it in terms of the anger she felt towards me 
which she is terrified of because she is afraid that, if she is angry with me, 
then I will actually physically attack her back because that has been her 
experience in her family. And so she turned her anger on herself. 
Her response to a patient's aggression is instinctively to pause and think before 
reacting: 
Well I guess patients are often attacking but I try to see the anxiety behind 
the attacking. So I don't think they are attacking ... I just think `yeah they 
are attacking me. I wonder what that is about. I guess there is a worry 
behind that'. But, if I feel the attacking is continuing even though I've 
tried to look behind it, then I will say to a patient, "you are attacking me 
and I am wondering what that is about". So I won't just sit and accept it 
and be beaten up and just let them sort of walk all over me. I'll be curious 
about it all. 
But I might also do a lot of work in-between a session in which I've been 
attacked, thinking about what might that be about? How do I need to 
respond to that? And formulate my sort of plan of action if it continues in 
the next session. If it doesn't continue in the next session but perhaps it 
feels like there has been an absolute right moment sometime down the line 
to bring it back again, I will. But I think it's ever so hard to say what it is 
that makes you feel that it is the right moment to make that interpretation. 
Something has moved on between you and the patient and you think now 
I think they can stand me saying that'. 
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Where she believes the presentation of different personalities by a patient has a 
sufficiently conscious element she will put back to a patient their tendency to talk as if 
they were different personalities: 
I said to her I wondered why she felt she had to present herself to me as 
though she was different people. 
Underlying psychotic difficulties are a measure of a deeper disturbance for which 
more limited and realistic aims may be appropriate. So with the second patient (and 
another patient) Amanda has much more limited aims: 
But I think it is very important that I don't have too much therapeutic zeal 
as it were. 
I guess I would hope the outcome would be something fairly subtle in a 
way in that I hope that her everyday functioning would improve enough 
for her to be able to go out and go shopping or walk down the street 
without feeling that somebody was going to attack her, to have a little 
more trust and security in the world. 
A centre piece of treatment that goes generally unremarked on in the interviews is the 
format of once weekly therapy in the NHS. Amanda comments on this: 
But I think there is a South Trent way of doing Psychotherapy and it is 
based I think on once week therapy. That was the sticking point that was 
flagged up when we had this UKCP visit. Some people see that as good 
and some people see that as bad and some people say `well it's the NHS, 
it's what we can offer our patients and we have to work within that'. 
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A final comment is on the difficulty of the work : 
I think the very nature of Psychotherapy Departments makes them difficult 
places to work in because we work with difficult patients and it's bound to 
affect us. We are carrying a lot of projections from patients and you know 
the type of patients you work with always affects the people that work 
with them. 
Amanda's Attachment Narrative 
Her particular professional knowledge base has emerged in part from the experience 
of her own therapy. Equally her attachment to what she characterises as a post- 
Kleinian perspective is based on the help it has provided to her in making sense of 
her clinical experiences: 
I think that Klein was a sort of starting point and [I] then moved on to 
post-Kleiman. It gives me a way of trying to analyse what difficulties the 
patient might have in thinking. And my impression is that the patients that 
we deal with here, and I don't know if that is the same for all 
Psychotherapy Departments, there is often an underlying psychotic level 
of disturbance which, without say the work of Bion (and I am thinking 
about like his `theory of thinking' and `attacks on linking') I would 
completely flounder. His paper on how patients attack links between their 
thoughts, between them and the therapist -I would be a far less capable 
therapist without that understanding because I think that a lot of the 
patients that we get here have had long psychiatric careers and have not 
really benefited from whatever interventions have gone on in the past - 
though that sounds a bit arrogant and I don't mean it to be. It's being able 
to think with the knowledge I have gained from Bion's work which helps 
me to see what's going on. 
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Well, I think the idea of needing to be kinder to yourself certainly comes 
from my own therapy. My own therapist was not a Kleinian as far as I 
knew, did not draw on a post-Kleinian [view]. I think my sort of leaning 
towards post-Kleinian theories has evolved out of difficulties that I 
knocked up against with patients while I was training and thinking, `oh my 
God what can I read so that I can understand this and help this' , because 
I 
think my background in nursing taught me that there is a saying about 
`first do no harm'. I don't want to do anything that is going to be 
damaging to patients so, if I would read something, often it would be a 
post-Kleiman paper and I would have this `Aha, that's what I think is 
happening with these patients'. 
Her attachment is not exclusive of other approaches. Rather she sees a need for a 
plurality of approaches: 
It has always been my view that to think that one model is superior is to 
have a very blinkered and rather arrogant view. In my past, when I worked 
as a CPN, when I worked in a day hospital, I worked with quite a few 
patients with anxiety problems using a much more cognitive model and 
they found that very helpful. I don't think that psychotherapy or the 
psychodynamic model is what everybody wants or needs. And I think that 
you have to be mature enough to say, `I don't think I'm the right person to 
help. I think they might be better helped here, there or wherever'. 
However she sees herself as at an early stage of development when it comes to 
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the psychodynamic approach and her 
particular version of it: 
I think that I am at a stage in my development as a therapist that is still 
fairly new in that I think I am quite enamoured with the psychodynamic 
model and I need a bit more experience post-qualification in order to take 
a more objective view of it. 
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She voices an attachment to the NHS context in general and to her experience of NHS 
Psychotherapy Departments in particular: 
I think I saw a lot of very solid stable practices that were the same 
throughout - wherever the Departments were set up, the ambience of the 
Departments, the quietness, the confidentiality that somehow gave a real 
sense of solidness. I think to see the differences - you can get little 
inklings of them as an outsider - but I think to be more aware of the 
differences you've got to be working within that group of people. 
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Summary of the interview with Amanda 
In the interview Amanda described : 
° her values / philosophies concerning how to live well psychologically that inform 
her professional knowledge in practice and which have emerged from her personal 
life experience, her professional experience and her own therapy. 
° the way theory ( and specifically post-Kleiman theory) offers her a map and guide 
for practice without which she feels she would "flounder" when faced with the 
patient's re-enactment of their psychological difficulties in the therapy. 
° how a more critical assessment of her approach and its relativity is not yet possible 
for her as she needs further post-qualification experience before she can make a 
more objective evaluation. 
° the importance, though, of not being so invested in a psychodynamic approach as 
to be unable to see when another therapy (or another therapist) might be more 
appropriate for a patient. 
°a steering towards a stance of a restrained but careful `being with' the patient in a 
more egalitarian way and a steering away from the role of objective expert. 
° the need to help create in patients a counter-culture of kindness to themselves 
(rather than such intense self-criticism), and of ownership of feelings (rather than 
their projection). 
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Interview with Jo 
In her interview Jo emphasised : 
° the need for a realism about life along with a sense of hope that "it may not be 
perfect but it can be good enough". 
° the importance of experiencing attunement so that we can develop as people who 
can be intimate and separate. 
° the importance of allowing time for a patient to develop at their own pace. 
° the value of being eclectic within the model 
° the hypocrisy contained in some more disengaged therapist stances 
° the "heavy-duty" nature of much NHS psychotherapy whereby rewards for the 
therapist may feel limited and sustaining oneself in practice is a key task 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient One (seen as the more damaged patient) was described as a single, 
professional woman in her 40s who lived a socially withdrawn life and suffered 
from marked obsessionality. She had attended therapy for some years following 
an experience of a breakdown. Therapy was experienced by Jo as slow and 
`heavy-duty' as the patient presented in a life-less, emotionally detached and 
unengaging way. Jo understood this pattern of engagement to be the product of a 
childhood lived with a depressed mother (as single parent) who was unable to 
`attune' to her child's needs and be engaging towards her child. Jo viewed the 
patient as struggling in her adult life to achieve any quality of relationship both 
externally with others and internally with herself. She saw the therapy as 
offering an opportunity to develop both. Furthermore, she felt the patient 
needed to accept the limits of life and relationships, recognising when it may be 
"as good as it gets" rather than waiting for a better deal from `life'. This would, 
paradoxically, enable her to take up the more positive sides of her personality. 
At the time of the interview therapy was ongoing and progress felt to be slow 
but the patient was seen to be kinder to herself and to have more capacity to 
relax. 
Patient two (seen as the healthier patient psychologically) was a married woman 
who came to therapy on account of a deteriorating relationship with her 
daughter. Jo understood her to be seeing and rejecting in her daughter an 
unwanted and bullied aspect of herself. She needed, Jo felt, to make this 
connection. Her health was shown in her capacity to be aware of others as 
separate persons, to feel her own guilt and distress without losing touch with her 
strengths. She was experienced as engaging to be with, a "breath of fresh air" 
and very capable of using available supports. At the end of a short and 
emotionally intense therapy the patient described an improving relationship with 
her daughter and a greater ability to stand up for herself. 
191 
192 
Jo's Psychodynamic Narrative 
At one point in the interview Jo said life "may not be perfect but it can be good 
enough" and this quote captures a sense of Jo's outlook for me. There is a streak of 
realism but also of hope running through her account. Life contains many 
"adversities" and Jo highlights the experience of not being adequately `attuned' with 
as a fundamental impediment to psychological development. 
However, she emphasised how important is our response to adversity. It is no help to 
hold out for it all to be `made right'. Maybe this is "as good as it gets" so it is 
important to start from the reality of the present position. Limitations need to be 
accepted. A relationship, grounded in such `realities' needs to be forged with 
ourselves and others. `Connection' is needed both internally with ourselves and 
externally with others and health can be measured in terms of this ability. Jo expresses 
it in the following way: 
I think psychological health is many different things and I suppose for me 
it's something about personal contentment and comfort with self. So it's 
something about being able to relate freely and openly with yourself with 
the bits you are happy with and the bits you are not quite so happy about, 
to have an open and free relationship with that, to recognise that there is 
an element of suffering in life and that from time to time bad things 
happen and that sometimes those things can be very unbearable. But it is 
possible to think about those, to come to terms with them and to recognise 
one's limitations and live to the best of your ability and capacity and 
achieve the most fulfilment possible within your own personal bounds and 
limitations. 
The ability to connect to others goes hand in hand with the ability to be separate: 
I think she [second patient] actually was quite a healthy individual 
compared to some patients we see because she could relate, see me as a 
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separate person. She had a warm relationship with her 
husband and 
sustaining friendships...... 
The evidence for psychological maturity is shown in a person's response to 
life 
events: 
So it's not so much about the things that have happened - it's about a 
person's capacity to think about those, to modify them, to hold them 
inside and to have a relationship with themselves about it I suppose. 
Making developmental changes takes time and can not be rushed. It involves 
employing the more positive aspects of our personality and tolerating the experience 
we are actually having. 
Jo's Developmental Narrative. 
The fundamental developmental need for a child is to be connected with an `attuned 
other', to experience an attuned other who is attentive and responsive to them in an 
intensely personal way. Jo describes the difficulty experienced by her first patient in 
presenting herself in an alive way in the therapy and presumably to others in her 
external life. The root cause of such a presentation is located in her childhood 
expenence: 
She had a very depressed mother because the father left ..... mother . 
collapsed into a depression and never really came out. So I think she [the 
patient] did not really have an attuned other. 
The second patient's ability to relate is taken implicitly as evidence of a far greater 
experience of being attuned to as a child. 
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Jo's Treatment Narrative 
Jo describes a number of tasks that a therapist undertakes in providing treatment to a 
patient. Firstly, the therapist needs to attune to the patient and this quality of relating is 
an "essence" of therapy: 
I think what is important for me about therapy is something about being 
available and really trying to understand the person.... Its about 
relationship and its about the quality of relationship ... it is about the 
quality of your relating and crossing the bridge to the other person. 
So in her practice Jo works to avoid an opaque stance that is wooden: 
I guess opaque can be keeping an analytic stance and being objective and 
I am certainly with that. But I certainly would not be wooden .I think 
when I started out I was rather wooden. I remember once a patient threw a 
pot plant at me. It whizzed past my head and I just said "I think you are 
feeling very angry with me". I did not know -I was covered in earth with 
it and I felt terribly humiliated and I did not I react at all and she left the 
therapy and years later I think I am not surprised actually. I was just 
totally wooden. So I suppose the key for me is about trying to attune. So 
that includes having a laugh sometimes. I'll make a joke. The patient 
makes a joke - that sort of thing. Even if it is defensive there is warmth 
and life. I think you have to be human at the end of the day. If the person 
sitting opposite you can't connect with anything human then what are you 
doing? 
Secondly, the therapist needs to allow time for developmental change to occur: 
For myself I think that developmental changes take time.... change comes 
when it comes. You can't hurry it..... change happens when people are 
ready and I suppose the value base for me is that people who get to this 
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department have often had a lot of short term help via the psychiatric 
services and most of those these days come in packages. So it is packaged 
therapy, you get a cognitive behavioural package, you get three weeks to 
work on the fact that you've been horrendously screwed up in your 
background and that kind of thing. So for me there is something very 
valuable about the length of time. 
Thirdly, the therapist needs to sustain herself in particular when what is re-enacted by 
the patient in the room is so lifeless and disengaging. Jo comments on how therapy 
has become more "heavy-duty" over the years: 
For me therapy patients have changed. They seem more stuck and more 
difficult and a lot of the rewarding work gets done at primary care level. 
There are a lot of people who have done counselling courses and 
psychotherapy courses so they see the more rewarding people who are on 
the cusp of a change, who can move on quite quickly...... I think that the 
rewards of doing long term, heavy duty psychotherapy .... you have to be 
grateful for small things. 
Sustaining myself is a constant difficulty I think in therapy and it is one of 
the hot issues in psychotherapy...... supervision is one of the ways of 
sustaining myself .... one of the ways I sustain myself in isolation is by 
trying to keep thinking and for me the task of therapy is to keep thinking 
and to keep my thinking alive. So that might mean that if I am absolutely 
sick ... I try and find a way of bringing some life to myself in a situation or 
just recognising that I am heartfelt sick of it and trying to be very aware of 
that. 
So I suppose it's staying in touch as much as I can with the feelings a 
patient brings up in me and how I feel, taking it to supervision and reading 
sometimes and recognising that that is sometimes a desperate activity to 
manage a counter-transference feeling. Silly things like when she has gone 
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throwing the window open, doing some exercises in the room, going out 
for a walk, phone a friend - anything like that really. So kind of a whole 
heap of different things. 
The tasks for the patient run in parallel. They need to experience the possibility of an 
attachment to the therapist and an attachment to more of their own experience. There 
are a lot of active verbs used for the patient's tasks: 
I do have a game plan ! .... my hope is that she will attach to me, work 
through some of the grief about what she has not done, come to terms with 
the fact that life isn't about being constantly fed and that it's possible to 
have bad and good experiences and think about them and recover from 
them, to accept that people come and go but they do come back and to let 
go a bit in her internal world and be less defensive I guess. 
So it's something about making connection with your self, learning to love 
the person you are with the background you have and accepting the 
limitations there are. There are some things that change, other things that 
don't change and actually that's OK in the end. It's not perfect and for 
some people it's as good as it gets. I don't know whether you ever saw 
that film `As Good As It Gets'. It's that kind of thing and as long as it's 
liveable with - so I guess it's about helping the person to live with 
themselves and live with more of themselves. 
A re-enactment of what is viewed as the patient's core pattern of relating appears to be 
marked with the first and more damaged patient and is at the centre of the therapy 
experience and work: 
I think for me perhaps the thing I think most about is attunement and 
trying to cue in and listen and it's very easy to switch off because she 
switches off. And the moment I start to drift off and think `oh that's a 
lovely tree out there, I am so glad I've got a lovely tree outside my 
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window' I realise something has gone dead between us and that I have 
become like a dead mother and she is like a dead infant with me. 
Her understanding of what is needed and what is being re-enacted is shared with 
patients but in an indirect way: 
I have shared parts of it with her I think because I suppose I make 
comments about what she is doing now so `rather than miss me when I go 
away I think you do this'. Its probably a bit of a veiled thing to say...... so I 
think I do share it in lots of different ways in the way I speak rather than 
saying 'this is where you are. I think. you need to move to here'. I don't 
tend to do that but I make comments about the areas where I think she is 
stuck and - and I guess I don't always say `I think you are stuck and you 
need to get here' but I often say `you are doing this instead of this'....... 
Sometimes if I want to say something I am not sure about I will preface it 
with 'I am not really sure about this but I've got a feeling that' something 
about this and share the uncertainty or sometimes share the dilemma - `I 
am sitting here wondering whether to say this to you or whether to say this 
and I think you make.... ' 
However, Jo expresses how it is important to her to be sure when she is sure and such 
moments occur for her when head and heart meet up: 
You know it's like every now and again when you kind of know 
something and you know it , it comes together and you've been thinking / 
puzzling about something for ages and you suddenly think `I am sure' - 
you just feel really sure about something. 
However it remains important to be open to alternative views without necessarily 
acquiescing: 
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It felt like a piece of insight and it felt like one of those pieces of insight 
that is really important...... But I am always willing -if she had come back 
and said `no...... I think you were wrong'. I think it would have been 
really important for me to acknowledge that. I may not have retracted it, 
you know, I may have said `well maybe it's something we could think 
about again'. 
Treatment is not particularly helped by over-pursuing a line of thought and going on 
what she calls a "witch hunt". It is not necessarily helpful to label disagreement as 
resistance: 
I have a sort of theory about her that sort of changes and I suppose a 
sketchy map of some of the things I think she brings in to the transference 
but if I try and link them to her family she completely blanks off and 
changes the subject or switches off and drifts and finds it very difficult. It 
could be very easy to sort of go on a bit of a witch hunt, you know do a 
sort of Malan's triangle, you know I must make this interpretation but it 
just does not go anywhere so I have learnt that it isn't helpful to her and 
she can't seem to hear that. She can link it to me but not link it to the past 
which I guess goes in to attachment theory and borderline understanding 
of not having a narrative. She did not have a narrative and if I try and offer 
an understanding it does not go anywhere. 
1 think I have worked with it enough to know that even if were resistance 
it isn't lessening at the moment. And I am not sure it is resistance actually, 
I am not really very sure what it is but I think to just name it as resistance 
would not do it justice somehow. I can't really give you any greater 
understanding it's just a feeling about what is right for this particular 
patient. 
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Jo's Attachment Narrative 
Jo voiced in the interview how her `realism' and sense of hope were not abstract or 
theoretical ideas to her but were rooted and grounded in her experience of her own 
therapy. So her attachment to them is personal as well as professional: 
Certainly for me one of the things I have learnt through therapy training 
and my own therapy is that it is possible to think about parts of yourself 
which have perhaps been difficult to accept and to bear and difficult 
experiences which you would rather forget or which trouble you and 
somehow make connections with those - not disavow them but learn to 
love yourself in spite of them and know that you are loveable, grieve 
about the things that have happened that you can't change, the parts of 
yourself which you would rather were different but aren't and that's OK 
actually. 
It isn't about having a perfect life, it isn't about avoiding adversity, it's 
about how you deal with adversity and how you manage in the face of 
things. And some things are unmanageable and that's OK. But I guess 
running away from things and defending against them means that they are 
going to happen and happen and happen again....... 
Her attachment to the profession of psychotherapist has a strong element of wishing to 
be helpful and useful and also an element of masochism: 
I often think psychotherapists go into psychotherapy because they want to 
help but they are not very sure they can so they are making reparation for 
something so there is this fear they may not be able to help. That may just 
be me personally and I'm acknowledging that is a personal thing but I 
think it is wonderful to have somebody able to move on. It's just so 
rewarding for me, so encouraging in validating what I do as a useful 
activity so that was a good experience. 
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I think I am probably quite masochistic actually, there is a masochistic 
edge to psychotherapy really and I think I am probably more comfortable 
with the idea of not being given to than given to actually. 
She 'described a critical attachment to the practice of psychotherapy. She referred to 
"hypocrisy" and "dishonesty" and "crap" centred chiefly around a more disengaged 
and inhibited therapeutic stance. She saw ways in which she had moved towards a 
personalised professional position: 
There are somethings where I have moved away from my original 
teachings and become much more free. Sometimes that makes me wonder 
if I am still a psychotherapist but other times I think I have found an 
analytical freedom and I have become myself as a therapist. And I think I 
am a better therapist for it. 
I think there is quite an element of hypocrisy - probably quite a strong 
word - which is to do with the idea of corrective emotional experience and 
teaching - the area you are interested in I guess which is that for example 
I was taught that you don't ask a question in psychotherapy -I don't even 
know why I was taught you don't ask a question- and yet we ask 
questions all the time -I wonder if ? perhaps you feel ? which is asking a 
question. So I often think we are not really that honest with ourselves. All 
the stuff about being opaque -I suppose I have quite a sense of discomfort 
about that. I think of the Nina Coltart paper about being a round peg in a 
round hole. I am not sure I feel bad enough to be a square peg in a round 
hole. 
I think what is important for me about therapy is something about being 
available and really trying to understand the person. And I suppose there is 
an essence of psychotherapy which I think sort of cuts across all the other 
kind of crap. Sometimes I think for example I smiled at a patient when I 
went to get them from the waiting room and I thought `what am I doing. I 
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am supposed to be an opaque person, I am not supposed to 
smile. What 
message would that give. Oh for goodness sake get a grip 
here'. So I 
don't particularly like that lifelessness bit to therapy. 
It's about relationship and it's about the quality of relationship and there 
may be aspects - it is about the quality of your relating and crossing 
the 
bridge to the other person. So there is for me a lot of theory, the blue print 
of psychotherapy which I don't particularly adhere to. Yet there are other 
things I am quite rigid about. For example I would never touch a patient 
but that might be me because I am not particularly a touchy-feely type of 
person. But I think I have good reason for not doing that. But I would not 
judge particularly someone who did. 
She described a more "eclectic" attitude to the application of psychodynamic theory 
whereby she responds to her sense of which theory best fits the particular patient: 
I don't think actually -I think I am going to be one of those eclectics. Not 
in a wishy-washy way. I don't think. For me theory is something which 
can move and change with the patient so I don't particularly favour one 
theory and there are some patients where I just think `this is Kleiman 
stuff'. Other times I can be with somebody and think `Winnicott' and 
think of various things. Some patients I don't particularly think of any 
theory. It's different at different times and as my understanding moves 
and changes over time the theory that pops into my head can also change. 
She presented openly a tension in practice around the application of her professional 
knowledge. At one point she talked of having a "game plan" while at another she 
referred to a "sketchy map" and a "sort of theory". She emphasised the importance of 
being sure when she felt sure and of being open to revision of views but also talked of 
the risks of being "dictatorial" and "foisting" her view on a patient. The danger of 
having expectations of a patient which might constrict them was articulated. Intuition 
was clearly valued by her as a guide. 
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Summary of the interview with Jo 
In the interview Jo stressed : 
° her values / philosophy that centre around the patient's need for realism, their need 
to make connections with others but also be separate, and their need to hold on to 
and modify internally their experiences. 
° the way her values/philosophy of living life well psychologically have emerged 
from her personal and professional experiences, in particular her own therapy. 
° the heavy-duty nature of some therapies in which it is so difficult for the therapist 
to sustain themselves and their creative involvement and not be overwhelmed by 
the culture of the patient's internal world. 
° the importance of the therapist being `attuned' to the patient, `being with' them 
with a quality of attention and care allowing them in time to internalise the 
expenence. 
° that a degree of expressiveness is required of the therapist and that some of the 
inhibited and disengaged stances practised by therapists are unhelpful and lacking 
in integrity. 
° the importance to her of being eclectic within the model and of carrying a soft-edge 
to her practice within the model. 
° the careful task of sharing her thinking with a patient and being open to their 
response without having automatically to defend her own view or acquiesce to the 
patient's view. 
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Interview with Paul 
In his interview Paul gave an account of : 
° damaging interpersonal patterns of behaviour that are created and maintained by 
individuals. 
° therapy founded on promoting a corrective emotional experience, with the patient 
taking `significant action' whereby an old story has a new ending. 
° his particular structure of time-limited therapy which emphasises therapy as a 
preparation for life rather than a substitute. 
° the task for the therapist of remaining creative under intense pressure from the 
patient to join a re-enactment. 
° the importance to practice of being opportunistic, evidence-based and of 
privileging effectiveness over compliance to a model. 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient One was presented as the more disturbed patient. She was a woman in 
her forties who had experienced periods of severe depression and suicidal 
impulses. At times she presented a risk to herself and others by, for example, 
acts of self-harm or dangerous driving. Paul constructed an understanding that 
experiences in childhood of being rejected and left feeling unlovable had created 
a pattern whereby she kept other people away to prevent them from engaging 
with the more vulnerable and needy side of herself. She pushed people away in a 
very denigratory manner. This both 'protected' her from the risks of intimacy 
and confirmed her belief that not only was she unlovable but she was also `evil'. 
It was this self-fulfilling interpersonal pattern that formed the focus of the 
therapy for Paul. Previous psychotherapy had not been able to `resolve' this 
pattern. The alliance with Paul was experienced as precarious as the 
interpersonal pattern was re-enacted with Paul feeling the full force of her 
denigration. He described a struggle to maintain a creative engagement and a 
need to monitor his own retaliatory impulses. Therapy ended with an uncertain 
result. 
Patient Two was presented as the less disturbed patient. He was a man in his late 
forties whose relative psychological health was shown by his capacity to hold 
together a career and maintain a marriage and family life. Paul organised his 
thinking about him around the concept of `narcissism'. He saw the patient as 
someone who reacted badly to criticism or a perceived lack of attention. He 
could become enraged and storm out on people. This behaviour was in evidence 
at home and at work and with friends. It was as if his whole self-esteem was on 
the line so much of the time. The roots of such a pattern of response were 
understood by Paul to lie in the childhood experience of feeling an `unwanted 
appendage' and being sent away to boarding school at a young age which he 
described as an alienating and isolating experience. This pattern was not re- 
enacted in the therapy which was experienced by Paul as 'enjoyable' and 
`moving'. The patient was prepared and able to listen and experiment with new 
ways of responding to others. 
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Paul's Psychodynamic Narrative 
For Paul healthy living psychologically involves: 
living as good a life as you can but being realistic about that, that 
everybody has often contrary and often devious parts of themselves which 
causes them to do all sorts of things...... 
We can become enmeshed in interpersonal patterns of relating that are repetitive, self- 
fulfilling, limiting and isolating. Such patterns reflect the `contrary' and `often 
devious' parts of ourselves. They need owning as choices people make within 
themselves, though for some people, change may be experienced as `beyond their 
capacity to will'. So Paul gives the example of the patient who pushes others away in 
a denigratory manner such that the response she receives confirms her critical self- 
view. He also gives the example of the patient involved in enraged protests (at 
perceived slights) which will not bring him the recognition he craves. 
In such ways we may defend ourselves against the pain of intimacy. Dependency and 
vulnerability may be eschewed and other people actively pushed away from awareness 
of them with the strategy that `the best form of defence is attack'. Alternatively others 
may be punished for their perceived neglect. While the past has relevance, for Paul, 
focus is better given to the present and future because that is where living is taking 
and will take place. 
Once established such patterns may endlessly repeat themselves with other people 
drawn into the script with set roles to play. There is a sense of there being the same 
old story with the same old ending. The degree to which such patterns and the sense of 
deprivation underlying them restricts a person's creativity is an indicator for Paul of 
the degree of disturbance in a person. External signs of health are noted in terms of the 
capacity to hold done a job, maintain a relationship and provide parenting. Similarly 
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changes in interpersonal patterns will show in external changes in behavioural 
responses. 
In order to move on we need among other things a capacity for `differentiated 
perception' that enables us to distinguish when another person is reacting to us or to 
some other issue or person. This enables us to avoid relating every aspect of 
interaction solely to ourselves. 
Healthy living involves making meaning and recognising our part in the wider' 
community: 
I am impressed by the existential position, that this is the life you have and 
to try and make some meaning out of it, find some purpose for yourself by 
all the sort of things this lady [first patient] said slightly ironically about 
reliability, patience and tenacity. I think those are important parts of 
living. 
I think also that all of the Adlerian principles of social interest are very 
important. We are individuals, we follow our own interest but you also 
have an objective, shared interest of which psychotherapy is one 
manifestation, one part of this larger community of people who 
subdivided the things that they are going to do. You are doing your little 
bit to promote the social interest. 
Paul's Developmental Narrative 
A pattern of attacking to defend is understandable to Paul in terms of profound an$ 
ongoing experiences of feeling disowned and ignored as a child to such a level that 
intimacy then becomes very threatening and interpersonal patterns develop to limit 
that threat. 
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A pattern of enraged protest at perceived slights and neglect (which Paul describes as 
narcissistic difficulties) is rooted in a lack in the consistency of loving attention given 
to a child by its parents (as opposed to an absence). 
There is limited focus beyond this in the interview in keeping with Paul's greater 
interest in the present and future. 
Paul's Treatment Narrative 
Paul's professional knowledge is directed towards the evocation of change in the 
patient which would have a significant impact on how they live. their life in 
interaction with others in the future. He approaches the evocation of change through a 
focus on interpersonal processes. He sets less store by intra-psychic processes and 
symptoms and he is very at home with the idea of narrative: 
So I want the best as I see it of the two worlds, the technology of changing 
behaviour and changing how people actually can do things differently 
which people do in groups and individual therapy and focal therapy, 
together with some much more interactive perspective which comes out of 
the life that the person creates as they go along....... 
Unless there is change in the external world I don't see there has been any 
great value come out of that [therapy]. 
I have always been interested in relationships, about people's stories and 
felt that psychotherapy, if it has anything to deliver, will deliver it in that 
area rather than the symptoms. So 1 certainly looked around to find 
elements that are focused on relationships rather than the symptoms or on 
intra-psychic processes which I don't find all that interesting. So that 
would lead me to be happy to describe myself as an inter-personal 
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therapist, but less reluctant or more reluctant if I am going to be pushed 
into certain forms of psychoanalytic therapy. 
He has, developed a particular pattern of delivering therapy which has an `intensive 
pbase' of weekly meetings for a year. This is followed by a `less intensive phase' of 
monthly meetings for a year which offers a chance to support the putting into practice 
of insights gained in the first phase. Paul also describes something he calls `anchoring 
therapy' in which he might meet someone every few months: 
Them are a lot of people I have seen over many years I keep in contact 
with but perhaps only every few months so that the supportive model is 
what I call anchoring therapy which provides a little bit of ballast and I 
think it's ..... a very effective way of containing the self-damaging 
personal relationships. What you do every few months can really stabilise 
that person. So I am very happy to do that. 
This pattern reflects his sense that therapy is a preparation for life and should not 
become a substitute and that longer term therapy may convey an unhelpful message: 
I think it [open ended long term therapy] encourages an inward looking 
focus on the therapy and an over-valuing of the therapy as opposed to the 
purpose and meaning of their patterns of interaction that would lead them 
to lead their life better outside. 
it is easy to get caught up in thinking that you might provide a substitute 
life for that person whereas in fact therapy, as I see it, is a preparation for 
the life outside. It comes up very sharply in group. People would want to 
go on in groups for a long long time or they want to have relationships 
with each other but actually the group is there to prepare them so they can 
make those new and independent friends and relationships outside. 
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For Paul there are particular qualities needed by therapists generally and also 
particular temperamental variations: 
I am pretty averse to open ended long term therapy .... I think for two 
reasons. One would be that temperamentally I am not suited to long term 
therapy. 
Among the qualities required [by therapists]...... are reliability, empathy, 
patience, good sense of humour and the tenacity to see the work through 
to a positive conclusion. 
He seeks to construct a treatment alliance around an interpersonal agenda from the 
beginning of the contact and enlist the `non-neurotic parts' of the patient in this 
process: 
I was therefore keen to review and freshly contract with her (first patient] 
at those points to try and enlist, as far as possible, the non-neurotic part of 
herself... so right at the beginning we had ten sessions together just to see if 
we could work together and try. and mark out the territory, what it was 
going to be for and so I was trying to set an interpersonal agenda right 
from the beginning which she signed up to, to look and see the part that 
she might play in creating the absence of relationships or the relationships 
patterns. 
As therapies proceed Paul is on the lookout for a `shared image' that in some way is 
experienced as summing up the core of a patient's interpersonal struggle: 
I often look for an image that can form part of our shared language we 
have between us, something that sums up in some central way that 
person's life and situation. 
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With the first patient this was an image of a traumatic moment when her mother 
disowned her and left her feeling abandoned and somehow non-existent for her 
mother. With the second patient there is not a single, clear incident from childhood so 
much as a collection of experiences that create an image of feeling an `unwanted 
appendage'. 
Ongoing treatment then seeks to address the identified interpersonal patterns. Re- 
enactment of the patterns takes place in the session when the level of disturbance 
makes it so compelling for the patient. With a less disturbed patient the enactment 
may take place more outside of the therapy with partners, work colleagues and others: 
{The therapy with the second patient] isn't particularly focused within the 
room, only if we get stuck. That's a good distinction because the first 
[patient], maybe I tried to focus entirely within the room, on staying as 
much as I could within the room because it seemed to me that what we 
lived and touched and experienced we could know in a way that would be 
different from what happened outside and it might give us a chance to do 
something useful, whereas [with the second patient] the issues aren't 
particularly with me, maybe they are ... but they are much more clearly 
related in the every day to his wife, his children, what happens at work. 
When the re-enactment takes place in the room (as with the first patient) the 
therapist's preferred style of relating is put under intense pressure: 
this particular patient made me think deeply about the preferred self I like 
to operate with and which generally I operate with quite well, quite 
effectively both in therapy and in a whole variety of other settings, but 
where this particular person kept on knocking me out of that particular 
position and caused me to make a whole series of errors which weren't 
huge in themselves but which I regretted and which she then hauled me 
over the coals over. So that in that particular person there was very much 
an interaction between a particular style of being with patients which I 
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find most of the time serves me quite well and I think serves them quite 
well and not being able to maintain that and with this particular person 
then attempting to try and understand .. about the 
fixes that we got into 
and finding it a very taxing process, one that was at the time almost too 
difficult for her and certainly very difficult for me. 
The impulse to retaliate has to be monitored and owned when acted upon. It would 
constitute for Paul a potentially very unhelpful joining of the re-enactment. With the 
first patient Paul became aware of less conscious ways in which he might be 
retaliating against the patient. One involved `forgetting' the patient's particular 
request not to be brought to the session by a route that took her past her previous 
therapist's door: 
a week or two later I brought her up past the other therapist's office and I 
think that was probably more than thoughtlessness, that this in some way 
was a counter-attack by myself on her because she had been pressing me 
so hard, she had been so difficult and critical and unpleasant and I 
suspected some part of my mind knew it would be upsetting to bring her 
up that way but that is what I had done. 
And that is an example of how, despite all of my best attempts to stay in a 
purposeful, positive, constructive position with her, I found myself 
slipping into counter-attack in the way that she perceived me overall and 
perceived other people. So what happened between us came, in its more 
fraught moments, to resemble some of the more persecutory things that 
she'd experienced with other people and which had been formative and 
which she feared in the most profound way.... 
there were other small incidents when I would press her in a way that I 
knew she probably would not be able to manage and so there was a little 
bit of tilting the balance of power back in my own favour and not the other 
way. 
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When such painful re-enactment takes place Paul 
feels a therapist needs to consider 
whether the problem might lie in the combination of the therapist's and patient's 
personalities being `toxic' in some way such that 
it would be better for the patient to 
we another therapist: 
But certainly if a toxic combination had control or if there had not been 
any sympathy for her then morally and professionally it would have been 
right to ask somebody else to take over. 
However, in this instance with the first patient, a reading of the notes from the 
previous therapy suggested that a similar struggle had taken place there as well. Paul 
felt the patient's reactions to him needed to be seen not just in personal terms but as 
transference which would contain projection and distortion. In this way he sought to 
practise bis concept of `differentiated petception' : 
As a therapist one needs to take what patients do personally and not 
personally. You have to stand back and think this isn't always about you 
as you are. This is also about transference and projection and distortion 
and that I think helps you in a difficult situation to make a separation 
between you and the perceived self in the other person. But at the same 
time I think you have to step back and constantly think `in this created 
selves together is there something to listen to and to learn about oneself 
and about the other person or about the way they interact with other 
people which will make their story intelligible? ' ....... So I had to come 
back and try and renew myself each time before the session in order to 
contend with it. 
Re-enactments can feel almost unbearable at times such that there have been 
occasions with patients when Paul felt he had to make it clear that there would need to 
be a change for therapy to be able to continue. The therapist also has needs: 
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I think my maxim is that the therapist must survive'. If the therapist gets 
killed off then the therapy comes to an end and then you've got two 
casualties. 
I certainly can think back and remember a number of times when I have 
said to people that we are at the limit of what I can do and if we continue 
in this particular vein I just won't be able to continue with you. You've 
got a choice. You've got to kind of cool it down to a manageable, 
tolerable level. The few times that I have done that most of the patients 
have been absolutely devastated by that. They've had a notion that either 
they weren't so toxic, or difficult or that I should be able to cope with 
whatever they - but those few occasions have led to a more fruitful 
engagement. They haven't broken off. They've been outraged but 
somehow something about the reality and the responsibility for that shared 
and created reality has come home to them. 
However this first patient was one who Paul felt was unable to respond differently to 
him. It was "beyond her capacity to will. " Additionally, she was a patient at risk of 
suicide and the ethically correct thing to do he felt was to continue and not demand a 
change. 
Paul described constructing an understanding of the patient's difficulties which 
appeared to `hold' him in his struggle and he believed the patient owned it too (as a 
co-construction at times). It centred around the shared image of her sense of 
abandonment and disowning by her mother who would not listen to and respond to 
her cries for help. Paul understood the patient's treatment of him as a re-enactment 
that functioned both as a communication to Paul of her own inner experience and as a 
Punishment of him in loco parentis: 
she needed me to be the person who heard those cries and was punished 
for not being able to respond to them. So that the way I partly understood 
it and tried to bring back into our conversation was that we were caught 
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up in a process that was trying to tell an old story but in a slightly different 
way, that might get to a different end point. 
I felt that she needed to, in a way that wasn't fully thought out on her part, 
but the needed me to experience that painful position that she had been in 
and go on living in and basically gone on surviving it and trying to come 
back in as reasonably positive, constructive unattacking way as I could 
muster and that would then [link to] my idea that my doing that long 
enough and sensitively enough might well add up to a corrective 
emotional experience for her. 
Therapy can then `seesaw' between the therapist being allowed near and 
being pushed away. 
To assist with the development of a more `differentiated perception' Paul will at times 
try to introduce `reality' to assist a patient: 
I therefore thought it was important to try and acknowledge that with her 
directly and try and separate out, to the best of my ability, the times when 
that [my manner] was a response to her or it was a response to something 
else in the attempt that this would allow her to make a more differentiated 
perception. Sure, sometime she had indeed succeeded in discomforting me 
or upsetting me or making me doubt myself. And it was important to 
recognise with her that she had that capacity but other times she got it 
wrong. There was some external event that I had been thinking about or I 
was tired because of some other processes that were going on in my life. It 
was then important to say `yes you are right I am feeling tired or feeling a 
bit under the weather today but I think it is because of something outside, 
on this occasion. ' On another occasion, yes there was a link to how we 
were together the previous week. 
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For progress to be made and as evidence of progress `significant action' needs to be 
taken by the patient that constitutes a re-writing of their own narrative: 
This is another key bit of the model that I am very keen on - people taking 
significant action which will help them re-write their own narrative. So 
that what significant action would be (for the second patient), to monitor 
how the situations break down with his wife before they get to the point of 
inevitable breakdown and he is going to have several days of sulking, can 
he actually do something that will break that pattern, something really 
quite simple like taking himself off and calming down or calling for time 
out or apologising, something that would be quite significant..... So he goes 
off and he practises that. 
Forays into the past take place only when warranted: 
And then [with the second patient) there has been some excursions into 
history particularly when he has got into some real time difficulty but it 
does not seem very much to do with the situation as it is now but clearly 
has historical antecedents so that his rage at being ignored, which is quite 
disproportionate to the situation, would then prompt an excursion. 
As an outcome of therapy Paul looks for there to be a `corrective emotional 
experience' that prevents an ongoing repetition of the interpersonal pattern 
indefinitely. He sums this up as: 
trying to tell an old story but in a slightly different way, that might get to a 
different end point. 
Outcome to both therapies is described in the following terms: 
Maybe who knows, perhaps she [first patient] has made a shift and that 
struggle symbolised something positive to her. 
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He [second patient) is less narcissistically involved in an extreme 
way,......... he is more able to feel he is loved as a person by his wife even 
though: he is. being criticised in that particular moment whereas before 
those two were one and the same thing. He didn't have a robust sense of 
bc4loveable unless it was constantly being topped up and affirmed. So 
again in this particular case there was an importance in his external life of 
addressing the reality of his situation, if he was behaving in an obnoxious 
fashion, recognising that and apologising and making amends in some 
way and try not to make that into a blanket condemnation of himself. 
Paul's Attachment Narrative 
This narrative unfolds through a series of contrasts through which he locates himself 
as an interpersonal therapist at the 'soft-analytic' end of the spectrum taking a more 
evidence-based and `opportunistic' approach to the model emphasising the search for 
what is `effective' in promoting change. He voices some of the conflict that exists 
between psychotherapists. The contrasts are: 
hard-analytic vs soft analytic: 
I really struggle with the culture of NHS psychotherapy in the region] 
because I am not sure there is a fully shared culture at all. There are, it 
seems to me, a number of quite distinctive cultures going on which co- 
exist but I am not sure they, in a deep way, that they have respect or 
acknowledgement for each other so that in terms of a spectrum, there is 
quite clearly a spectrum from hard analytic to soft analytic and I would be 
at the softer end of that spectrum. 
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idealised vs opportunistic: 
I think there is a spectrum of attitude to the model in the sense that some 
people idealise the model, thinking that practising within it is a good in 
itself. There are other people who are much more opportunistic. 
right vs helpful: 
Well, I think that some people think that there is a right way to practise 
therapy and, with that patient, if you don't practise that way then that's 
wrong whereas I think that's a funny way of putting it. I can see a question 
which would be `is there a right or better way to help patients with 
particular kinds of problems'? That is a research question and you could 
tease that out. You might come up with the answer that this way is the best 
way but you might actually find that a lot of it is, not exactly mumbo 
jumbo, but does not have that - isn't that crucial to the success of the 
project. 
to constantly go back to `is what you are doing the best that you can do 
for this particular person's problems, is it working, is it proving helpful' 
rather than `am I doing the therapy right'. 
Paul emphasises his central criteria of `effectiveness' and the need for evidence-based 
practice. He feels he has been `paring away' over the years at what in the 
psychodynamic approach has seemed superfluous to the aim of evoking change: 
I've always thought that effectiveness is the name of the game and unless 
You are doing something or trying to do more the things which are 
effective, what are you there for ? But I think other people seem to value 
the model and doing things within the model as being a good in itself. I 
have never been able to see that at all. 
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So within my development whenever I have come across people being 
absolutist or reductionist I tended to react against that. I didn't fancy that 
very much and over die-years have pared away some of the elements 
which don't seem to me to be essential for evoking change. So, history, 
yes it's important but you can't do very much about it........... what you or I 
are going to do in the next few moments, tomorrow and the next day. It 
strikes me that that particular focus is the one where there is a chance of 
altering minds. 
There are a number of things about psychoanalytic models, the way it is 
practised by some people ....... which I don't find to my taste, they include 
people being certain about the truth of those constructs or the primacy of 
those constructs. There are alternative ways of seeing things. Perhaps the 
research evidence does not really support the assumptions. 
Paul's approach reflects his training: 
My" medical background, I was brought up to question and to test and to 
weigh evidence and it seems to me that that is a model that, over time, 
tends to advance, tends to discard what is wrong-headed and does more of 
what is right and so I am fundamentally quite questioning about all sorts 
of things. I am very happy to have those things on the table. 
It doesn't seem to me that we are likely to have got the model perfectly 
worked out, an example would be the benefit of long term therapy. Long 
term therapy tends to be used for people with major problems or for 
people having training therapies who can commit themselves for such a 
long time. 
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There needs to be a study that will investigate other particular groups of 
patients, do you actually need that length of time or is it the case that 
people get to a particular point and then they tend to plateau and there are 
diminishing returns and could you achieve the same amount of benefit by 
perhaps having, what I tend to do, an intensive phase and then a much 
more distributed phase of sessions. ' It is a really good research question 
with huge implications for the way we organise our services and 
Departments. 
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Summary of the interview with Paul 
In the interview Paul stressed : 
the intme pressure some patient's evoke on the therapist's personality in the 
therapy that results in the therapist feeling `pulled out of shape', and in their 
joining the re-enactment unhelpfully. 
° that a developing understanding of the patient assists the therapist in tolerating the 
pressure and maintaining appropriate restraint. 
° the need to consider whether the personality of the therapist is part of the problem 
in a therapy. 
° the importance of the therapist's professional knowledge being informed by and 
anchored in an evidence base which provides a measure of objectivity to practice. 
° how `being with' a patient needs to lead to the patient `doing', by way of their 
tatting "significant action" interpersonally and how therapy's value should be 
judged by its effectiveness in bringing this about. 
° the need for a soft-edge to the model of practice that privileges pragmatic and 
opportunistic practice over compliant practice. 
° the need for a counter-culture within psychodynamic therapy that would challenge 
a culture of longer term therapy, an undue focus on the past, and an undue reliance 
on a pre-set model of practice. 
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° how the map or guide to healthy psychological living that informs his professional 
knowledge focuses on the interpersonal dimension of life and the way a culture of 
self-fulfilling and damaging interpersonal relationship patterns are created and 
sustained by individuals. 
° that his values/philosophy as a therapist have been shaped by his own 
temperament, his medical training, the research evidence for practice and his 
clinical experience. 
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Interview with Peter 
In the interview Peter gave an account of : 
° the importance of a pluralistic acceptance of yourself and your experience and of 
letting other people in on that experience. The alternative involves a `mutilating' of 
yourself internally by the disowning of unwanted aspects or experiences. 
° the problems that arise in relating when `Basic Trust' has not developed and there 
is a paranoid quality to relating. 
° the centrality to therapy (and struggle) of `being with' a patient in an `I-Thou' 
relationship. 
° the need for realistic ambitions as a therapist when therapy needs to be more about 
promoting `management' than promoting 'change'. 
° the need to accept the limits of theory, the struggle with uncertainty and the value 
of the `unknown'. 
° common reference points that allow for understanding between people. 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient one was presented as the more disturbed of the patients. He was an older 
man with a long history of abuse in childhood and within the psychiatric system 
to some extent. In childhood he was `terrorised' and `virtually imprisoned'. As 
an adult he had repeated admissions to psychiatric hospital and was often 
suicidal. He had ongoing out-patient involvement with Mental Health Services. 
There has been a paranoid quality to his relating in the sense that he had not 
been able to trust others and had to be guarded and secretive. His active mental 
life had not been translated into an ability to relate and express himself with 
others. He was viewed by Peter as developmentally at the `paranoid-schizoid' 
level. He had been seen for weekly therapy for some years with the aim of 
assisting with psychological `rehabilitation'. 
Patient two was presented as the less disturbed of the two patients. She was an 
older woman who had had an experience of being depressed to the point of 
feeling suicidal. Peter constructed an understanding of her as desperately trying 
to avoid her depression as she felt persecuted by it. Therapy lasted around 18 
months and focused on helping her tolerate and be in touch with her feelings. 
Depression was seen by Peter in her case as not so much a pathological 
condition but as part of the texture of her human experience. Her background 
was seen as containing deprivation and abandonment but not, as with the first 
patient, a damaging level of persecution. As a result she was seen as less 
disturbed. 
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Peter's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Healthy psychological living, in Peter's view, requires a `pluralistic acceptance' of 
ourselves, an attitude of `inclusivity' and a `letting in' of people. Acceptance is of the 
experience you have and of the person you are, including those parts you feel most 
ashamed of and most want to, be rid of. Non-acceptance of aspects of ourselves is 
akin to self-mutilation: 
I think the task is to learn to live more tolerantly with how it is. 
I suppose the idea that you can't be selective about your inner experience 
that it is as it is but that if you start categorising it as ` that's a good thing 
to feel, that's a bad thing to feel , that's sick, that's 
OK' then you start 
mutilating yourself in a way that is profoundly unhelpful. I suppose that 
the ideal is a' much more pluralistic acceptance of one's range of 
experience not that that does away with conflict - in fact the very 
opposite....... I suppose if I have a sort of an ideal, a psychological 
approach it would be very much an inclusive one where the emphasis was 
in some way on valuing the experience you are having and finding a place 
for it and that includes experience that is painful....... so I suppose if I have 
a therapeutic philosophy it's probably that. 
I think I see therapy as enabling people to have the experience of 
themselves and of the world that they have actually got . 
A number of defences are described which can be thought of as intra-psychic and 
inter-personal strategies for managing the psychological risks of life. They are 
described as `hiding', `pretending', `avoiding', `managing', `introjecting', `sustaining' 
and `guarding'. . 
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So (as with the second patient) experiences such as that of depression are fended off 
and avoided where possible but at a price: 
I suppose the overall understanding that I got of her was of somebody who 
was desperately trying to avoid being depressed ....... I think that was the 
work in a sense - something like helping her develop the capacity to be in 
touch with and tolerate her own experience. That is seeing depression not 
as a pathological condition which it can be, but more a part of the texture 
of human experience... 
When people function at a more `paranoid-schizoid' level strategies include managing 
other people and trying to keep them going out of a fear that they might become 
attacking or they might collapse (as previously experienced). Other people can not be 
taken for granted in a healthy way [as with the first patient]: 
There is quite a theme you can not rely on the other, you have to sustain 
them. 
So he has to humour me to keep me concerned because otherwise I 
become totally persecutory and seek to destroy him. 
.... because I have a sense of his need to manage me and so I am not always 
sure - sometimes it is obvious that he is managing me and that is easy 
because we can talk about that..... I don't know sometimes whether he is 
managing me or not. 
Knowledge may be withheld from self and others: 
The way I think about it is that what is happening inside of him is 
happening inside of him [the first patient] - he has no control over it. He 
can neither make it happen nor stop it from happening but he has spent 
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most of his life trying to pretend that it isn't happening so that he has 
gone into the psychiatric system asking them to make him better and to 
look after him without ever telling them anything about what the problem 
IS. 
In an attempt to stay attached (originally to parental figures) it is as if an attempt is 
made to introject or swallow whole the other. There is a process of introjection but not 
digestion or integration [as with the first patient]: 
I think some people keep their parents alive in a very literal and concrete 
kind of a way by allowing part of themselves to become them. I think we 
all do that to some extent but in this case it's swallowing wholesale 
something, some very paranoid quality that his mother held and 
identifying with it as himself and I really do get a sense of it as a huge 
foreign body inside of him at times. Not an internal parental object -I am 
not quite sure what these words mean - but sort of an introject where you 
have somehow got someone stuffed inside of you that is acting quite 
independently and it just takes over, somebody like a nazi regime in 
occupied France, it runs the show but does not really belong there but it is 
in control. 
Peter's Developmental Narrative 
By implication the foundations of mental health are laid for Peter in the experience of 
being accepted and valued for the person you are. This promotes a `Basic Trust' in 
life. 
Peter addresses through the first patient the impact on the `inner self of earliest (and 
ongoing) relationships that have had a severely unreliable and persecutory quality 
such that there is a `basic mistrust' of people. He prefers the concept of level of 
disturbance rather than the terms health/ill-health. Peter has a sense that his patient has 
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not had a sustained experience of being accepted, of being able to 
bring himself to his 
caregivers and experience something like `unconditional positive regard'. 
Instead the 
patient had: 
.a very long standing history of abuse of a particular kind so in effect he 
Evas somebody who was terrorised and virtually imprisoned for most of his 
childhood and has spent most of his adult life in the psychiatric system in 
a sense repeating that pattern. 
Such experience can lead to the emergence of `entrenched mental structures' based 
around a `paranoid-schizoid' type of functioning. 
Peter distinguishes between the experiences that have an abandonment-rejection 
quality and those that have a paranoid-persecutory quality. The latter result in more 
severe pathology: 
She [second patient] was much more of a depressive position than a 
paranoid schizoid patient. Her despair was a depressive one about 
abandonment and rejection, not a paranoid-persecutory feel.. I think there 
was an element of feeling paranoid about the depression. I think people 
can feel attacked by depression and that is very unhelpful as they try to 
fend it off..... but there was no comparison in terms of the severity of 
pathology. She had a deprived background but not such a persecuted one. 
She was a bit of an ugly duckling brought up in deprived war time 
circumstances but not depressed in a persecuted sense, more in the sense 
of being left out than picked on. 
Peter's Treatment Narrative 
A treatment narrative is more implicit in the interview and appears centred around the 
therapist `being with' the patient in a manner that offers an experience of 
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`unconditional positive regard' and therefore tolerance and acceptance of what the 
patient brings. It is an evolutionary and relatively non-directive approach. Peter, 
therefore, steers far more towards a `being with' stance than a `doing to' stance as a 
therapist. 
This fits with Peter's therapeutic ambition and he links it to an experience with a 
supervisor: 
I suppose my ambition therapeutically would be to be the person that I 
would feel comfortable with when it came to the things about myself I am 
most embarrassed about and most ashamed of.. 
Some supervisors you can take yourself to and some you just can't and 
some you can sit down and say what is really happening and others you 
just don't 
...... it is profoundly affecting being on the receiving end of that 
kind of experience [of being able to take yourself] because you know at 
first hand the value of it. Again I am not saying that enables me to do the 
same for other people but that would be my ideal. 
Such an experience in therapy may allow the patient to develop a more open 
relationship to themselves, their experience and to the world: 
I think I see therapy as enabling people to have the experience of 
themselves and of the world that they have actually got. 
But I suppose at the end of the day for all of us therapy can do that for us. 
It can help us not change who we are but maybe we are feeling more able 
to go out into the world, if you like, which is both relieving and 
disappointing about it. I think that's how I would see it. 
So treatment should not have over-ambitious aims but its potential limits should be 
acknowledged. There is a clear sense that Peter has taken on the first patient in full 
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knowledge of the limits of the patient's capacity to change due to the entrenchment of 
his 'mental structures'. So this therapy is described as `rehab' type therapy and there is 
unburned air to it. The emphasis is placed not on `change' but on `management' 
and `acknowledgement' and `tolerance' and `letting others 
in'. The task is 'about 
helping the patient manage the culture that they find within themselves rather than 
attempt to set up a counter-culture. This is in keeping with Peter's sense he 
is less 
ambitious now as a therapist: 
So I suppose it's something about managing better his mental state, not 
necessarily changing it...... I don't feel that ambitious about him....... I think 
I probably think of him as a rehab patient more than as treatment patient, 
in the sense that I don't sort of imagine that he can get better. I think the 
task is to learn to live more tolerantly with how it is and perhaps to take a 
few tentative steps... 
I think it's a matter of managing one's mental state rather than 
transforming it. I am not saying it could not be transformed in other cases, 
there are changes but that there is something about very entrenched mental 
structures that I don't see the need to be anxious about in terms of wanting 
to change. 
The danger of somehow being incorporated in an undigested form by the patient is 
noted. Just as a patient may introject parental figures as a way of staying close to them 
(as a defensive way of `being with' them) so too the therapist may be introjected. 
Ideally the patient would have 'an identity that refers more to his inner self . Instead it 
can be as if: 
....... you have somehow got someone stuffed 
inside of you that I is acting 
quite independently and it just takes over, somebody like a nazi regime in 
occupied France, it runs the show but does not really belong there but it is 
in control. My fear of course is that I am seeking to replace the nazi 
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regime with a humane, liberal but just as much an introject regime, just as 
much of a foreign body. 
An enactment of the difficulty occurs in the therapy and a key task for the therapist is 
to `monitor' and attempt to track the enactment, to understand on what journey the 
patient is taking the therapist. It takes the form of an interpersonal struggle and a 
negotiation. With the first patient such a fundamental level of distrust leaves them 
with a difficult task of managing the situation and the therapist with a difficulty in 
`reading' what is offered: 
So this is a constant difficulty for me to keep in mind that what is on the 
surface and what is underneath are I think very discrepant. So it's a 
difficulty of understanding what's in front of you and trying to work out to 
what extent you can trust your experience because you know there is a lot 
that is hidden in a paranoid state. [Peter clarifies that, by paranoid, he 
means `automatically guarded and secretive'. ] 
I think he sees me as someone who needs to be sustained, as someone who 
is potentially helpful and part of that is to avoid me turning on him. So he 
has to humour me to keep me interested and concerned because otherwise 
I become totally persecutory and seek to destroy him. So I see him as 
having really a quite difficult management job with me. How to sustain 
me is his problem and he is still quite a long way from being able to be 
sustained, to take me for granted. 
Peter works to retain an awareness that nowhere may feel safe for some patients and 
to monitor and restrain grandiose ideas in himself 
I think it is very easy to think that he is all right here and it is very 
important to remember that he isn't. That rather complacent sense of 
knowing what is better and what's best is precisely one of the dimensions 
he has always [experienced] .... I think 
it's more that I try to monitor 
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myself. Because I find that all sorts of things happen inside me. For 
instance I feel I am better than them and if only he had been here 30 years 
ago how much better this would be. None of this was necessary and stuff 
like that. I try to monitor that sort of grandiosity and try to think of that as 
something that in a sense he tries to feed because one of his tasks is to 
keep me going because he does not have any great faith in anyone he 
values being able to keep on going without his being there to keep them 
on track. 
He both knows and does not know when some patients are managing him: 
I think I do know when he is managing me, when he is saying things he 
knows I want to hear. I think I can pick that up. What I don't know about 
is what is happening the rest of the time. I think it's the same with her 
(second patient). I kind of know when she is saying things -a little present 
to keep him going, I think he likes me saying this. For the rest of the time - 
uncertainty - you live with that and you don't know. 
A description is given of a complicated and frequently unclear process of negotiation: 
When I very first saw him it occurred to me that he did not trust me at all 
and I said that too him and I said that felt like it was part of the problem, 
not just me but he did not trust anybody. I still think . that is right and we 
talk about that and he refers back to that occasionally. That's partly an 
illustration of the negotiation process. I say something and he agrees or he 
does not agree or he says something - so there is a kind of a built up 
mutual understanding over time as to what it is that is happening inside of 
him and what it means. And then there is also the issue of the fact that he 
does not trust me and then I never know what to make of what he says 
because I have a sense of his need to manage me and so I am not always 
sure - sometimes it is obvious that he is managing me and that is easy 
because we can talk about that. 
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Progress in treatment is described in terms of a patient's growing ability to 
communicate: 
I suppose I think he [first patient] has gradually been able to tell people 
more about his inner experience - and I am mainly thinking about his 
family - so that they now understand him a lot better and I think that's 
enabled them to manage him better and it's enabled him to trust them a bit 
more and be with them a bit more so that now everybody knows when he 
is going off and they can talk about it and it's no longer such a paranoid 
secret. 
He distinguishes between the level of disturbance in a patient and the experience of 
disturbance in a therapist: 
There are people who are very disturbing to me and there are people who 
are very disturbed and perhaps even more disturbed - whatever that word 
means - but not necessarily as disturbing to me. 
Peter's Attachment Narrative 
There is acknowledgement of his particular perspective, based on his values and 
philosophy, which shapes his approach to the patient. This is displayed in the 
phenomenological account he has constructed of his first patient's inner world: 
I suppose I have a particular idea about who he is and how he has come to 
be that and what has gone wrong for him with that and that set of ideas 
inevitably informs everything I do and say and think and feel about him. 
So, though I would not put it as a matter of conscious technique, I think 
that orders my being with him .... 
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yes. I think . there is something in that in the sense that all psychotherapists 
have their own understanding about what the world is about and what 
people are about and they can't dispense with that so I'd probably 
say.... it's not a criticism. I'd think of it as something to be reckoned with 
and acknowledged. 
Theory plays a holding function for the therapist but theory should not be taken too 
literally or as too certain. In this way Peter is subversive of too great a sense of a 
therapist'. s.. obj ectivity: 
Our theories are what in a sense sustains us while something else is 
happening that we don't understand which is why theory is really 
important. I use theory in a very broad sense I include our values, our 
philosophy as well as our particular understandings of the way we work 
but we need that in order to keep us going when something else we don't 
know about is happening. Hopefully those ideas are not alien and 
incompatible with that something that is happening but essentially there is 
something we don't understand and can't understand and what is crucial is 
our capacity to not know but without that being a cliche ............. 
[certain concepts] are a useful short-hand for thinking about some of the 
way he presents [first patient]. For me that's a bit like a nail or a screw. I 
make use of it. They are useful things and they do the job. 
I don't think we have a proper understanding of people and how they 
tick..... talking about not knowing, esoteric and incomprehensible... for me 
that is nearer the truth of things. I'd say that theories are useful but not 
necessarily true. 
Over the years his therapeutic ambition has lessened, with movement away from the - 
need to `do to' a patient, away from an the urgent need to help create a counter-culture 
within the patient : 
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I think I am much less ambitious and therefore much less..... tense? I am 
much more tolerant of myself... .I think 
I kept feeling I had to prove 
myself when I started and perhaps I have come now to the conclusion that 
I can't but I think the difference is that I don't mind that so much. It's not 
that I feel I am better than I was. I probably don't mind not being as good 
so much ................... which helps me to be a bit more down to earth. 
To inform his professional knowledge, Peter seeks out theories, such as those of Dion, 
that he finds address a deeper level of experience that is often missed: 
There is something about Bion that I think that, although he is pretty 
incomprehensible, he addresses a level of experience that not many 
psychoanalytic writers do and I think it is that level of experience -I don't 
know how to describe it any better - that psychotherapy is all about really. 
A lot of psychotherapy writing I find quite alien and unhelpful because it 
talks about that level without contacting it. Whereas for me Bion talks out 
of that level which means that he can be conceptually very difficult to 
understand but experientially very powerful to be with. 
He sets out his strong belief in there being an `inner self': 
There is little doubt in my mind there is an inner self independent of the 
external environment which is not to underplay the importance of the 
external environment and the way it affects us but a good environment 
enables us to realise a pre-existing inner self. I feel that as an absolute 
truth really. I have no doubt about that. So I would say Goffman is talking 
about people who have lost their inner sense of self as a reference point so 
they are very prone to external influence, more prone than is good for 
them whereas people who have progressed more on their own inner innate 
nature can sustain themselves and be transformed by the outside world 
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rather than being taken over by them. That is my particular faith if you 
like. 
He goes on then to articulate a more general, epistemological view of the possibility 
of common ground between people. Such common ground allows sufficient alliances 
to be made in therapy between therapists and patients around co-constructions of the 
journey that therapy is taking or needs to take. He drew on the ideas of Jung about `the 
collective' to suggest that, as persons, we each have an `internal collective reference 
point' to measure ourselves against: 
If I was to take the view that it's perfectly OK to sleep with patients, in 
fact it would probably do them good and therefore one should really do it - 
I think if I were to say that I would be out of touch with my own sort of 
collective internal reference point, that it would be a disaster. 
But I might equally be out of touch with my collective reference point if I 
took the view that the only interpretation a psychotherapist should make 
is a transference interpretation. Again that would not be in tune with my 
inner reference point and if I was trying to do it I would be doing 
something very alienating to me and therefore very peculiar for the 
patient. 
It sounds like I am saying I am right about everything - so long as it feels 
all right inside it's OK. I don't mean that either. But I think at the end of 
the day you do your best. You try and do what feels right and to try and be 
as inclusive as possible about the other experience. 
He talks then of an external collective reference point which is society and its 
influence on the individual. It is, for Peter, our participation in both that allows us to 
understand each other "because ultimately we share the same set of psychological 
possibilities". The relationship between the two collectives Peter describes as follows: 
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I don't see the collective as being external and the individual as being 
internal. I see the individual as mediating between the internal and 
external collective - which is what enables me to share an experience with 
each. 
It's partly that we have been brought up in the same culture to use the 
same language and partly that we share in a psychological culture that 
enables me to talk about these kinds of issues and for you to know from 
inside yourself what I'm on about. I don't create that internal collective 
culture any more than I create the external one... I think of as being 
somewhere in the middle of the two and having to work out a position. 
That is my sense of what people are about and that is where the more 
completely individual the scenarios, the more collective they become. 
There would be no point in doing psychotherapy without that collective 
inner experience... because you would not have collective internal 
reference points. 
However such reference points do not provide for certainty. Rather uncertainty has to 
be lived with and also valued. Peter conveys both his sense of security within a 
psychodynamic culture and his experience of the level of stress that is inherent in 
therapy given the uncertainties that have to be lived with: 
Half the problem in psychotherapy is understanding when we don't 
understand something. That's really difficult because you don't know that 
you don't know about it. 
The closely guarded secret which it [psychotherapy] will not allow the 
uninitiated to know is that actually we value not-knowing. Now that 
would sound criminally appalling - what have we been doing all these 
years ? It would not be immediately [easy] to say what an immense value 
that is. 
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It's hard. to have faith without certainty. At the end of the day you are 
doing what you can do or think you can do and you hope it is OK and you 
know it is not always. When you come up against when it isn't you do 
your best and struggle with that and suffer from it. That is all highly 
unsatisfactory from one point of view. From another point of view it is 
truly human. 
I think at the end of the day you do your best. You try and do what feels 
right and to try and be as inclusive as possible about the other experience. 
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Summary of the interview with Peter 
In the interview Peter emphasised 
° how his perspective is . 
informed by values / philosophy that centre around 
fostering in the patient a culture of pluralistic acceptance of self and experience. 
° his need as a therapist to acknowledge and take account of the relativity of his 
values and philosophy and their impact on a therapy. 
° theory as a useful (but not necessarily true) guide which sustains him while he 
engages with the uncertainty and the unknown in therapy. 
° how common ground between patient and therapist (and people in general) enables 
some alliance to form and understanding to be co-constructed such that there can 
be a sense of therapist and patient being on a shared journey together. 
° nevertheless, the difficulty there can be for a therapist in understanding and 
keeping track of the journey on which the patient appears to be taking the therapist. 
° how hard it is, as a therapist, for practice to be based on "faith without certainty". 
° the importance for his practice of steering firmly towards a stance of `being with' a 
patient in a way that communicates an acceptance of the patient and enables them 
to better manage their internal culture with appropriate realism about what they are 
able to do. 
0 an emphasis on the value of the unknown and the limits of theory, an emphasis that 
is subversive of too great a sense of the therapist's objectivity and of too hard an 
edge to the application of the model, 
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Interview with Maria 
In the interview Maria gave an account of: 
° the need for a person to feel seen, recognised and engaged with in their 
individuality. 
° the enabling of the development of a sense of personal agency or authenticity, of a 
capacity to become more one's own advocate. 
° therapy as a reflective space which a patient can learn to use and thereby move 
away from more reactive and impulsive responses that lack this sense of agency. 
° an experiential kind of `knowing' emerging from the experience of relationship 
with a person. 
°a caution about wider claims to knowledge and a non-directiveness when it comes 
to patient choices and decisions. 
° how the emergence of inner disturbance may seem to others to be making the 
patient more `ill' while it may in fact be therapeutic for them. 
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Patient Summaries 
Patient one was presented as the more disturbed patient. She was a 
middle-aged woman who had been professionally successful and 
maintained longer term relationships. However her life appeared 
characterised by a lack of agency. She had not been able to be reflective, 
to stop and take stock. Instead she had lived in reaction to others' wishes 
and adopted a compliant stance, particularly with authority figures. She 
voiced for herself a sense that she had not actively chosen where she had 
got to in life. Her underlying difficulties had come to a head with long 
term sickness from work. Therapy had continued for more than three 
years. 
Patient two was presented as the less disturbed patient but focused on only 
briefly in the interview. She was again a middle-aged woman who had 
experienced the trauma of nursing a dying parent and then subsequently 
`breaking down' emotionally herself. For Maria, the therapy felt naturally 
focused on these events and she found herself more able to think in a 
coherent and integrated way about this patient's life and needs. She took 
this as a sign of a lower level of disturbance. 
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Maria's Psychodynamic Narrative 
Healthy living psychologically requires a capacity for agency, for the making of 
authentic choices that emerge from a capacity to reflect and then be proactive. Maria 
talks of a capacity to be our own advocate. Such health or lack of health may not be 
immediately visible to another person. In fact someone may seem to function well. 
externally while inside they have `borderline' aspects to their personality and 
experience "internal world disturbance" : 
what patients I see externally maybe seem to be functioning all right but 
once they're in therapy ....... they might be struggling with a 
lot of 
disturbance inside. 
I think I'd use the word `authentic'. How authentic are the together bits 
that the patient presents? 
I don't know if I see any neurotic patients. I think they are all more 
borderline. I don't know what terms you want to use but they seem to have 
more disturbances unless I am not seeing something. I don't know what a 
neurotic patient is sometimes. I think I've lost sight. 
Maria's first patient, deemed more disturbed, illustrates this struggle. She is someone 
who has been professionally successful and has had a number of valued personal 
relationships in her adult life. However she conveys to Maria an impression that she 
has no sense of agency in her life and her apparent external success disguises an inner 
disturbance. So Maria comments: 
.. over her lifetime people could have looked at her and thought she was a 
fairly healthy person ............. what she is coming to understand 
is that none 
of this has been about her. She has no sense of her own agency in all this. 
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If we think about false self or whatever it feels like that is very much it. So 
as a therapist I would say there is something quite disturbed inside even 
though on the outside some people might think she has been fairly healthy. 
now she's got there it's like what's all this about but she has no idea. I 
don't think she has ever stood back and thought what was she doing and 
what was it all about ... I think she is just beginning to think who am 
I 
doing all this for. 
'Internal world disturbance" reveals itself, in Maria's view, in the quality of the 
person's relationships and their ability to function, for example in employment. 
Symptoms, for the first patient, are detailed by Maria as stress leading to time off 
work and a tendency towards punishing perfectionism, along with a previous history 
of anorexia. However Maria does not talk much in terms of symptoms as generally 
understood. Instead she describes wider `existential' themes. 
Maria describes a need to foster a culture of authenticity inside ourselves, an 
eedstential sense of being true to ourselves in some way: 
.... it is about a sort of true self and when I say that I don't mean I think 
there is one core -we are changing all the time but all the time I think we 
need to retain some kind of true self within us, true selves perhaps or 
whatever. You know I think we change all the time but I think it's a 
position, a position we can perhaps hope to find as we go through life. So 
I am not the same as I was when I was 19 or 20. I am not the same person. 
I don't believe I am the same person at all. The skin's older and you 
change inside don't you ...... but throughout all of that I think it would be 
nice in life if one had good enough experiences to feel that each and every 
stage they at least felt - value I suppose as well - you have a voice and that 
people do see you as a whole being. 
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Maria's Developmental Narrative 
Each of us needs a sustained experience of being related to in ways that enable us to 
feel recognised and engaged with as an individual of worth. This experience is 
internalised such that a person can become their own `advocate'. They can then act 
with `agency' in the world and experience a sense of `authenticity' in regard to 
themselves. When such a relationship has not been available to someone in their 
childhood or later then the therapist might offer this in a way that begins to be 
corrective. 
Maria illustrates this in the particular biography of her first patient whose mother 
struggled to bond with her: 
Mother could never contain her as a child. It sounds like mother was very 
depressed after having her......... it sounds like she was quite rejected by 
her...... there is a sense of not being contained, of overwhelming feelings, 
of feeling not wanted, when siblings came along pushed out...... 
deprivation, the [lack ofJ sense of someone wanting to be with her.. 
Childhood relationships can be enmeshed in a way that does not allow a child to be 
reflective, to become able to distinguish its own needs and wishes and learn to act 
autonomously: 
Therapy is about reflective space and I think that particularly with her, 
because she seems to have spent her life just jumping. That is what she 
has not had. That's part for me of what the therapy is about, learning to 
use reflective space. 
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Maria's Treatment Narrative 
Maria. offers the patient an experience of being personally engaged with and 
`recognised'. She seeks to `be with' the patient, learn from the experience and allow 
an understanding to unfold: 
I know what it is for me, I think. I think it is about the process of them 
being with you, being with another and what that's about and I think it's 
about being recognised and I think it's something about being heard, being 
recognised, somebody struggling with you, not when you are going off 
mark saying you don't understand me but someone staying with you and 
trying to want to recognise whatever it is you are trying to - so it's 
something about recognition. And I don't think it's about clever 
interpretations, it's just about for me the process of being with somebody, 
what goes on. 
When such recognition is experienced Maria implies it can be internalised such that 
the patient can offer it to herself. So she can be her own advocate and feel more 
confident about her presence in the world and have the capacity to tolerate 
experiences of difference from others: 
Advocate. It's like being your own advocate in a way. 
I think what I am trying to say is that if they are recognised in therapy, 
there is something about recognition, they are probably less frightened of 
being invisible out there and they can exist. I think that is what I am 
trying to say. 
Yes they have the right to some space. They can exist. They have as much 
right as anybody else. 
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It's about feeling you can be different with people but still have something 
to offer. You have a right to be there. You don't have to be the 
same ... that's OK, not always to see eye to eye. 
At the heart of the process of therapy is the provision and experience of reflective 
space. Agency is fostered in the patient by this experience of being provided with a 
reflective space: 
What I often say to patients at the start of therapy or at assessment when 
they say `what is therapy about ?" it's about a space for you to come and 
think about yourself, your relationships and ... 
She models a reflective stance that can tolerate uncertainty and not knowing: 
I will often say to patients "I am not sure about this but" or "I don't know 
this but I am getting the [impression]", "I wonder if ". But I know with 
her [first patient] I use it a lot ..... 
it's only recently she said it's all right to 
say I don't know this. And I smiled and said "I say that a lot don't r' and 
she said " oh yes you do". And it was something about she has to be so 
perfect and get everything right and I was even unconsciously with her 
modelling a different position which is I can be here and I can talk ... but I 
haven't a clue what's going on. 
Maria is sensitive to the need to negotiate understanding and keep open a reflective 
space on both sides: 
I am going to have to wait and see what she does with that [comment] 
it's about allowing yourself to think `well OK' but leave some space 
for something different. 
I do have the overall sense sometimes of wanting to be aware of a wider 
view. Or I like to think that the patients might be able to tell me 
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something It's not that I have all the theories and that is going to fit ..... 
I 
try and keep it open to other possibilities It might be that I have missed 
something else and they are trying to tell me something else. 
I have heard myself say ..... 
"I Think". But..... I only use that with patients 
who .... can say no to me 
if it's not right. 
When patients make dramatic changes while in therapy, such as leaving a partner, this 
poses the question for Maria whether this is an impulsive or reflective act and what 
may have been Maria's own contribution: 
I must admit I feel I have done something dreadful. 
It's like she is either doing a lot of reflecting very quickly on her own or 
something is just being acted out but I can't stop it. I can't take full 
responsibility for that. 
Patients, she says, sometimes quote you back and you think `I never said that'. Her 
intention is to be non-directive and this can be frustrating to patients: 
I would not overtly direct patients I hope. 
Well she comes to see me and I don't tell her "no, you should go back or 
yes you shouldn't go back". I am trying to help her find her own way 
which patients can get very frustrated with at times ...... 
The experience of therapy may draw out the patient's inner disturbance such that it is 
seen by others who might see this as a backward step. Maria holds to the potential 
value in the long run of disturbance being allowed to emerge: 
she's recently actually become more disturbed - some people would see it 
like that. This is the trouble with being a therapist, I actually think she is 
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doing something positive and useful in this disturbance .... Some people 
might think she has been fairly healthy and how dare therapy disturb her. 
You have made this woman ill. 
The first patient supported Maria in this: 
But she is saying it has really helped me. I might look like I am falling 
apart but I feel better about myself than I have ever done in my life which 
I think is interesting. 
A lack of agency can be seen to be re-enacted and Maria described an occasion in 
which she clearly and expressively challenged the [first] patient over this. 
You are doing it. You have been to see [X] and he has said do this and you 
are telling me how angry you are but you are doing it. Where are you in 
this ? 
The greater the disturbance the harder it can be for the therapist to maintain a coherent 
construction of the patient in their head: 
So it seems like the work [with the second patient] seems more focused 
and ... somehow it feels like it can be held together more where with the 
[first] patient I see as more disturbed... trying to get (it) all together..... I 
feel it's harder to get hold of. 
Different patients bring out different responses: 
You can't make interpretations to someone who is about to keel over. 
And it can feel different with different patients. Some patients it might be 
full of transference interpretations but with somebody else it might not 
and actually I think that's patient led...... There are things I might be 
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sayug to one patient that I would be saying differently with another 
patient and k don't always know exactly why. 
Maria voices her criteria for judging a successful outcome of treatment with her first 
patient: 
How do I know what is authentic with her? I will know when she 
demonstrates for me in a way that she is finding something for herself. 
Yes, if I feel she can hear both what he says and maybe what she thinks I 
say or anybody else but then can take stock and think about it and come to 
some solution herself, that to me feels more authentic. 
Maria's Attachment to Professional Knowledge 
Maria did not make explicit links in the interview between her approach and her own 
personal experiences. 
Maria regards her form of `knowing' of a patient as experience-based: 
A sense of something about her rather than saying "I know"....... It's a 
sense of her life experiences and how, what that means to her... how she 
feels about herself..... I know what it's like being with her , being with her 
is the story you hear so it's the experience of being with and the gathering 
of information that gives you a sense of who she might be, what's going 
on for her. 
I know something but it is the other sort of way of knowing which is about 
experience. 
However, people are never `known' in some definitive and objective sense anyway: 
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I only know or have a sense of what she brings to me but I always think 
there are parts of patients we don't know.......... you never know anybody 
fully. I have worked with patients for years sometimes and can feel I have 
not got a clue about them. I don't feel I know much about them at all. 
Her clinical thinking is informed by theory but hers is not, she feels, a very `theory - 
conscious' approach in practice: 
I don't think I go and think in models. I'm with patients but I do 
sometimes think whatever particular model is coming into my head at that 
particular time.... rivalry, oedipal stuff as well . 
Some people can hold on to bits of theory out of books and bring it up . If 
I do that it's prbbably only because I have re-read something recently. I am 
not very good at that sort of holding on to..... I might be able to call on one 
or two things I have recently read. 
She describes ways in which she checks the ongoing `validity' of her approach. She 
compares her understanding against her own experience and tests it out with 
colleagues for their `recognition': 
I suppose one of the important things I am saying is about being seen and 
recognised. If you are in isolation there is no-one to see you or recognise 
you ....... it's almost like I heard you almost saying that if I was going to 
go off at some weird tangent someone would step in and say "here 
Maria".......... Personal experience comes to mind . How do you get to the 
position? You get to the position through experience. 
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She looks to the outcome of therapies for confirmation or otherwise of the value and 
usefulness of her clinical thinking. These outcomes are not presented in 
idealised 
terms: 
How do we evaluate the outcomes of therapy ? My overall sense is that I 
might have a few therapies end, it's not been a brilliant ending or 
whatever but generally patients seem to find something useful. I would 
like to think they did overall. You know when they start telling you how 
they are dealing with their relationships differently and that side or they 
are doing things they did not do before, could not do before. It sounds 
really weak in a way but I suppose that is how you know or you have a 
sense that there is just something valid in it. 
But the stories they (the patients] tell change. So if they are coming and 
telling you they can hardly go out and socialise and have tb hide in a 
corner when they do or basic things like they have not been able to work 
for years and all of a sudden they get a job or they buy their own house 
and tell you about having better relationships, more intimate ones, you 
start to get a feel that something is changing. 
She sees the psychodynamic model as containing multiple perspectives that a therapist 
has to choose between. It needs to be open to further development: 
.. we know there is more than one model. And because thoughts are 
developing all the time, particularly with all the modern papers thinking 
more intersubjectively ............. so I suppose it was like - what model were 
you thinking of? 
Well if we weren't like that [staying open to new ideas] where would we 
be with - theories developed. We'd still all be Freudians wouldn't we and 
we would not be thinking about Object Relations. But it's a struggle. 
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Yes even with the models we do have there are times when there might be 
at least a choice of three or four ways of looking at something. It's 
interesting then which do you choose at any one moment in time, if you 
were going to make a comment about something, it's interesting which 
you happened to be thinking. 
Throughout the interview Maria implies a problem for her with `knowing' and a need 
to negotiate knowledge based on the experience of the encounter. She is concerned to 
avoid claiming too objective a status for her clinical thinking: 
.... I will often say to patients "I am not sure about this but" or "I don't 
know this but I am getting the [sense), I wonder if... ".... 
I don't know that I ever do know for sure, do I ?... 
I think it would be omnipotent for me to say `I know' ..... 
I know something but I don't know if I can tell you what it is I know [in 
response to an assessment]. 
The psychodynamic model at times stands in sharp contrast to other perspectives such 
as a psychiatric focus on illness. Maria quotes the example of the patient whose 
psychiatrist told her she was ill and psychotherapy would not help: 
... but it is a different approach isn't it ..... I think she 
has struggled all her 
life. I don't see her as having an illness. I disagree with him. It is a 
different perspective isn't it ? 
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Maria is aware of a punitive side to the model. As a therapist she can feel quite 
criticised by `the model' : 
I think the model can become quite punitive if we let it. You know how it 
is When you are struggling with some patient sometimes and you have 
those sessions when you think "God that was not very dynamic. I should 
not have said that" or "am I doing psychotherapy with this patient rather 
than thinking what is this about? " "What did this patient mean? " "This 
patient is trying to get something else out of me. Maybe it's because 
actually that's what they need rather than ...... you know we end up 
punishing ourselves thinking `Oh God am I doing psychotherapy here? ' 
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Summary of the interview with Maria 
In her interview Maria emphasised : 
° that the psychodynamic approach contains multiple perspectives and a therapist is 
continually choosing between alternatives 
° how her professional knowledge is informed by values / philosophy that centre 
around our need as individuals for someone to `be with' us in a sustained way, 
recognising, valuing and engaging with us. 
° that such experiences allow for an individual to develop an internal culture of 
`authenticity' in their living, of `agency' in their choices, and of self-advocacy. 
° that one hazard encountered in the therapy journey is the pressure on the therapist 
to make decisions for the patient and thereby provide a map of what to do and how 
to act, so re-enacting in the therapy the patient's lack of agency. 
° the importance for her clinical thinking of steering always towards the experience- 
near, emerging from the subjective encounter rather than steering towards and 
being led by more general theorising. This reflects her sense of the limitations of 
what a therapist can know about a patient. 
° how an ability in the therapist to express views to the patient as 'enquiries' models 
for the patient a thoughtful and reflective stance. 
° the need as a therapist to have a stance that steers firmly towards a `being with' the 
patient that fosters a culture of reflection in the patient and allows them in time to 
`act' with a sense of agency. 
°a pressure she has experienced to be more hard-edged in her application of the 
model. 
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FINDINGS 
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Findings 
I have described in this chapter my findings in two parts to reflect the sequence in 
which they developed in order to give to the reader more of a sense of the way in 
which these findings unfolded. 
My analysis of the interviews resulted in a set of initial findings about professional 
knowledge and its use that focused around six areas: 
° that the therapist's professional knowledge was drawn from their personal and 
professional experience. 
° that its use constituted `moral work from a value position'. 
° that it was expressed in the form of narratives. 
° that it was employed in the context of a relationship. 
° that its use involved the therapist and patient in enacted narratives. 
° that its use required the facing of limits. 
A period of further analysis, literature search and the completion of the final four 
interviews resulted in five further findings which are the core findings of this thesis; 
° that the use of professional knowledge in practice involved for the therapists a 
process of `clinical reasoning'. 
° that such clinical reasoning was organised in the form of narratives in the mind of 
the therapists. 
° that in their clinical reasoning the therapist drew on `situated' knowledge. 
° that it involved a process of `dialectical tacking'. 
° that, in a postmodern climate, it constituted a 'hazardous journey' for the therapist. 
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Initial Findings 
I have now set out my initial six findings along with a selection of references from the 
interviews that illustrated them. 
1.1 The therapists' professional knowledge was rooted in and developed from a 
combination of their personal and professional experience. 
The therapist's professional knowledge had emerged within the context of their 
particular life story. It was a perspective, drawn from an amalgamation of the 
therapist's own personal history, their professional training and experience and the 
local culture of psychotherapy within which they practised. It had developed within 
socially available discourses and practices. The individual personality was both the 
resource and the source of limits. 
Peter and Mike articulated this clearly: 
All therapists have their own understanding about what the world is about 
and what people are about and they can't dispense with that so I'd 
probably say ... it's not a criticism. I'd think of it as something to 
be 
reckoned with and acknowledged (Peter). 
I suppose there were other ways you could make sense of him [first 
patient]. But I was his therapist and I was kind of like given the job if you 
like of being with him and trying to talk with him and I suppose me trying 
to make sense of him and draw on some of my reading, the ideas that 
came to me, that meant something to me. I don't know whether I would 
call it a truth... I think its meaningful - my formulation of him I think is 
meaningful. I think there'd be other meaningful formulations...... yes I am 
almost certain if someone else had been with him [the therapy] might have 
turned a very different shape (Mike). 
269 
Martin and Amanda described significant attachment to their professional knowledge 
which they felt was an integration of their personal and professional experience: 
It sustains me-well it keeps me going and if I was not able to keep going 
then I would not be able to function as a psychotherapist. Well, I don't 
know if I would be able to function as a human being and certainly not as 
a doctor or therapist ... I suppose it is a way of thinking about the world that 
was clarified by my psychotherapy training - the way of thinking then 
became clothed in analytic language, became much richer because of the 
unique way it has of describing and understanding human nature. But 
clearly it was there before... it found a mode of expression (Martin). 
Well, I think the idea of being kinder to myself certainly comes from my 
own therapy (Amanda). 
The experience of feeling at home within psychodynamic thinking and/or particular 
schools within the model was mentioned. Mary described a `fit' between her 
experience and Kleinian thought. Amanda and Mary both recounted experiences that 
were thought of as `a-ha' moments when they were reading theory and it vividly 
illuminated their clinical practice. 
I think that my sort of leaning towards post-Kleiman theories has evolved 
out of difficulties that I knocked up against with patients while I was 
training and thinking, "oh my God, what can I read so that I can 
understand this and help this ?"..... so if I would read something, often it 
would be a post-Kleinian paper and I would have this `aha, that's what I 
think is happening with these patients' (Amanda). 
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1.2 The therapist's use of their professional knowledge constituted "moral work 
from 
a value position " (McLeod, 1998). 
The therapists' narratives shared a common theme or assumption of the `reality' of 
what might broadly be called a `deep interior self' (internal world) that could be 
helpfully explored and given room to develop within a relationship. Thereafter, the 
therapists were involved in working to determine what constituted `the good' for a 
particular patient. Common ground was found in the way that the therapists valued the 
integration of a patient's sense of `self which was generally seen as split in some 
crucial way. Therapists valued too the capacity for agency in life, the ability to be 
proactive in life rather than just reactive. Therapists worked to support subjugated 
sides of the patient's personality and subjugated knowledge within the patient and in 
so doing subvert and change the balance in the internal world. The therapists also 
valued appropriate acceptance of the `realities' of life. 
I have selected quotes to illustrate some of the particular morals and values that were 
expressed by the therapists in the interviews: 
I suppose its about facing reality. I think we evade reality all the time but 
some more than others and yeah, I think it's that, facing reality and the 
pain that that involves and learning that pain is bearable.. -I suppose 
it 
does not work not to (Mary). 
I think the task is to learn to live more tolerantly with how it is. I suppose 
the idea that you can't be selective about your inner experience, that it is 
as it is, but that if you start categorising it as `that's a good thing to feel, 
that's a bad thing to feel, that's sick, that's o. k, ' then you start mutilating 
yourself in a way that is profoundly unhelpful (Peter). 
I guess in ordinary everyday language I would say that they [the patients] 
need to be kinder to themselves (Amanda). 
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You have to accept the flawedness of the world and the people in it and 
not be so totally disillusioned by it that you can't experience also the joy 
and the pleasure (Martin). 
, 
It [1ifej may not be perfect but it can be good enough (Jo). 
R's about feeling you can be different with people but still have something 
to offer. You have a right to be there. You don't have to be the 
same-that's OK, not always to see eye to eye (Maria). 
1.3 The therapist's professional knowledge was expressed in the form of narratives. 
Each therapist had, I found, a stock of stories/narratives that they worked from, mainly 
implicitly. In the interviews each informant told their stories in relation to two 
particular patients but they were also presented as characteristic and generalisable. In 
summarising them here I acknowledge I have adopted an oversimplified style in an 
effort to bring out some headlines themes. 
Martin's narratives included the need to take up and enjoy what life does offer and not 
allow the inevitable disappointments of life to stand in the way. The present needed to 
be seen in its own terms and not solely through the lens of the past. We carry fault 
lines in our personality that can be opened up by stress and defences can be undone to 
our cost. The therapist needed to think more widely than their psychological model 
and embrace biological and social factors and recognise when an alternative treatment 
was required. 
Mary's narrative focused on the importance of facing reality, both internally and 
externally. She facilitated this as a therapist by being direct and where necessary quite 
confrontative within the context of the therapy relationship. Helping make the 
unbearable bearable and the avoided faced up to might be said to characterise the 
narrative. 
272 
Mike's narrative focused on our need for holding environments and containing 
relationships without which we experience ourselves as fragile, disorganised and 
unintegrated. Therapy may be corrective of some deficits through the therapist's in- 
depth relating in a reliable and ongoing context. 
Amanda's narrative focused on the way we can become our own worst critics and 
enact destructive patterns of relating to ourselves and others. Her story lines were 
about narcissism and psychosis. Childhood deprivation may create an experience of a 
psychotic level of terror. As a therapist she looked to provide an experience of 
positive unconditional regard and thoughtful enquiry that would allow the patient to 
address their internal critics, track their aggression and develop a more creative and 
less destructive relationship to themselves and others. Supporting the development of 
more affirming sides of the personality might be said to characterise the task in her 
narrative. 
Jo's narrative focused on our need as individuals for experiences of being well related 
to so that we can in turn relate well to ourselves and others. So as a therapist she 
looked to provide a quality of relating. A realistic sense is needed that life will not be 
perfect but can be `good enough' so that we do not unnecessarily fail what is on offer. 
Staying open to the potential in living is perhaps characteristic of this narrative. 
Paul's narrative focused on the way we develop and perpetuate patterns of relating 
that work restrictively for us. Therapy then is offered in his approach to promote a 
change in the pattern, a new ending to a familiar story line. This involves the therapist 
remaining creative under intense pressure to enact the familiar story line. What goes 
on in the therapy is in the service of change outside of the therapy. 
Peter's narrative focused on the need for a pluralistic acceptance of ourselves and of 
our experiences and the `mutilating' consequences of disowning parts of ourselves. As 
a therapist he aimed to offer an empathic presence, with a realistic level of ambition 
and with an openness to the unknown in the therapy. Fostering wholeness in the face 
of splits might be said to characterise his narrative. 
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Mesa's narrative was focused around her sense of our need as individuals to be seen, 
recognised and engaged with so that a sense of our own personal agency and 
authenticity develops and we become capable of being our own advocate. To facilitate 
this she offered, in her role as therapist, a reflective space which the patient could 
learn to. use and so move away from more reactive and impulsive responses that 
lacked agency. Inner disturbance needed to be facilitated to become outer disturbance 
if it was tobe treated. 
1.4 The. therapist employed their professional knowledge in the context of a 
relationship. 
This theme was explicit in some of the interviews and implicit in them all: 
And I suppose there is an essence of psychotherapy..... its about 
relationship and its about the quality of relationship - it is about the quality 
of your relating and crossing the bridge to the other person (Jo). 
I think it is something probably to do with contact, being able to make, to 
do deep and sustained contact with someone..... the job, the nature of the 
contract if you will, is that I provide the time and the room and I provide 
my mind and I try to use those and let the patient use those as freely as 
possible (Mike). 
I think it is about the process..... of being with another...... about being 
recognised, somebody struggling with you...... staying with you..... it's 
about recognition. And I don't think it's about clever interpretations, it's 
just about for me the process of being with somebody (Maria). 
Such an experience of being attuned with was seen by Maria as providing an 
experience that could be internalised by the patient in terms of the quality of their 
relationship to themselves. As a result they could become more `self-attuned' and be 
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more their own "advocate", have more of a sense "they can exist" and "have a right to 
be there". Peter talked of aiming to be the kind of therapist with whom he imagined 
he himself would be more comfortable sharing shameful aspects of himself. 
It was a quality of relationship within a context that was being talked about. Therapy 
was offered within the NHS and followed an assessment for suitability. Martin 
explicitly pointed to the way that he actively assessed at the beginning of contact 
whether there was enough "common ground" for the therapy relationship to develop, 
whether there was a sufficiently "similar mind" and "shared understanding". 
However, there was agreement that, while the relationship was the foundation of the 
therapy, more was involved. It was a matter of relationship plus. This plus was 
thought of as being about new experience or insight or a combination of these. 
However the establishment of an alliance was seen as essential to other components 
being usable. Mary commented: 
I don't think the relationship is sufficient but it is crucial and I really do 
believe that it is through the relationship, through the transference and 
counter-transference - that is how therapy works. 
1.5 Therapies gave rise to 'enacted narratives' that could be deeply disturbing. 
Phillips (1999) described life as an "enacted narrative" and Holmes (1996: 104) 
suggested that it was as if there was "a compulsion to find an object with whom the 
drama of attachment - however painful - may be re-enacted". Such ideas fitted well 
the descriptions of the therapies given to me by the therapists. 
The therapists actively looked for this re-enactment in which they felt the quality of 
the relationship was tried and tested. Each gave a central place to a view of therapy as 
`enactment' and attempted to make sense of the enacted journey on which the patient 
was taking them. Therapists described how they experienced the more disturbed 
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patients (in the therapist's view) as more vividly enacting their disturbance within the 
therapy encounter. The patients viewed as less disturbed were experienced as 
far less 
testing to be with in therapy. The patients viewed as more disturbed were much more 
the focus of the interviews and as such these findings relate to the sharper edge of 
practice. 
I think what I was subjected to with the [first] patient was some of the 
awl ess. of their inner world and through projective identification I think 
I was very much gripped in the awfulness of their inner world (Mike). 
So I suppose it's staying in touch with the feelings a patient brings up in 
me and how I feel, taking it to supervision and reading sometimes and 
recognising that that is a desperate activity to manage a counter- 
transference feeling (Jo). 
I felt that she need me...... to experience that painful position that she had 
been in (in her childhood) and go on living and basically go on surviving 
it and trying to come back in as reasonably positive, constructive 
unattacking way as I could muster... (Paul). 
Some bruising encounters were described. Mary referred to the patient's presentation 
as like a "barrage" while Jo talked of "heavy duty". psychotherapy. Amanda described 
her reaction to viewing the patient's brutal self-harm. Paul talked of "a very taxing 
process", "almost unbearable". Martin described a situation where the exploration 
overwhelmed the patient's defences leading to a breakdown. There was no capacity in 
the patient, he felt, for any critical distance from what was happening. Peter described 
an enactment with a paranoid quality that emerged from a profound lack of basic trust 
in people. 
The enactments, described by informants, were seen by them as involving a playing 
out in the therapy by the patient of important aspects of their internal world with the 
therapy structured to facilitate this. A hazard was seen as lying in the patient's cueing 
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of the therapist to join a re-enactment with a familiar outcome. The tasks of the 
therapist in response were variously described by informants as non-retaliation (Paul), 
endurance (Mike), staying with (Maria), a change of containment (Martin), staying 
alive (Jo), and providing holding and containment and offering empathy with the 
struggle along with a stance of no blame (Mike). Such enactment led to experiential 
knowledge (Maria) and new experience (Paul). This emerged from a mix-up at an 
unconscious level (Mike) and led to selves being `created together' (Paul). Amanda 
talked of the need to tolerate aggression, withstand superiority, resist provocation to 
anger and withstand near psychotic levels of anxiety. 
Paul talked of the need for the therapist to be able to take things personally and not 
personally at the same time. He voiced his maxim that the therapist must survive for 
the patient's sake and their own and so there might be a need on occasions to tell the 
patient to `cool it'. He was also the one informant who described openly querying in 
his own mind whether he and the patient might have formed a `toxic combination' 
such that another therapist was required. He talked of the need to enlist the non- 
neurotic part of the patient and of the danger and inevitability of being knocked out of 
position. Mary talked of the need for speaking reality to the patient, confronting and 
not being over-cautious in so doing. Maria countered impulsiveness and lack of 
agency with the provision of reflective space. Martin emphasised how the patients did 
not need, in the drama of therapy, another experience of failure. 
1.6 Limitations had to be faced. 
The therapists described the need for both patient and therapist to face limits. The 
sense that life imposed limits was described in various ways : 
it's possible to recognise one's limitations and to live to the best of your 
ability and capacity and achieve the most fulfilment possible within your 
own personal bounds and limitations. It's as good as it gets (Jo). 
277 
Well that pain and disappointment are part of life..... you have to accept 
the fawadness of the world and the people in it and not be so totally 
d sillusioned by it that you can't experience also the joy and pleasure, the 
love in the world (Martin). 
You can't be selective about your inner experience (Peter). 
... living as good a 
life as you can but being realistic about that, that 
everybody has often contrary and often devious parts of themselves which 
causes them to do all sorts of things...... (Paul). 
Several therapists described what they saw as the limits to change in some patients: 
There are some who breakdown or symptomatically become much worse 
(Martin). 
.. illness has woven it's way into their personality.... so bedded into social 
and interpersonal structure that their room for manoeuvre, for change, is 
limited ........ change isn't always possible, it really isn't (Martin). 
I think it is a matter of managing one's mental state rather than 
transforming it. I am not saying it could not be transformed in other cases, 
there are changes but there is something about very entrenched mental 
structures that I don't see the need to be anxious about in terms of wanting 
to change (Peter). 
How do we evaluate the outcome of therapy? My overall sense is that I 
might have a few therapies end, its not been a brilliant ending or whatever 
but generally patients seem to find something useful.... you know when 
they start to tell you how they are dealing with their relationships 
differently.. or they are doing things they did not do before, could not do 
before-the stories they tell change (Maria). 
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It's something about making connection with yourself, learning to love the 
person you are with the background you have and accepting the 
limitations there are. There are some things that change, others things that 
don't change .... 
it's not perfect and for some people it's as good as it 
gets ... as long as it's liveable with ...... I guess it's about helping the person 
live with themselves and live with more of themselves (Jo). 
The limits of understanding were repeatedly commented on. Professional knowledge 
was seen as only taking a therapist so far. Such knowledge was both affirmed and 
subverted by the therapists: 
Good ideas always get taken to the point at which they no longer are good 
ideas. Everything is pushed to the limit where it fails. Perhaps it has to do 
that. So biological understanding of the mind's processes becomes 
patently absurd at some point. But so does the psychoanalytic work 
(Martin). 
Our theories are what in a sense sustain us while something is happening 
that we don't understand which is why theory is really important. . [certain 
concepts] are a useful short-hand for thinking about some of the way he 
presents. For me it's a bit like a nail or a screw. I make use of it. They are 
useful things and they do the job.... I'd say that theories are useful but not 
necessarily true (Peter). 
What I want to convey to a patient at the outset is the tentative 
understanding, expressed with a reasonable degree of conviction "look I 
think this is what is happening" but either implicit or explicit is "but I may 
have got this wrong"... and I am looking for that as well (Martin). 
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I have learnt that there is not always a correct way. I think I have learnt 
t iat: is so much we don't know... and it's the sort of classic thing that 
the o. 'you get the more you realise what you don't know (Mary). 
I don't know if I ever do know for sure (Maria). 
I think it would be more a strong working hypothesis along with all the 
caveats that this is me functioning at this time in this society with all the 
sort of cultural influences - so I don't imagine if I were a therapist twenty 
y ms from now I would be working in the same way (Mary). 
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Core Findings 
The core findings of this thesis are that, rather than relying on professional knowledge 
conceived as conventional theory, the therapists engaged in a process I have termed 
`clinical reasoning'. This involved a process of tacking principally between their 
professional knowledge base, their experience with the patient and their personal 
beliefs and experience. In their clinical reasoning they drew on `situated' knowledge 
which was held in mind and organised in the form of narratives. Such a process, I 
argue, constituted a `hazardous journey' in a postmodern climate in which the value of 
a psychodynamic perspective could not be taken for granted. My core findings 
emerged as I completed the remaining interviews and engaged with a further literature 
search. 
2.1 The use of professional knowledge in practice involved a process of `clinical 
reasoning' in the therapist. 
At this point I felt strongly the limitations of my working definition of professional 
knowledge as theories of psychological functioning, theories about the process of 
being therapeutic for people, and underlying theories about living the `good life' 
psychologically. It did not do justice to the processes I was fording in the interviews to 
be involved in the use of professional knowledge in practice. 
So the central finding of this thesis is that the therapists were involved in a process 
best described as `clinical reasoning'. This concept offered a far richer conception of 
the use of professional knowledge in practice. The accounts given of the therapies in 
the interviews showed me that far more was involved than could be summarised as the 
application of theory to practice. A significant part of the interview I felt involved the 
therapist in making explicit what was a largely intuitive process of `reflection-in- 
action' in which they drew substantially on their previous clinical experience as much 
or more than on theory per se. Their clinical reasoning involved the therapists in an 
interplay between not just their professional knowledge but also their personal 
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experience of life and their experience of the patient. I have given examples of this 
in 
my initial findings. 
I had found the phrase `clinical reasoning' in two textbooks of practice (Mattingly and 
Fleming,, 1994; Dutton, 1995) for occupational therapy students where it was used to 
conceptualise the process of occupational therapy in practice. There `clinical 
reasoning' was seen as having three characteristics. It was a goal-orientated activity 
aimed at enabling the patient to achieve their best possible functioning. It was a form 
of reasoning that involved applying general theory to the particular patient which 
required `situational thinking'. It was a cognitive process of problem-solving 
(Dutton, 1995: 3). 
I reformulated this concept and reshaped it to apply it to the use by the psychodynamic 
psychotherapist of their professional knowledge in practice. I found within the 
interviews and within the literature support for such a deeper conception of 
professional knowledge, one that filled out the content of this concept. 
Within the literature Schon (1983) challenged the view that real knowledge should be 
seen as residing in theory and technique, which are then applied to specific problems, 
as this did not do justice to the reality of practice. There was, he argued, a gap 
between professional knowledge and the demands of practice in the real world. 
Polkinghome (1992: 14) suggested that while theory was useful in constructing 
cognitive order, it could not capture human complexity sufficiently and in this sense it 
was always at the level of inadequacy in itself. In practice there was an 
"unprecedented requirement for adaptability". Professional practice was characterised 
by "complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value conflicts". He argued 
that practice was divergent and required divergent thinking skills in that the 
knowledge base had to be adapted to the unique situation. Problem solving approaches 
missed the point that professional practice required problem setting in terms of 
finding the right problem, naming and framing it. 
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Mattingly and Fleming (1994) used the concept `clinical reasoning' to capture more 
of a sense of a moment-to-moment process in the practice of Occupational Therapy. 
They were describing a process of `reflection-in-action'. In my understanding of the 
concept I have combined these various more clinically active perspectives to conceive 
of the therapist's clinical reasoning as their attempt to stay in creative and exploratory 
therapeutic contact with a particular individual in a particular context and time. Such a 
perspective was filled out further by other writers who argued that such clinical 
reasoning might often be known only tacitly and that it emerged from practice. 
Often 'tacit' 
While such theorising might become explicit much of it was often `tacit' knowledge, 
which was absorbed in less formal and conscious ways. Polanyi (1966) distinguished 
between `distal' and `proximal' knowledge. The former was that knowledge which 
could be expressed and so was reasonably accessible. The latter was less easy to 
identify, to find words for and be clear about but it was more significant and 
influential for practice. He captured the tacit nature of most professional knowledge 
with his comment, "we know more than we can tell. " Given the complexity of 
practice it is perhaps inevitable that much remains tacit. 
Emerging from practice 
Mattingly and Fleming (1994) argued that what was most useful to the therapist in 
informing their clinical reasoning tended to emerge from practice and was based on 
experience out of which meaning had been made. Similarly Argyris and Schon (1981) 
distinguished `espoused theories', which were those more likely to be written about in 
books, and `theories-in-use' which were practical theories that formed a guide for 
practice and supplemented espoused theories at the points where they were 
experienced as lacking. Such theories-in-use might in time become espoused theories. 
In order to be useful to the therapist in their reflection, ideas needed what Gendlin 
(1962) referred to as a `felt sense' of a `fit' before they would be used, as when a 
metaphor or symbol `works' and so unlocks a sense of meaning or new meaning. 
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Fonagy and Target (2003) argued that theory tended to focus more on the elaboration 
of psychological models such that, of Freud's twenty three volumes of his collected 
work, only part of one volume was specifically about technique. Practice, they argued, , 
was not rooted in a theory-based certainty. Rather it was rooted in "cumulative clinical 
experience" such that "what we are theorising may be at most a useful adjunct to 
clinical practice - but not its justification" (p291). Clinical practice had developed on 
the basis of trial and error, based on inferences drawn from previous practice. Quite 
different techniques could apparently emerge from the same theory and quite different 
theories could appear to be behind the same technique. 
2.2 The therapist's clinical reasoning was organised and held in mind in narrative 
form. 
My initial findings had shown to me that, in their use of their professional knowledge 
in practice, the therapists I interviewed employed narratives. Further analysis led on to 
my second core finding that the therapist's clinical reasoning was organised and held 
in narrative form in their mind. As I have shown in the initial findings the therapist's 
accounts revealed the intrinsically `storied' nature of their clinical reasoning. The 
narratives acted as frames for organising their thinking and included narratives about 
living the good life psychologically, about how psychological problems developed, 
and about how treatment was best provided and understood. I returned to the literature 
to explore this further. 
Mitchell (1993) argued that in a postmodern climate professional knowledge could 
not simply be said to `correspond' with `reality' as if it provided an x-ray into the 
mind of patients. On the contrary Christopher (1996) argued that the therapist had to 
recognise the inevitability of fact and value being intertwined. Such a climate McLeod 
(1997) and others felt had fostered an enormous growth in interest in the idea of 
narrative as: 
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"we are bom into a narrative world, live our lives through narrative and 
afterwards are described in terms of narrative" (Murray, 2003: 11 1). 
"the story represents the basic means by which people organise and 
communicate the meaning of events and experiences" (McLeod, 1997: x). 
So McLeod (1997) argued that we construct ourselves through narratives but are also 
lived through narratives as we are part of wider social narratives. Ricouer (1987: 437) 
commented that "we may learn to become the narrator of our own story without 
becoming the author of our life". Our personal narratives give us a sense of our 
location within time and our individuality. Ricoeur (1984) suggested we needed 
narratives because of the temporal nature of the world. They brought a sense of order 
to chaos by helping us define a `plot' to our lives. 
For Kvale (1992) the multiplicity of stories in our culture pointed to a loss of faith in 
single grand narratives as well as the extent of cultural diversity. Our narratives and 
the stories that comprised them were seen as emerging within a context such that they 
were context-dependent in keeping with the Talmud saying, "we see things not as 
they are but as we are" (quoted in Phillips, 1999). The challenge provided by the 
concept of narrative was to open up an understanding of how stories help us construct 
and constrict a sense of reality. Booth (1991: 78) captured this in his description of the 
novelist's focus: 
The novelist who chooses to tell this story can not tell at the same time 
that story; in centring our interest, sympathy and affection on one 
character, he inevitably excludes from our interest, sympathy and affection 
some other character. Art imitates life in this respect as in so many others. 
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MeLeod (1998) charted the development of the use of the concept of narrative by 
therapists. . 
Sarbin. (1986) described the difference between the machine metaphor which he 
saw being employed in psychology and the narrative metaphor. 
Bruner (1986) described two different ways of knowing which he called 
paradigmatic and narrative ways of knowing. Paradigmatic knowing refers to what 
we think of as scientific knowledge that deals in generalities and abstract 
propositions. Narrative knowing refers to the way we talk about our experiences, in 
the particular, from the inside. The distinction is also thought about by Hobson 
(1985) as the difference between `knowing about' and `knowing', or, in Buber's 
terms (1937), between an 'I-It' and an `I-thou' relationship to knowledge. 
° Gergen and Gergen (in Sarbin, 1986) outlined what they saw as the social 
construction of personal narratives. Social narratives are instrumental in defining 
both the culture and the experience of individual identity. 
By way of definition McLeod (2001: 104) argued that a story could be "tentatively 
defined as an account of a concrete, specific event, with a beginning, middle and end, 
active protagonist and some kind of dramatic climax. " He further defined a narrative 
as an "organised interpretation of a sequence of events" which attributed agency to the 
characters and pointed to causal links. A narrative implied a narrator who brought to a 
story comments that provide evaluation of the story for the reader. Taylor (1989) 
referred to weak and strong evaluations which were statements within the narrative by 
which the narrator conveyed the relative importance of different aspects of the story. 
The terms `narrative' and `story' tend to be used interchangeably in the literature. I 
have not found that problematic and have also used them interchangeably. 
Narratives were thought of as having one of three structures (Gergen and Gergen in 
Sarbin, 1986). A narrative with a progressive structure conveyed a sense of a struggle 
that had led to success. A narrative with a regressive structure conveyed the sense that 
a struggle had led to someone becoming overwhelmed. A narrative with a stable 
structure conveyed a sense of a struggle that had resulted in little change one way or 
another. Narratives could be thought of as a combination of these. 
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McLeod (1997) suggested that story telling used to have an important role within 
western culture as a way by which people aligned themselves with their society. In 
modern western culture such a social role had reduced. However therapy was one 
setting for individual story telling with a focus now more on the individual's story. He 
described three approaches to stories within the therapies : 
°a therapist can look beyond or behind the story to what he/she views as a deeper 
and more foundational level of reality and such therapy would be "narrative 
informed". 
°a therapist can work with the individual's actual story, keeping it as the focus of 
attention. 
°a therapist can attend more to the cultural, collective stories that lie behind the 
individual story. 
Psychodynamic Psychotherapists, McLeod (1997) argued, practice in a way that is 
narrative informed whereby they have looked beyond or behind the story for a deeper 
level of reality. 
Phillips (1999) applied the concept of narrative and story to Freud's work with 
patients. While `narrative' is not a term Freud used, Phillips argued it was very 
relevant to Freud's project. Given the centrality of this concept to my research I have 
quoted Phillips (1999: 28) more fully: 
While Freud did not use the terminology of narrative, his entire enterprise 
was built upon the introduction of the unconscious to fill in the gaps of the 
patient's conscious narrative; i. e. the patient would attempt to tell their 
history, the story of his or her life. But the story would be filled with 
breaks, incoherencies, missing links, all of which Freud came to attribute 
to defensive processes that kept the missing portions out of consciousness. 
These breaks in the attempted story were usually marked by the eruption 
of symptomatic behaviour (e. g. the patient presents a story as a happily 
married man and then reports his incomprehensible and self-destructive 
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visits to prostitutes). Freud treated these symptoms as a break in coherence 
of the patient's consciously enacted life narrative and he argued that 
coherence could be restored through the insertion of unconscious content 
into the broken narrative. 
Ilm patient came in with a story that did not make sense in significant 
ways, and the consequence of psychoanalytic treatment would be the 
restoration of sense. In this original formulation, therefore, the 
unconscious did not represent a limit to the life narrative; in fact, it 
represented the opposite, a fulfilment of narrative. 
Phillips (1999) then divided what he saw as the Freudian narrative into three parts: 
°a psychodynamic narrative which comprised of the patient's telling of their story 
which evolved as the therapy proceeded and a psychodynamic perspective was 
absorbed. 
°a developmental narrative which comprised Freud's account of how the patient's 
difficulties had come about. 
°a treatment narrative which involved the patient in free association, giving rise to 
transference and defences and the interpretation of conflict and needing a period of 
`working through'. 
Phillips (1999) argued that, for Freud, these three formed a `unitary narrative' as he 
gave the Oedipus conflict pride of place in psychological life. Phillips described this 
as a "one-size-fits-all" approach. The patient's psychodynamic narrative would 
display how oedipal issues were being addressed or repressed. The therapist's 
developmental narrative would describe when oedipal issues arose. The therapist's 
treatment narrative would involve the patient re-living in the transference his or her 
oedipal difficulties. Such a unitary narrative, Phillips felt, was too constricting for a 
time in which we live with theoretical and clinical pluralism. This I found to be 
reflected in the way that narratives had the potential to be quite diverse even within 
the psychodynamic approach. 
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McLeod (1997: 23) commented that "each therapist has a story to tell about how life 
should be lived, and can not help but convey this story to clients. " Phillips (1999: 35) 
believed this required of therapists a capacity to choose and defend their narrative 
choices: 
Since any person's life can be seen from many perspectives, and since the 
life story can be told in many ways, one must choose one's narrative 
approach and be prepared to defend it. 
Phillips (1997: 2) posed a question central to my study : 
To walk into a psychoanalyst's consulting room, like being born into a 
family, is to walk into a very elaborate family of stories about who one is 
supposed to be. But if analysts can help patients discern the family stories 
they have inherited, who can help the patients, and the analysts, with the 
analysts' stories ? 
I found that the concept of narrative had been used to date in limited ways within 
psychodynamic psychotherapy which remained a lightly narrative-informed approach. 
Only two examples of its use stood out in the literature. 
° Luborsky et al (1994) and Strupp and Binder (1984) and others had explored the 
patient's stories in therapy for evidence of core storylines that illustrated `core 
conflictual relationship themes'. 
° Therapists employing an attachment perspective had pointed to a demonstrable link 
between the quality of childhood attachments and later adult narrative style. 
Securely attached infants, it was said (Holmes, 2001), told coherent and engaged 
stories as adults. Narrative style provided then a clue to the nature of childhood 
attachments. 
However there were ways in which some writers felt that psychodynamic 
Psychotherapy could be more readily thought about in narrative terms. Mattingly 
(1991) suggested the therapist initially constructs a prospective treatment story. The 
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raw data for this, particular to the patient, was drawn from referral letters and initial 
contact. At that point the therapy itself was an as-yet-unwritten story. The patient and 
therapist became involved in story making which required a `doing-with' each other, 
a co-scripting. Ricoeur (1984) referred to this as `emplotment'. Telling stories was a 
retrospective activity while story-making was a prospective activity. A sufficient sense 
of `sharing the same story' was needed for therapy to progress. 
When the prospective treatment story met the `reality' of the interaction it would then 
be modified, revised, rewritten and adapted (Mattingly, 1991). The therapist was an 
"assistant biographer" (Holmes, 2001) who worked to help the patient develop a 
coherent biography in which they could distinguish their own experience from that of 
others, tell the story of their feelings and have a capacity to break up and reform their 
stories, to construct and deconstruct their narratives when new experience required it. 
Where such shared progress was not possible a painful sense of a loss of story, or 
`falling out of story" took place which might or might not become part of a newer 
more encompassing story (Mattingly and Fleming, 1994). In this way of thinking, 
stories developed (or fell apart) through shared experience. The story had a future 
focus in that it involved a vision of what might be achievable, in keeping with what 
was seen as living the `good life' psychologically. 
When experience had been traumatic the patient might have narratives that remained 
"in the raw", in search of a voice (Holmes, 2001). The therapist then was like a 
witness who looked on the unbearable with the patient who feared that in any attempt 
to tell the story they would become stuck in the story. However, Holmes (2001) 
suggested that the experience of engagement with the therapist could allow the patient 
to engage with their story and develop some critical distance from it in the way that 
was being modelled by the therapist. 
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2.3 In their clinical reasoning the therapists drew on 'situated' knowledge and 
understanding. 
In my initial findings I had come to see that the therapist's professional knowledge 
was the product of both personal and professional experiences. There was sense in 
which theory was biography. However I felt on further reflection that I had 
understated and underplayed the importance and significance of this finding. The 
clinical reasoning of these eight therapists had emerged from a context and was being 
held within a context and the implications for practice of this `reality' needed further 
attention. This was most in evidence in the sections I entitled `attachment to 
professional knowledge'. I found two particular contributions from Mitchell and 
Haraway in the literature opened out this area for me. 
Mitchell (1988: 276) as a practising therapist described what he saw as the context in 
which a sense of self develops. I have included it here as quite a long quote as it 
became central to my thinking. 
One cannot become a human being in the abstract; one does so only by 
adopting a highly specific, delimiting shape, and that shape is forged in 
the interaction between the temperamental givens of the baby and the 
contours of parental character and fantasies..... the prolonged condition of 
childhood dependency makes the discovery and forging of reliable points 
of connection not just an emotional necessity but an apparent condition for 
physical survival.... 
..... I become the person I am in interaction with specific others. The way I 
feel it necessary to be with them is the person I take myself to be. That 
self-organisation becomes my "nature"; those attachments become my 
sense of the possibilities within the community of others; those 
transactional patterns become the basis for my sense of interpersonal 
security and competence to function in the world. 
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Adhesive devotion to the relational matrix reflects a deep terror of total 
loss of self and connection with others, as well as deep loyalty and 
devotion to the interpersonal world which, no matter how skewed, 
allowed one to become one's own particular version of human. 
Haraway, (1988) coming from the perspective of epistemology had deep criticisms to 
make of the kind of objectivity that implied a view from above, a "conquering gaze 
from nowhere", a transcendence in perspective. She described such knowledge claims 
as "unlocatable" and "irresponsible" in the sense that no one takes responsibility or is 
accountable for them. She was equally critical of relativism which she described as "a 
wayof being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally. The "equality" of 
positioning is a denial of responsibility and critical enquiry" (1988: 584). 
Such objectivity and relativity, she argued, were "perfect mirror twins" of each other 
and missed the point : 
[Both are] "god tricks" promising vision from everywhere and nowhere 
equally and fully, common myths in rhetorics surrounding Science 
(Haraway, 1988: 584). 
The only way to find a larger vision is to be somewhere in particular 
(Haraway: 1988: 590). 
She identified a task of `seeing from below' and argued for an "embodied objectivity", 
for "partial locatable critical knowledges", for an "epistemology and politics of 
engaged, accountable positioning" and a rationality that "does not pretend to 
disengagement". 
Haraway (1988: 583) redefined objectivity as: 
a particular and specific embodiment and definitely not about the false 
vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility. The moral 
292 
is simple : only partial perspective promises objective vision. All Western 
cultural narratives about objectivity are allegories of the ideologies 
governing the relations of what we call mind and body, distance and 
responsibility. Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated 
knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object. It 
allows us to become answerable for what we learn how to see. 
She further looked to remove the individuality from traditional views by seeing 
situated knowledges as "about communities, not about isolated individuals. " 
The combination of these two perspectives from Mitchell and Haraway further 
informed my finding that the clinical reasoning of the therapists I interviewed was 
drawing on `situated knowledge' held and developed within a community. Mitchell 
(1988) had written about the process of becoming one's own particular version of 
being human. Haraway (1988) had argued that to have a larger vision one had to be 
somewhere in particular. So the clinical reasoning of the therapist could not be 
separated from the therapist who employed it and needed a community to foster it. 
Ins eparable fr' om the therapist 
McLeod (1998) argued that the clinical reasoning of the therapist could not be 
separated from the person who employed it and operated on intuitive-subjective lines 
as much as on scientific-objective lines. Bergin and Garfield (1994: 499) suggested 
that "the ability to forge a positive working alliance, make accurate interpretations, 
act in a plan-compatible fashion involves skills that reside in individuals, not in a 
body of theory". Mattingly and Fleming (1994: 11) quoted Aristotle (1985: 51) that 
"... getting angry, or giving and spending money, is easy and anyone can do it; but 
doing it to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and 
in the right way is no longer easy, nor can everyone do it. Hence [doing these things] 
well is rare, praiseworthy, and fine. " 
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Fostered within a community 
Just as the clinical reasoning of the therapist could not be separated from the therapist 
who empioys it, so too it could not be separated from a language community (of 
therapists) in which it has been held, developed and maintained. This community 
contained as "oral tradition" which could not be subsumed within a textbook but was, 
in the words of McLeod (1998: 199): 
A richer, more comprehensive, more open-textured version of what is 
, known and believed... Books and articles convey a version of this 
approach, rather than the approach in its entirety.... [Theorising is better 
seen as) an active, subtle, personal and interpersonal process... embedded 
in, social life, and the written word inevitably abstracts ideas and concepts 
from their actual usage. 
Such theorising was often communicated in story form between colleagues, perhaps 
over a cup of coffee in the kitchen, and it might become part of the shared, collective 
experience of the group and/or become part of espoused theory. Rustin (1991) wrote 
of the method by which psychotherapy was taught as being like a "craft 
apprenticeship" in the sense that understanding was fostered in supervisory and 
therapy relationships in which the detail of sessions and the therapist's own life 
respectively were gone into in depth. 
The therapists I interviewed articulated their sense of their `situatedness' in that they 
were aware that they were offering their version of being a therapist. There was less 
comment on their roots within a particular therapist culture in which particular 
narratives were favoured and fostered while others were not. I was reminded of 
Booth's comment (Booth, 1991: 78) that the writer cannot tell all stories but has to 
focus. I was also reminded of Mitchell's comment (Mitchell, 1988: 276) that we 
become human beings, not in the abstract, but by adopting a specific shape forged in 
interactions with specific others through which we develop our own particular version 
of being human. This, I felt, applied also to the experience of becoming and being a 
therapist. 
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This finding seemed both self-evident and new to me. After all therapists engage in 
their own therapy precisely to understand better their own `situation'. And yet the idea 
of `situatedness' had not been clear to me as a practising NHS psychotherapist. This 
finding posed for me a question about the particular psychotherapy culture in which 
the therapists had `grown' and the particular culture of therapy they offered to their 
patients, with its strengths and limitations. 
2.4 In their clinical reasoning the therapists were having to negotiate tensions by a 
process of 'dialectical tacking' 
The interview accounts I found to be full of the interplay in the therapists particularly 
between their professional knowledge, their experience of the patient, and their 
personal experiences and beliefs. I found these tensions could be further divided and 
conceptualised. I observed in the therapist accounts that they were tacking between: 
° viewing themselves as an observer with objective vision and viewing themselves as 
a participant with subjective vision. Another way of conceiving this was in terms 
of the therapist viewing the patient in terms of generalisable `norms' and viewing 
the patient as a `universe of one. 
° `being with, the patient empathically and `doing to' the patient in a way more 
deconstructive of the patient's psychological world. This could also be viewed as a 
tension between the aims of evolution and revolution. 
° being expressive and being restrained towards the patient. 
° supporting culture or fostering counter-culture in the patient and the wider social 
system. 
° adapting the psychodynamic model (with a `soft-edge' to its use) or applying the 
Perceived psychodynamic model (with a hard-edge to its use). 
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Tacking is a word with several meanings that include tying, varying, navigating, 
deviating and changing one's mind. In the context of this thesis it refers to a process 
that involves alternations and variations and movements between polarities. The term 
, dialectic' implies for me opposing forces acting on each other. Ogden (1994: 14) 
described a dialectic as : 
a process in which opposing elements each create, preserve, and negate 
the other; each stands in a dynamic, ever-changing relationship to the 
other. Dialectical movement tends towards integration's that are never 
achieved. Each potential integration creates a new form of opposition 
characterised by its own distinct form of dialectical tension.. . In addition, 
dialectical thinking involves a conception of the interdependence of 
subject and object.. . one cannot 
begin to comprehend either subject or 
object in isolation from one another. 
I have now expanded on these tensions in the interviews and incorporated the results 
of the further literature search that I undertook. 
2.4.1 Therapist's clinical reasoning involved them in a process of 'dialectical tacking' 
between seeing themselves as observers with objective vision and participants with 
subjective vision. 
I found a range of literature that addressed my sense that the situated nature of the 
therapist's clinical reasoning in a postmodern climate had led to a need to tack 
between objective and the subjective perspectives, between reasoning clinically about 
the patient in generally classifiable or normative terms and reasoning clinically about 
the patient as someone who is unique, "a universe of one" (Erikson, 1958). 
Bruner (1986) described what he called `paradigmatic' and `narrative' ways of 
knowing. The former referred to more abstract and scientific forms of knowledge and 
knowing that involved causes, effects and predictions. The latter referred to a form of 
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knowing that was held in personalised story form, specific to the individual rather 
than abstract. Hobson (1985) adapted Buber's concepts (1937) to suggest professional 
knowledge involved the ability to think in both abstract, theoretical terms about the 
patient (I-It) and also in particular personal terms (I-Thou). An interweaving of both, 
he argued, was needed. Likewise Corwen (1995: 28) described a process of `tacking' 
between the general and the particular, which was expressed in: 
... a therapeutic stance that neither eschews specific cultural knowledge or 
behavioural theory out of concern for stereotyping or false `knowing'.... 
nor overlooks idiosyncratic perceptions and interpretations of the culture... 
a full understanding of another's point of view involves a process that 
Geertz (1983: 69) described as a `continuous dialectical tacking' between 
idiosyncratic perceptions and meanings and broad characterisations of 
culture and grief experiences. 
Ogden (1994) argued that too much objectivity constituted a clinical problem as well 
as too much subjectivity. Bion (1975) wrote of the need for a therapist to hold 
together their knowing and not knowing in what he called `binocular vision'. One eye 
focused on what the therapist felt he did know about the patient and the other on what 
was not known. This required the capacity for free floating attention which he called 
`reverie'. Bion was particularly concerned about the danger posed by the therapist 
prematurely concluding they understood the patient. 
Phillips (1995: 8) described the need to "straddle" two projects: 
The contemporary psychoanalyst - who must straddle both projects, 
contain within herself the Enlightenment Freud and the post-Freudian 
Freud, the knowing and the problem of knowing - becomes a new kind of 
expert: an expert on the truths of uncertainty. She has to recognise the 
sense in which each person revises - is inevitably a threat to - the available 
description of what a person is. 
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Fonagy and Target (2003: 291) suggested therapists needed to manage a tension 
between linking theory tightly to technique and so gaining from advances in theory, 
and decoupling theory from practice so that technique can progress on the more 
empirical grounds of what is effective. 
Keats was regularly quoted in the literature for his concept of `negative capability', 
"that is when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without 
any irritable reaching after facts and reasons" (quoted in Casement, 1991). 
In the interviews I perceived that the therapists had and needed a sense of their 
objectivity, a frame of reference that they could take sufficiently for granted. A 
correspondence was implied between their frame and `reality' such that the frame 
could be thought of as having been `found' more than constructed. A strong 
conviction was evident about the `presence' of a deep interior self affected by nature 
and nurture which gained from a sympathetic exploration. Peter talked of this inner 
self as "an absolute truth". 
I observed that a way of structuring their thought, a way of classifying a patient as part 
of a norm or a diagnostic category, was generally a necessary first and ongoing step. 
This corresponded with Buber's notion (1937) of an I-It relationship in which the 
perspective of available cultural discourses provides the basis for understanding. A 
strong level of conviction was apparent in all the interviews (with some variation of 
level). 
Martin voiced the need to assign a descriptive category to the patient' problems in 
order to orientate himself and without which he would feel "all at sea". Jo spoke of 
moments of felt objectivity when head and heart came together. Peter spoke of the 
way theory held him while he encountered what was unknown in the patient. 
The perceived location of this sense of objectivity varied. The therapists did not voice 
a strong sense it was locatable in the patient. Several talked as if it resided in the 
model itself though this was criticised by Paul who suggested objectivity implied an 
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evidence base. There were suggestions it might reside in the space between patient 
and therapist. There were references to the idea that part of the assessment process 
involved trying out the psychodynamic perspective with a patient to see if they were 
willing and able to give it a status of provisional objectivity. The patient could be seen 
then to objectify the approach (and the therapist) as a necessary part of making 
informed consent to treatment. 
The therapists described the need to recognise their subjective involvement, their 
participation, how they were part of what they were observing in keeping with 
Haraway's concept of "situatedness" (Haraway, 1988). There was an awareness of the 
impact of their own unique personality on the process of therapy. Subjectivity was 
strongly located in the patient's perspective. There was less of an articulated sense of 
the subjectivity/relativity of the model itself, its situatedness. The model, as a 
participant, was accorded more objective status. So, the constructed nature of the 
insights arrived at in therapy was acknowledged but with some limitations. 
Subjectivity was felt to involve a `being with' the patient in an I-Thou relationship 
with an awareness of the patient as constituting a "universe of one" rather than the 
patient being made to fit a `norm'. 
Subjective and objective had an `in-out' feel to them. The subject participated and the 
objective person observed. Perhaps it is best to say that the therapists sought to temper 
each perspective with the other, to observe their subjectivity and to subjectify their 
objectivity. In the interviews informants appeared to struggle with the middle ground 
perhaps describable as the wish to be either objectively subjective or subjectively 
objective. 
Objectivity and subjectivity were thought about both as resources and limits and there 
was a strong sense of practice involving tacking between them. The therapists could 
also be said to be tacking between Hamlyn's four epistemological positions (1970) 
and between their pre-existing narratives and emerging new narratives. There was a 
sense for some that the model provided the objectivity leaving the practice free to be 
particular and individual. 
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Maria talked of her knowledge as experiential i. e. it was a participant's knowledge. 
While she stated clearly her convictions she emphasised her uncertainties and how she 
never really knew. Martin looked to make judgements that were tentative but based on 
a reasonable degree of conviction with an implicit acknowledgement he may have got 
it wrong. He also felt all ideas got pushed beyond the reasonable and he was wary of 
dogma. Peter talked of the "esoteric" and "incomprehensible" being nearer the truth of 
things when it came to our knowledge base. 
Mike wanted to avoid premature conclusions. Jo wanted to avoid simply labelling 
disagreement as resistance and talked of having a "sketchy map", and a "sort of 
theory", of being sure but of the danger of foisting a view on a patient. Mary talked of 
formulating strong working hypotheses. Amanda was reluctant to assume the role of 
expert. The developing understanding of the therapist was thought about more in 
terms of patchwork quilting than a neat, objectively based knowledge (Saukko, 2000). 
2.4.2 Therapist' clinical reasoning involved them in a process of `dialectical tacking' 
between 'being with' a patient in a way that supported and contained them and 'doing 
to' a patient in a way that was more deconstructive of their sense of self. 
There was evidence in the interviews of the therapists weighing up their stance with 
their patient and tacking between these two particular stances. 
'Being with' implied an attuned, empathic, non-directive way of being with the patient 
which allowed time for development within a `low-structure' frame to the therapy. It 
involved an emphasis on togetherness, mutuality, sharing and reciprocity. It involved 
a process of working with the patient to hold together a particular version of the 
patient's self. 
'Doing to' implied a stance that was more interventionist, exploratory, directive and 
challenging, It emphasised the aloneness, distinction and autonomy of the patient. It 
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was subversive of the patient's established patterns as it involved a deconstruction of 
their apparent objectivity. 
Managing this tension involved a constant assessment by the therapist of the resources 
and limits of the patient and a judgement of the hazards of conveying either intrusion 
or a lack of presence. This was presented as linked to the patient's psychological 
health on the basis that the psychologically healthier patient could tolerate and make 
use of a greater degree of `doing to', of de-construction of their sense of self. I thought 
this could also be thought about in the interviews as the difference between the aims 
of psychological evolution and psychological revolution in the patient. 
There was literature to support my perception of the therapists tacking in this way. In 
particular there was a paper by Wolff (1971) which addressed what he called the 
developmental and therapeutic functions of psychotherapy. 
The developmental function of psychotherapy, he argued, paid attention to areas of 
arrested development or `knots' in the patients development. The therapist was seen 
as providing a holding function, an empathic `being with', rather as a parent would do 
for a child. It involved the therapist in being empathic, being intuitive, being reliable 
and being sensitive. The focus was less on symptoms and more on the patient's 
development needs and the evolution of their personality. Such empathic work, he 
argued, had to be allowed to follow the patient's developmental timetable. 
Buber's (1937) concept of an `I-Thou' relationship appears to me to reflect a similar 
stance. Roger's (1957) description of the therapeutic relationship as needing to be 
characterised by an attitude of empathy, warmth and unconditional positive regard on 
the part of the therapist also appears to me to reflect this `being with' stance. 
The therapeutic function of psychotherapy Wolff (1971) regarded as more in line with 
the classical medical model with its emphasis on symptom alleviation and results. 
The patient was viewed more as an object to whom the tools of the trade are applied 
in order to `do something' therapeutic. This approach is characterised by action 
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language, for example when the therapist gives an interpretation, challenges a stance, 
explores an issue or addresses a problem. Wolff believed some separateness was 
implied between therapist and patient in this stance and areas of the patient's 
experience are isolated and focused on. Outer behaviour took more of the attention. 
Phillips (1997: 160) suggested the twin risks were that a therapist would be "too happy 
to settle for too limited a version of the patient" or that the therapist would be 
"too 
demanding of the patient to be many people ... a repertoire of possible versions of 
oneself'. So in their clinical reasoning the therapist had to tack in their mind between 
these possibilities. 
These two functions were not in Wolff s view entirely separable and he emphasised 
how correct `doing to' depended on the right kind of `being with' and how `doing to' 
came after `being with'. 
To these functions Holmes (1993) added that of `doing with'. He suggested that 
psychotherapy had moved from Freud's father principle and the patriarchy of the time, 
through to the maternal principle post-second world war and on now to the principle 
of the sibling which he saw as a phase of "therapeutic co-constructionism" whereby 
"therapist and patient collaboratively build up a picture of their world and history". 
This appears to me to be a combination of Wolff's two functions. 
Hobson (1985: 73) offered a parallel tension between aloneness and togetherness in 
therapy which he saw as a process requiring a rhythm of `aloneness-togetherness' 
which was not a static state. Rather "it is continually recreated out of verbal and non- 
verbal conversations between people in a balance of stability and change with a 
rhythm of intimacy and distance". He was describing a hope, an ideal, but not, he 
said, an idealisation. `Doing to' emphasises a patient's aloneness in terms of their 
separateness from the therapist while `being with' emphasises more the experience for 
the patient of intimacy with the therapist. 
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Generally the therapists emphasised how an attitude of `being with' provided an 
essential backdrop and pre-condition to a necessary attitude of `doing to'. The 
therapies described were for the most part longer term work which allowed for 
evolution. However, the exploratory element of psychodynamic psychotherapy 
implied a `doing to' as well as `being with'. So there was a need to be open to more 
than a gradual evolution and therapists varied in this regard in their examples they 
gave. Differences emerged as to whether therapists found a relatively fixed position 
within the continuum or tacked between positions in the context of the particular 
patients they were talking about. 
As regards `being with', Maria talked of `recognising' and `engaging with' the patient 
and providing reflective space, Jo of `attunement' with the patient and how 
developmental change can not be hurried. Mike talked of providing holding and 
containment provided in an unhurried way, and Amanda of providing something akin 
to Roger's notion of unconditional positive regard. Perhaps Amanda's account can be 
thought of as `evolutionary Kleiman' compared to Mary's `revolutionary Kleinian'. 
Images employed in the interviews were generally along integrative lines e. g. connect, 
accept, bear. The implication or faith was that growth would occur with the right 
conditions - though it may be limited. 
As regards `doing to', Mary talked of "confronting", "standing up to", "being very 
blunt", "putting in black and white" and avoiding being "too cautious". Paul stressed 
the importance of the patient taking "significant action" in their lives outside of 
therapy and the dangers of being over-valuing of and over-investing in the therapy 
such that it became a "substitute life". He saw value in limiting the time spent in 
therapy. Martin's account pointed to the dangers of exploratory work when the patient 
lacked the `ego strength' to cope. With his other patient Martin spoke of using six 
sessions to help "launch her", "free her up", "give enough hope. " The risk of `doing 
to' was described by Peter in terms of the patient taking in/introjecting the therapist as 
akin to a foreign occupying force. 
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The idea of 'doing with' perhaps represented an attempt to hold 
both in tension. 
Informants gave a sense that they 'do' reflection with their patients. Paul talked of 
generating "shared images". Maria spoke of making a reflective way of thinking 
available to patients. Amanda spoke of her egalitarian style of co-exploring. 
Mike 
spoke of offering his mind to the patient to think with. 
This is in keeping with the 
notion of reflexive self- functioning as a goal to be prized over insight per se. 
2.4.3 Therapists were involved in a process of `dialectical tacking' between 
expressiveness and restraint towards the patient. 
In the interviews therapists reported experiencing a dilemma as to how restrained or 
expressive to be with the patient. While they gave accounts of some alternation they 
described generally erring well more on the side of restraint. 
I found support for this finding in the literature. Classical psychodynamic theory, 
Mitchell (2000: 216) suggested, was heavy on injunctions to be restrained, neutral, 
abstinent as if following a maxim, "when in doubt, don't..... silence and emotional 
flatness are safe". Mitchell questioned whether this constituted a form of "posturing 
non-involvement" and "hiding". What he saw in the post-classical literature was "an 
emancipatory tone of expressiveness" and a taking account of the engagement of the 
therapist being at a deep emotional level. 
In the same vein Paula Heimann (1989: 317) wrote of the therapist's need, not for 
neutrality, but for "tamed naturalness". Kennedy (1998) saw the tension as being 
between the therapist as coming over to the patient as being too friendly or too 
unempathic. Coltart (1986: 142) wrote of the need for "intuitive, unlaboured 
spontaneity" and of the strain of restraint and the loneliness of the consulting room. 
Ogden (1989: 127) wrote of therapy as "intimacy in the context of formality" and 
suggested "we have yet to work out a way of fully taking into consideration both 
expressiveness and restraint in theorising about clinical technique". 
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Mitchell (2000: 146) suggested disciplined self-reflection is a pre-requisite of 
spontaneity: 
Both restraint and spontaneity can be either thoughtful or thoughtless. It is 
a central feature of the analyst's craft to struggle with these distinctions, to 
make what seems to be the best choices at the time, and continually to 
reconsider past judgements and their sequelae, in order to expand and 
enrich the context in which current choices are made. 
He distinguished the restraint needed by the therapist from that of the patient. The 
patient is encouraged to be expressive, to allow buried emotions to be heard, in a 
sense, he says, to be irresponsible with their emotions - an analytically constructive 
irresponsibility. Conversely the therapist is responsible for keeping the experience 
analytic. The patient is able to let out feelings not, he suggested, because of the 
therapist's anonymity as in the classical model of therapy, but rather because of the 
therapist's disciplined engagement. 
Therapist can be passionately feeling and also remain analytic because, Mitchell 
(2000: 29) argued, feelings are context-dependent. We shape our feelings such that 
what we feel depends to some extent on what we want to feel. So "we all construct 
contexts and cultivate relationships in which certain kinds of loves and hates can 
develop and others are foreclosed". Shafer (1976) suggested similarly that emotions 
are actions. 
Restraint was a hall mark of the accounts therapists gave to me in the interviews. 
Therapists sought to give space to the patient, to be less directive and allow the focus 
of attention to be on the patient with as little intrusion as possible. However, this was 
not conveyed as being a blank screen. Rather they saw themselves as quite 
passionately involved with patients but having to hold on to an immense amount of 
their passionate feelings. 
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Mike spoke of the need to hold on to the agony of the patient, Mary talked of a 
patient's dishonesty as "a blow in the stomach", addressed but not retaliated 
for. 
Peter's `rehab therapy' was long-standing with limited gains and Paul talked of 
tolerating much goading and denigration. Amanda had to witness the effects of severe 
assault by the patient on her own body. Jo referred to the need to throw open the 
windows after a particularly deadening sessions to enliven herself again. She also 
comments on her over-restraint when a flower pot was thrown at her by a patient after 
which she failed to react. Jo described refraining from physical contact with patients. 
Amanda described how she would look to meet aggression with a thoughtful 
response. 
Expressiveness was also in evidence. Mary could be quite direct as could her 
supervisor. Jo would speak firmly when `head and heart' came together. Paul 
described retaliation towards his patient as an expressiveness he was unable to 
monitor and check in time. Maria challenged a patient with "you're doing it to 
yourself'. Paul described a need on occasions to tell a patient to "cool it" when their 
expressiveness was threatening the therapy. 
The hazard might be expressed as the danger of intrusion by expressiveness over 
against the danger of a felt lack of therapist presence if they were too restrained. 
Restraint was something informants practised and actively fostered in themselves. 
2.4.4 Therapists were involved in a process of 'dialectical tacking' between 
supporting culture and promoting counter-culture. 
In the interviews the therapists described a tension that I have conceptualised as 
between supporting culture and promoting counter-culture. This tension overlaps with 
the previous section concerning `being with' and doing to' but also goes beyond it in 
ways that I describe. 
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I am using the term culture in two ways. Firstly, it applies to the internal world of the 
patients as described in the interviews. The therapists described working to gain a 
`feel' for the culture within the mind of their patient. Secondly' it applies to the 
contexts in which the therapists were practising about which they had important things 
to say. 
With regard to their patients the therapists reported having to weigh up in their own 
minds and with the patient what constituted appropriate therapeutic ambitions at each 
point in the therapy, tacking between the ambition of radical change in the creation of 
a counter-culture within the patient and the ambition of promoting an acceptance of 
aspects of the inner culture. 
I found support for this in the literature from the point of view of changes within the 
culture of therapist ambitions. Sandler and Drehr (1996) set out how wide the 
variations in therapeutic ambitions have been over the years. Holmes (1998) argued 
that there had now been a movement away from the therapeutic aim of radical change 
in the personality of the patient to an aim of promoting a shift in the patient's psychic 
equilibrium. The creation of the capacity for a self-reflective internal culture in the 
patient was valued. This was seen as more important than the achievement of insight 
in its own terms, Holmes argued. 
Storr (1979) suggested that neurosis was a matter not of having a psychopathology but 
of being overwhelmed by it and not being able to make effective use of it. Progress is 
found in not feeling at the mercy of one's pathology but being able to make creative 
use of it. 
Alexander (1954) argued for therapy as a `corrective emotional experience' that 
addressed the deficits in a patient's internal culture. This met with the suspicion in the 
wider psychoanalytic community at the time that it would lead to an idealisation of 
therapy. Winnicott (1963b) described the need to `fail' as a substitute parent to the 
patient and for this to be worked through. Malan (1979: 141) wrote that the aim of 
therapy was not to make up for what the patient had not had but "to help them work 
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through their feelings about not having it". And yet I find it hard to argue that 
corrective provision is not part of therapy. 
Holmes (2001) suggested change in the patient involved shifts in the patient's focus 
between culture and counter-culture which he described as being in three stages: 
° The patient develops what can be a painful awareness of how past experiences are 
affecting them in the present. He refers to this as "getting in touch with one's 
ghosts. " 
° The patient attempts to expel or exorcise the `ghosts' which appear to be alien 
inhabitors. This involves feelings of anger to parents and of protest about what was 
endured along with a hope of emerging anew and unscathed by the past. 
° The patient becomes aware of the limits to the ambitions of the second stage. The 
past can not be shed like a skin and our parents were themselves influenced by their 
past. History can not be re-written and the very subjective sense of being `I' is 
based on the reality of what has happened. `I' would not exist if the story were 
different. 
Most informants saw themselves as fostering an internal culture of integration in the 
patient. This involved offering a quality of relationship (Jo), valuing what was often 
despised and belittled in the patient (Peter), showing them kindness (Amanda) and 
effectively destabilising a patient's preferred but problematic position in relationships 
(Paul). Time was given to these processes in contrast to many other therapy 
"packages" (Jo) and the ability to reflect and therefore gain some critical distance was 
prized (Maria). This could be viewed as a radical agenda. Each idea has a contrast 
with someone or an aspect of culture implicit in it. In the broadest of terms informants 
might be understood to imply a contrast with a society that is too impersonal and 
mechanistic, prone to short term `fixes' and offering little space in a hectic world for 
thoughtful reflection. Versions of humanity are evidently in conflict. One source of 
conflict was voiced for example by Maria, as being with a more biologically 
orientated psychiatry. 
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A subversive attitude to `objective' knowledge was evident. Peter stressed the value 
of not-knowing and the way our theories are tools rather than certainties. Martin 
described the follies of dogma and wanted to hold perspectives together and avoid 
over-privileging any one. Maria preferred to limit herself to experiential knowledge. 
Mike valued avoiding premature conclusions. 
There was evidence of tensions for informants between an individual focus and a 
more social, relational and integrative view. Agency (with its implicit sense of 
autonomy) was valued by some informants as a capacity to be fostered. Conversely 
integration was also a prized capacity. Paul talked of the need for "social interest", 
Peter of the need for his patient to let others in and to integrate the unwanted and 
unvalued parts of ourselves, Mary of the need to face reality and the personal and 
social consequences of not doing that. The whole context of NHS psychotherapy was 
relational. It operates in a context (the NHS) to which patients had an association and 
attachment and took place within a relationship with a therapist who was a participant. 
At the same time the patient was an individual. 
Tensions existed very visibly within the world of psychodynamic psychotherapy with 
informants seeing themselves as in a counter position to an aspect of accepted 
practice. Paul was clearly wary of longer-term therapies and offered a significantly 
different model. Jo talked of "hypocrisy" and "crap" associated for her with some 
aspects of practice, in particular any attempt to be an opaque or unresponsive 
therapist. Martin felt the need to push forward a biological perspective which might 
otherwise be neglected. Mike talked of the true spirit of psychotherapy with its 
implication of other types of practice. Mary took a more confrontative style and talked 
of the South Trent's culture being more open than many London trainings. 
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2.4.5 Therapists. were involved in a process of `dialectical tacking' between 
employing the psychodynamic model in a way that was 'soft-edged' and 
in a way that 
was 'hard-edged'. 
In the interviews I observed the therapists to be managing this tension between 
employing the model in a pragmatic and adaptable way and staying firmly within the 
perceived orthodoxy of the model. 
In 1910 Freud (SE, Vol: X1) wrote a paper in which he attacked what he referred to. as 
"wild analysis" in which psychoanalytic understanding and technique were misapplied 
by practitioners. In his subsequent paper `On beginning the treatment' Freud 
(SE, Vol: X1I: 134) noted that the therapy setting was stressful in its relative 
deprivation and commented: 
I know that many analysts do it differently, but I do not know if it is the 
passion for doing it differently, or an advantage they have discovered in it, 
that has a larger share in this deviation. 
In that quote Freud captured the dilemma for the therapist as to whether an innovation 
in practice might constitute a clinically useful development. Dialectical tacking would 
represent a `testing out' of this, at least in the mind of the therapist. Without such 
tacking the strengths and weaknesses of the model are not explored. 
Fairbairn (1958: 6) described the risks of idealising a form of practice and suggested: 
A complete stultification of the therapeutic aim is involved in any demand 
whether explicit or implicit, that the patient must conform to the nature of 
the therapeutic method rather than the method must conform to the 
requirements of the patient. 
Steiner (1996: 1082) commented on the limits of theory, how " theory always lags 
behind practice and leaves us perpetually dissatisfied and frustrated with its 
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inadequacies. " He reported how he found theory to be "not much use to us when we 
are actually in a session trying to understand what is going on ". Overall he felt "such 
disappointment with theory is a healthy state of affairs and leaves us aware that a good 
theory is a fine servant but a poor master". 
Bollas (in Molino, 1997: 7) feared the effect of an undue reliance on previous practice 
and argued for re-invention as a necessity: 
Each psychoanalyst must, no matter whether he or she does it consciously, 
reinvent psychoanalysis for themselves. It is those analysts who show the 
re-invention that sustain a level of creativity that is essential to the 
development of thinking. 
In the interviews the therapists described their attachment to the practice of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy as involving a combination of personal and 
professional experiences and as firmly integrated within them. There were several 
references to developmental changes in the nature of their attachment to the model. 
Amanda felt that she needed more time as a therapist before she would be able better 
to evaluate the model: 
I think I am at a stage in my development as a therapist that is still fairly 
new in that I think I am quite enamoured with the psychodynamic model 
and I need a bit more experience post-qualification in order to take a more 
objective view of it. 
Other therapists expressed a sense of their development mainly in the form of a 
greater sense of freedom within practice, freedom from a pressure to `know' and 
freedom from a pressure to do it a certain way (though this latter pressure continued to 
be felt to some degree as I will come on to). Jo talked of a sense of finding an analytic 
freedom and becoming herself as a therapist. Mary described how she used to worry 
more about doing it the correct way but had now learnt there was not always a correct 
way and that "it is OK not to know". 
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Paul voiced the need for a soft-edged approach and warned against the danger of an 
idealisation of the model: 
there is quite clearly a spectrum from hard analytic to soft analytic and I 
would be at the softer end of that spectrum........ some people idealise the 
model, thinking that practising within it is a good in itself. There are other 
people who are much more opportunistic..... some people think that there is 
a right way to practice therapy and, with that patient, if you don't practice 
that way then that's wrong whereas I think that's a funny way of putting it. 
I can see a question which would be `is there a right or better way to help 
patients with particular kinds of problems'? That is a research question 
and you could tease that out. You might come up with the answer that this 
way is the best way but you might actually find that a lot of it is, not 
exactly mumbo jumbo, but.... isn't that crucial to the success of the 
project. 
Several therapists pointed to a pressure, experienced as punitive, to be harder-edged, 
to conform to what they conceived as the model, to do it 'by the book'. Jo felt this and 
it troubled her, not enough to feel "a square peg in a round hole", but her practice had 
left her wondering at times "if I'm still [behaving as] a psychotherapist. ". She talked 
of "hypocrisy", "dishonesty" and "crap" that can be part of accepted practice. Maria 
felt the model "can become quite punitive if we let it" such that she might practice in 
a way that left her feeling "God that was not very dynamic ...... you know we end up 
punishing ourselves thinking "Oh God am I doing psychotherapy here ?" Martin 
described his belief that particular understandings always get pushed to the point 
where they fail, where in a sense they become too hard-edged. 
Jo and Mary alluded to the danger of being "wishy-washy" within the model as a 
counter to the danger of being too hard-edged. Jo described herself as "eclectic within 
the model" and Maria preferred not to think in terms of models but to allow herself to 
see what emerged. 
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Mary saw a balance to be struck between open and closed systems of understanding 
both of which have dangers and she related this to the culture of South Trent 
Psychotherapy Departments: 
I'd hate to think I was narrow-minded and was not open to all sorts of 
ideas. I try not to restrict myself to one view because I think that's 
dangerous..... So I think there is an open-mindedness [in her Psychotherapy 
Department] which I suppose..... is something that I think is positive about 
South Trent in contrast to quite a lot of the London trainings. But on the 
other hand I think the danger of that is that sometimes I think that it can 
get too woolly ..... I suppose it's something about boundaries and whilst I 
think it is important to be open to ideas there is something about having 
something that defines what you are doing and I think you can be too 
open to other ideas so that you are not clear what you are and what you do 
think. I sometimes feel that's a danger here. I think a worse danger is 
people being very closed ......... that is one of the features of South Trent 
that there is a pretty open tolerance of difference. 
I have found it difficult to locate therapists in a simple way within this tension. 
Perhaps Paul might be said to characterise the pragmatic spirit and Mike the more 
classical spirit of psychotherapy. But Mike's attempts to stay open to the patient did 
not lend itself to the description of being called hard-edged. Amanda's preferred self 
is not hard-edged but more egalitarian and soft-edged. Maria described being very 
practice-led rather than theory-led but I felt might be clearer about the model's frame 
than her words suggested. Though a therapist might describe their theoretical stance in 
harder-edged terms, their practice may not simply follow. This applies equally in 
reverse. I saw evidence of this in the interviews. 
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2.5 The clinical reasoning of the therapist constituted a `hazardous journey'. 
The metaphor of a `hazardous journey' summed up well for me my sense of the 
process described by the therapists in the interviews. Stake (1994: 24 1) had referred to 
the "hazardous passage" that research faced in its progression from writer to reader. 
From this grew my finding that the clinical reasoning of these therapists was 
experienced (in my terms) as being a hazardous journey because of the combination of 
the findings I have already described. These findings can be subsumed under three 
main concepts which collectively suggested this metaphor. 
'Situated 'Knowledge 
I observed the therapists that I interviewed were working with the complexity of 
employing 'situated knowledge' (Haraway, 1988) within which 'fact' and `value' 
had been intertwined and which offered "truth without certainty" (Christopher, 1996) 
and for which a simple correspondence between theory and `reality' could not be 
claimed. Such knowledge involved an amalgam of theory, experience and values, held 
and developed within a personal and professional context and within a particular 
culture. 
Intersubjectivity 
I observed the therapists engaging with the complexity of therapy as an intersubjective 
encounter. Their clinical reasoning took place within the context of an engaged 
relationship. In particular the therapist's personality was identified as the main 
therapist tool and it provided both a resource and a limit. The quality of relationship 
was seen as crucial (though not sufficient in itself). 
Dialectical Tacking 
I observed in the interviews the therapists reasoning clinically in a way that involved a 
process of dialectical tacking principally between their professional knowledge base, 
their experience with the patient and their personal beliefs and experiences. 
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Overall I found that informants were describing a sense that they were working at the 
hazardous and stressful edge of an integrated sense of their identity, their personality, 
their capacity to relate to the patient, and their understanding. Painful enactment's 
were described that took place on this `edge', on the lived border between people. The 
therapists described the demanding task of facing limits and `tolerating the 
intolerable'. These included the limits of what life might have offered to someone and 
the limits to change, the limits of what the therapist (and/or the approach) could offer 
and the limits to ongoing understanding. 
McLeod's (2001: 10) description of the hazards involved in qualitative research fitted 
well I would argue with the experience of therapy described by the therapists in the 
interviews: 
Qualitative enquiry [and psychotherapy] generates uncertainty, ambiguity 
and a sense of the unknowability of things, a loss of boundary between 
self and other. These are experiences that cannot easily be contained 
within a set of standardised research procedures, or, to put it another way, 
should not be so contained. It is willingness to enter fully into the process 
of the enquiry, a willingness to draw upon (or risk) one's integrity as a 
person, that gives the best qualitative research it's `edge'. 
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Discussion 
In the previous section I set out my findings from the interviews in two stages, my 
initial findings and then my core findings. In this chapter I discuss these findings and 
their implications. I am arguing that while they are specific to the eight therapists I 
interviewed, they can usefully be explored for their implications for the practice of 
NHS psychotherapists more generally. 
This research was motivated in part by my experience of a lack of an adequate 
conceptualisation of the process I have termed `clinical reasoning'. I found that 
professional knowledge is usefully understood as only one part of the process of 
clinical reasoning and needs to be set alongside the therapist's personal beliefs and 
experience and their experience with the patient. There are a number of areas I have 
identified for discussion and for consideration of their implications which I have now 
outlined. 
Know thy narratives. 
There is an implication for practice in my finding that therapists organise and employ 
their clinical reasoning implicitly in the form of narratives. I argue that therapeutic 
practice would benefit from the therapist being more explicitly aware of the library of 
stories that inform their clinical reasoning. 
Within our postmodern culture therapists encounter a plurality of competing visions 
of what it means to be a person. Object Relations Theory itself represents a 
community of theories that have common themes but much diversity and this was in 
evidence in the interviews. Therapists have to choose from within this plurality of 
competing visions. The choice is made as much unconsciously as consciously between 
a plurality of competing visions/narratives about what it means to live the `good life' 
psychologically, about how psychological problems arise, and about how they are best 
treated. 
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In the interviews the therapists spoke to their choices with regard to two particular 
patients but in a way that suggested to me that it was quite reasonable to assume they 
were articulating from among their core narratives. They described how their choices 
had emerged from within the matrix of personal experience, professional training, the 
professional culture that had fostered them and from within the socially available 
discourses and practices of our culture. Their narratives represent a synthesis of what 
is and has been culturally, professionally and personally available and their synthesis 
was like a personal signature on their practice. 
Therapist stories are inevitably conveyed on some level to patients (McLeod, 1997) but 
if they are left at the implicit level they are not open to examination. Phillips (1995: 2) 
put this in an interesting form : 
To walk into a psychoanalyst's consulting room, like being born into a 
family, is to walk into a very elaborate family of stories about who one is 
supposed to be. But if analysts can help the patients discern the family 
stories they have inherited, who can help the patients, and the analysts, 
with the analyst's stories? 
Within a culture of competing stories the therapist is in a position of having to defend 
their choices. Phillips (1999: 35) commented: 
Since any person's life can be seen from many perspectives, and since the 
life story can be told in many ways, one must choose one's narrative 
approach and be prepared to defend it. 
The implication for practice is that therapists would usefully become more aware of 
their preferred stories (and their rationale for them) with which they inform their 
clinical reasoning and that they tell to their patients directly or indirectly. This 
involves a process of making the implicit more explicit. It can also be thought of as 
`excavating a tacit dimension' (Mattingly and Fleming, 1994). When such therapist 
stories are better known to the therapist, explicitly rather than implicitly, their effect 
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on the therapy can more easily be reflected on. Such a requirement would meet 
Haraway's demand (1988) for an "embodied objectivity". One of the outcomes of this 
research has been an exploration and opening up for examination of the narratives of 
eight NHS therapists as a contribution to this task of making therapist narratives more 
explicit. 
Reflexivity requires a frame. 
My findings indicate how reflexivity is the key therapist skill. Narratives are 
employed in therapy by both patient and therapist and this may be done in a reflexive 
way or a thoughtless and defended way. However reflexivity has to start from 
`somewhere'. A framework within which to be reflexive is required. I have found that 
the concept of the therapist tacking principally between professional knowledge, their 
experience of the patient, and their personal experience and beliefs has provided one 
such framework. Therapeutic practice would be helped, I argue, by there being a 
developing understanding of such frameworks within which therapists reason 
clinically. 
The subjectivity of the therapist. 
The personal therapy undertaken as part of a therapist's training is intended to make a 
contribution to the therapist's self-reflexive ability through helping them to become 
better acquainted with their own subjectivity, their situated story, their values and 
morals, their relational patterns and their expectations of others. This is designed as 
one contribution to safeguarding the patient from the unthoughtful imposition of the 
therapist's internal world upon the patient. Supervision offers to the therapist another 
opportunity for reflection on their participation in the therapy. Personal therapy and 
on-going supervision also make their contribution to making more tolerable for the 
therapist what is intolerable within the intersubjective encounter and enactments of a 
therapy. 
However, personal therapy or supervision do not offer a `neutral' vantage point from 
which to view `reality'. Rather I argue again that choices are made and the therapist, 
along with their personal therapists and their supervisors, employ "embodied 
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objectivity" (Haraway, 1988). I question the extent to which the subjectivity of the 
therapist has been, and to some degree, can be taken on board within a therapy. 
Benjamin's critique (1995) that therapists collapse subjects into objects was to some 
extent borne out in the interviews with regard to the subjectivity of the therapists 
themselves. The subjectivity of the therapist was notable paradoxically for both its 
presence and absence. The tone of the therapist's account conveyed a sense of their 
perceived objectivity. 
I am not making here a broad criticism of therapists as if they are adopting positions 
that are unhealthily `defended' (Holloway, 2000) though inevitably defences are in. 
operation. What I am reflecting on here might relate to O'Hear's (1991) quote of 
Newatt that "knowledge is a ship on which we are afloat and which we can therefore 
only change plank by plank". This could be paraphrased as `a therapist's clinical 
reasoning is a ship on which they are afloat in the therapy and which, therefore, they 
can only change plank by plank. ' The therapists generally started, I suggest, with a 
presumption of the objectivity of their perspective in relation to the patient and 
changes were managed as much as possible. Perhaps this is an inevitable process and 
an expression of what is meant by "embodied objectivity" (Haraway, 1988). 
Reflexivity has to start from `somewhere'. The implication for practice is that 
therapists could usefully be more aware of the subjective element of the `somewhere' 
from which they start and which shapes for them their encounter with the patient. 
Such awareness would allow for a clearer tracking of the intersubjectivity of the 
encounter. 
Secure and exploratory 
The concept of clinical reasoning implies a necessary skill in the therapist for it to be a 
creative process. An implication of my findings is that such creativity requires a 
capacity to be attached securely to a model and able to explore beyond it. 
Holmes (1993,2001) writing from within the perspective of attachment theory 
described a dialectic between security and exploration, intimacy and autonomy, 
closeness and separation, attachment and loss, and attunement and challenge. Bowlby 
(1988) described how a secure base for an infant allows for exploration beyond that 
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base. A lack of capacity or opportunity to attach may result in clinging behaviour or 
avoidant behaviour. 
I argue that these dialectics can be applied to the practice of therapists in terms of their 
attachment to the model and the narratives that inform their clinical reasoning and 
practice. In these terms, then, a secure attachment to a conceptual approach would 
allow a therapist to feel rooted and grounded in that approach and therefore secure 
enough to be able to explore beyond it. An enmeshed attachment pattern would see a 
therapist too insecure and needing to cling to their conceptual approach such that they 
would be unable to gain any critical distance in their practice or make any 
innovations. An avoidant attachment pattern would see a therapist unhealthily distant 
from a commitment to an approach. 
The therapist, according to this view, will be able to reason clinically in more 
adventurous ways when, paradoxically, they feel more secure in their conceptual 
approach. Roth and Fonagy (1996) similarly suggested that outcomes of therapy are 
best if the therapist is firmly rooted in their model and also flexible to particular 
patients needs. 
Phillips (1995) described Freud's two projects as: 
° an enlightenment project that involved the pursuit of objective knowledge which 
would constitute norms (such as of mental health) against which a person could be 
measured. 
°a postmodern project that questions norms, acknowledges perspectives and the 
situatedness of all knowledge and asks what we use our knowing to do. 
A combination of the perspectives of Holmes and Phillips leads, I argue, to a way of 
conceptualising the `modern' and `postmodern' therapist. The `modem' therapist 
leans towards an attachment to their model of practice that has a secure sense of its 
firm objectivity, a sense that it is 'normative'. The `postmodern' therapist questions 
norms and objectivity and leans away from the 'normative' and towards varied 
practices, specific to the situation, practices that go beyond, if necessary, the accepted 
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model. These two therapists, the modern and the postmodem, are `straw' 
figures in 
that the therapists I interviewed and whom I meet in my NHS practice do not sit neatly 
in such camps. However these two therapist figures illustrate the tension for therapists 
to hold and the dialectical tacking that is required of them. 
An implication of what I am arguing is that therapist training and continued 
professional development needs to provide for a therapist a secure base within a 
model and its theory. However, it further needs to question how this base is used and 
with what consequences. Phillips (1997) applied this to therapist training: 
A psychoanalytic training should not only teach people theory, it should 
be showing people what they might be using theory to do, and noting the 
ways in which people are inclined to use theories" (p142) There is a sense 
in which we are producing pictures and metaphors and analogies of what 
we think of as internal space. All these pictures have consequences 
attached to them (p146). 
A lack of difference 
Within the psychodynamic model the therapists described their own versions in terms 
of preferred narratives and in this regard they displayed considerable variation. 
However, overall, I was left with a question about the lack of differences between the 
therapists. There was a strong apparent consensus about a `normative' psychodynamic 
psychotherapist in the interviews. I was left wondering what had happened to their 
wider ambivalence to the model and to other identities within themselves that might 
compete with their `psychodynamic identity'. I found evidence of substantial 
difference only in Paul's account. 
In my experience of NHS psychotherapy within the South Trent Region there has been 
an emphasis on the importance of keeping together a critical mass of psychotherapists, 
as it were, else it may become impossible to avoid being pulled out of shape. It is 
perhaps this sense of a necessary shape (or purity of model) that I was detecting in a 
relative absence of difference. It is as if the principle hazard is that of `shapelessness', 
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of loss of coherence and frame to practice, of practice disintegrating into something 
chaotic and unmanageable in the face of patient distress and projection. 
NHS Psychotherapy in the South Trent region is conceivably at a stage of 
consolidation and maintenance, which McLeod (1998: 298) referred to as the 
`professional service stage'. At such a stage the initial innovative creation of a service 
has taken place and there is more an emphasis on `holding it together'. Perhaps this 
leads to some suppression or restraining within the therapist of alternative identities 
and ways of working. Peter pointed to this when he talked of theory as holding him 
while he explores and lives with the unknown in the therapy. This suggests to me that 
the model is needed as a container whose firmness makes possible the exploring and 
`tolerating of the intolerable' that takes place in therapies. It contains the therapist 
personally and professionally while in a potentially very difficult intersubjective 
encounter. The model provides the conformity while the invention is to some extent in 
the practice within the model. 
Unarticulated reinventions 
In my mind I have combined what I have seen as the implicit nature of therapist 
narratives and my hypothesis about a relative silence about wider differences in the 
therapists. I suggest that differences are being underplayed and re-inventions in the 
form of fresh syntheses are being insufficiently owned and articulated and would 
helpfully be made more explicit. Several therapists referred to the pressure to `do it 
right' rather than own their approach. 
Within each therapist that I interviewed some degree of reinvention of psychotherapy 
had taken place involving a synthesis of their personal life experience and 
professional trainings within the context of a professional setting and culture. This 
synthesis I found could be expressed in a division of the informants accounts into their 
narratives about living the good life psychologically (their psychodynamic narrative), 
about the origins of psychological problems (their developmental narrative), about 
how to proceed in therapy (their treatment narrative). 
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Bollas (in Molino, 1997) argued that reinvention was essential to the 
future of 
psychotherapy. Therapists, he argued, need 
to be creators of theory and practice and 
not just passive absorbers of it and they needed to avoid being crushed 
by their own 
institutions: 
Each psychoanalyst must, no matter whether he or she does it consciously, 
reinvent psychoanalysis for themselves. It is those analysts who show the 
re-invention that sustain a level of creativity that is essential to the 
development of thinking" (p7). Psychoanalysis must survive "the 
psychoanalytic movement". If it survives psychoanalysts and their schools, 
then it will grow and develop. But this remains to be seen (p50). 
Generalising from these interviews I would argue that psychodynamic 
psychotherapists have more differences and variety in their practice than they choose 
to acknowledge. I would suggest that the problem may not be a lack of reinvention in 
the practice of therapists but a danger that actual reinventions are not being seen and 
shared. The implication of this is that therapists need to find ways of having more 
open dialogue between themselves about their differences in practice. 
Critical realism and social constructionism 
I found that the therapists' accounts located them as practising within the individualist 
ethos of our culture. However I felt there was an ambiguous and ambivalent 
relationship between therapy and this dominant individualist ideology of our time. 
The therapists perhaps shared and rejected the culture's aspiration that we be 
`autonomous, bounded and masterful individuals'. There was a clear limit to the ways 
in which the therapists thought in terms of the social construction of identity (beyond 
the family). Conversely, there were references in the interviews to psychotherapy as a 
counter-culture to the paradoxical neglect of the individual. So a further implication of 
my findings for practice is that social constructivist ideas about the formation of a 
sense of identity could usefully be integrated more into practice. 
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I did not ask the therapists during the interviews whether they would describe 
themselves as `critical realists' (O'Hear, 1991). However their accounts implied that 
they took such a view, as I do myself, that there is a real world even if we can not 
know it with certainty. However, in a spirit of postmodern reflexivity it is important, I 
argue, to ask what the therapist might use their `critical realism' to do for them. 
Critical realism can then be thought of as a valid ontology and also as a containing 
belief. This, I argue, relates again to Newatt's notion of knowledge as a ship on which 
we are afloat. A critical realist perspective allows a therapist to start from an 
assumption of the validity of their perspective which I have argued above is both a 
necessary and inevitable starting point. 
One of the dangers of a critical realist `perspective' is that the social construction of 
knowledge might be underplayed by therapists through not exploring beyond the 
model. While the interviews gave evidence of therapists working within postmodern 
epistemologies of practice, they were much lighter on the social construction of 
reality. This was in evidence in the way that the therapist narratives leaned towards 
the clinically individualist and tended to focus on the `self as if it were a spatial 
entity. 
Rustin (1991) argued for a realist position regarding the `deep structures of mind' 
postulated by psychodynamic psychotherapy. Fonagy and Target (2003) argued that 
Freud's concept of non-conscious mental functioning represented his core theory and 
had commanded significant support (along with its relevance to psychological 
problems and the value of becoming more aware of what is not conscious). However, 
they criticised Freud for being too specific about the contents of the non-conscious 
conflict, theory which they suggested was at a different level, based on clinical 
observations. Psychodynamic theory is then open to endless revisions and updating of 
this content in the form of multiple theories, all of which are based chiefly on what 
they called "enumerative inductionism" which they saw as the main therapist 
epistemology. 
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Perhaps therapists can be critical realist when it comes to these deep structures but 
explore more the socially constructed dimension of non-conscious conflict, examples 
of which I gave in the chapter on the use and misuse of professional knowledge. The 
question of how therapy orientated around social constructivism might differ from a 
psychodynamic therapy needs to be the subject of another piece of research. My 
interest is more in the useful clinical integration into the practice of psychodynamic 
psychotherapy of ideas about the social construction of identity. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have argued for the importance of therapists knowing their narratives 
in a more explicit way and their rationale for them, and for the further development of 
frameworks for reflexivity. I have argued that the subjectivity of the therapist could 
usefully be taken more account of in practice and for the importance of their being 
securely within while exploring beyond their model of practice. I have questioned 
whether `reinventions' go unnoticed to an unhelpful degree and whether ideas which 
draw on the social construction of identity could find more of a place within the 
clinical reasoning of therapists. 
In the final chapter I have drawn together the threads of the thesis and the implications 
for practice. I have considered too the limitations of my research. 
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Conclusions 
I can now look back on a journey that has taken me from a foreshadowed problem to 
an expounded argument in this thesis. I set out to explore the question `what is 
professional knowledge in therapeutic practice? ' I had not found an adequate way of 
conceptualising the thinking that the therapist undertakes when with a patient. I was 
unclear about the implications for therapists of the felt absence of a comfortably 
simple correspondence between their theory and `reality' and of the gap between 
theory and actual practice. I felt it was an area under-represented in the literature and 
containing many hazards for therapists in their practice. This enquiry expanded in 
directions that have been very enriching to pursue. 
The central finding of this thesis is that, rather than relying on professional knowledge 
conceived as conventional psychodynamic theory, the therapists engaged in a largely 
intuitive process I have termed `clinical reasoning' which was practice-based, 
reflection-in-action that involved tacking principally between their professional 
knowledge base, their experience with the patient and their personal beliefs and 
experience. Such a process, I argue, constitutes a `hazardous journey' in a postmodern 
climate in which the value of a psychodynamic perspective cannot be taken for 
granted. 
I found that an understanding of the hazards for these therapists in their clinical 
reasoning could be organised around three themes : 
° therapists employed `situated knowledge' to inform their clinical reasoning, held in 
the form of narratives. Such knowledge could be thought of as if it were a map that 
offered `truth without certainty' and needing to be read through the eyes of a 
`critical realist'. 
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0 therapy was an intersubjective journey that involved both parties, therapist and 
patient, in an intimate and uncertain exposure of their personalities. Maps only 
helped to a degree as they had also to be re-created as the encounter progressed. It 
was very easy to become lost on this intersubjective journey. 
° therapist accounts highlighted hazards which had to be negotiated in practice and a 
course divined by what I have referred to as a process of `dialectical tacking'. 
The therapists I interviewed described their practice in ways that made clear to me that 
they employed postmodern epistemologies of practice which involved them in a 
tacking between the normative and the particular. An interweaving of Hamlyn's 
(1970) four criteria epistemological criteria underpinned their practice. `Pragmatic 
rationality' (Bernstein, 1983) appeared to have replaced a `simple' correspondence 
with `reality'. A `correspondence with experience' was particularly valued. 
Implications 
In the previous chapter I described a number of implications of my findings for 
practice. The first of these highlighted the value of therapists being more aware of 
their own library of stories that shape their practice. This would promote a greater 
capacity for reflexivity by clarifying the `somewhere' in which the therapist's 
reflexivity is 'situated'. 
The second implication was that the training and continuous professional 
development of the therapist needed to provide both a secure base for practice and 
question and problematise that base. This would promote a healthily secure and 
critical attachment to the professional base. 
The third implication for practice focused on the need to create space within the 
community of therapists for therapists to own their differences, their particular 
syntheses and reinventions within practice so that it becomes possible to learn from 
them. This would prevent potentially valuable changes being `lost'. 
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The fourth implication for practice was that within the training and continuous 
professional development of therapists time needed to be set aside to explore whether 
and how social constructivist views of identity could be integrated into practice. 
The overarching implication central to this thesis is that there is a need to promote an 
understanding of the ways in which therapists think when with a patient, the 
frameworks within which their reflexivity operates. My findings have offered one 
such framework. The idea of tacking I believe involves a helpful movement away 
from the notion of pre-existing, text book theory applied in the therapy room in the 
manner of flat-packed furniture that is unpacked, assembled and employed (in 
accordance with the written instructions) by the therapist in the therapy. 
Limitations 
There are areas that I had initially hoped to explore more of in this study but which I 
found to be beyond its scope. 
I had hoped I would be able to generate in the interviews more specific examples of 
the process of a negotiation of understanding between the therapists and their patients 
so as to explore the process of how therapist narratives evolve and come to be shared 
and/or co-constructed. However I found I had not tackled this directly enough in the 
interviews perhaps in recognition that it would have overloaded an already crowded 
interview agenda. 
I set out with a view that I might have explicit things to say about the culture of South 
Trent Psychotherapy in the light of the interviews. Again this proved a step too far for 
this particular research though I did ask quite specific questions within the interviews. 
I have found it did not remain a central focus. However, given the argument that the 
individual therapist's clinical reasoning is fostered and nurtured within a community 
of therapists a further study would be particularly interesting, one that explored the 
distinctive culture of NHS psychotherapy in the South Trent Region, its particular 
communal narratives as well as its points of difference. 
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A line of enquiry that I did not attempt because it was clearly a project 
in itself 
concerned whether and in what ways the gender of the therapist shapes and 
influences 
their clinical reasoning. 
Strengths and limits tend to be two sides of the same coin. A strength of this research 
is that it has generated understandings within a context, situated understandings in 
other words, based on the accounts given by eight practising NHS Psychotherapists. 
Conversely I can not offer findings that are `typical' or `normative' though I have 
argued that they offer significant pointers to what is more general and normative. As 
such the findings need to stand or fall by whether they are experienced as both 
clinically significant and plausible, and also theoretically cogent. 
Finally.... 
A combination of metaphors that I have particularly valued is that the clinical 
reasoning of the therapist constitutes a `hazardous journey' that is undertaken along 
`lived borders' (Saukko, 2000). The tacking that the therapist undertakes in their 
clinical reasoning involves a journey along a number of lived borders. I have already 
described the border between professional knowledge, the experience of the patient 
and the therapist's own beliefs and experiences. 
Additionally and as part of those there are borders between the `self and the `other', 
the known and the unknown, the found and the constructed, the secure and the 
exploratory. This I believe is where both the stress and the creativity lies and it is why 
clinical reasoning constitutes such a necessarily hazardous journey. I argue that these 
hazards are intrinsic to the creativity of the process of clinical reasoning rather than 
being avoidable. The saying applies equally to clinical reasoning as it does to ships: 
"Ships in a harbour are safe. But that is not what ships are built for" 
(Shelton, 1989). 
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APPENDICES 

APPENDIX A 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Introductory question concerning the length of time the therapist has worked as an 
NHS Psychotherapist and an estimate of the number of patients seen for therapy in 
that time. 
A request to choose two patients who the therapist has seen for therapy (or perhaps for 
assessment) : 
°a patient regarded by the therapist as at the mentally healthier end of the spectrum. 
°a patient regarded by the therapist as at the mentally more disturbed end of the 
spectrum. 
A selection of questions to open out the therapist's understanding of the two patients 
in succession, their interventions and the outcome of the therapy : 
° what was it about the patient that seemed so healthy / disturbed ? 
° around what ideas and metaphors did you organise your thinking about them ? 
° what did the patient need help with in therapy ? 
° how did you negotiate your understanding with the patient ? 
° what was the nature of the relationship between you ? 
° did you feel you helped this patient and if so how ? 
° what theory was most helpful in thinking about them ? 
3 
Broadening out from these specific patient examples to wider questions about their 
practice : 
° what understanding about what it means to `live the good life' do you bring to your 
therapies ? 
° what do you think you teach your patients ? 
° what status do you give to your understanding of the patient ? 
° what do you feel you know as a therapist ? 
° how do you decide what your patient needs ? 
° what do you regard as the limits of the psychodynamic approach ? 
° how has your practice changed over time ? 
° what was the contribution of your training to your current practice ? 
4 
APPENDIX B 
CONSENT FORM 
I consent to being interviewed by Nigel Runcorn for the purposes explained to me. I 
understand the interview will be taped and transcribed, that all material will be treated 
in a confidential manner and its future use will be discussed with me along with the 
understanding gained from it. I understand I can withdraw myself and this material 
from this process at any time. 
Signed: 
Date: 

APPENDIX C 
LETTER TO POTENTIAL INFORMANT 
Dear 
Following our conversation I am writing to ask if I could interview you as part of 
my PhD research which I am engaged in through Derby University. I am looking at 
the issue of how psychotherapists use their professional knowledge in practice. I am 
interested in how therapists structure their understanding, what status they give it and 
in particular how understanding is negotiated with a patient. I am very aware of these 
in my practice to the extent that I would like to explore how others handle them. 
I would like to ground these questions in specific examples so I would be asking you 
to explore this area by talking about two of your patients, one who you regard as more 
healthy /less disturbed and one who you regard as less healthy / more disturbed. The 
confidentiality of all the material will be carefully preserved by me. However, I need, 
at times, to share parts of interviews with my supervisor(s) from the university . The 
focus of the research is on therapists and the way therapists use their professional 
knowledge. Nothing would be used in attributable form at any point and I envisage 
patient material as such appearing in a very limited way and well anonymised. 
If you were to participate I would be happy to consult with you about the way material 
could be used in the final paper and accept your wishes. You would be able to 
withdraw yourself and therefore your patient material at any point in the process. 
The interview would last up to an hour and a half and requires no preparation as such. 
7 
I am happy to offer more information if it would help your decision whether to 
participate. At the start of the interview I would ask you to sign a form indicating your 
consent to the interview and its uses as described to you. 
Thanks for your time in considering this. 
Yours Sincerely 
Nigel Runcorn 
Social Work Specialist in Psychotherapy. 
